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David Herbert and Marie Gillespie
Introduction:
Social Media and Religious Change
Media professionals have been stripped of their exclusive narrative power, as a multiplicity
of individual fans have emerged, wielding the unprecedented ability to publish their own
understandings of celebrities online through a wide variety of public venues (Bennett
and Campbell: #).
[R]eflexivity and plurality make it difficult for any public performance of the sacred not to
evoke scepticism from sections of its public who regard it as inauthentic, instrumental or
based on an inadequate form of the sacred (Lynch: #).
How do religious and spiritually oriented groups use social media? What impact
does this use have on their relationship with religious institutions? How are no-
tions of the sacred being redefined with the advent of social media? How are
discourses on religion and the sacred being re-positioned and mobilised in social
media such as blogs, Facebook, Twitter and in virtual worlds? How do mass and
social media interact? To what extent are social media catalysing religious
change? These are the main questions addressed in this book. They were also
the key issues debated at a symposium entitled ‘Social Media and the Sacred’,
organised by the Mediating Religion¹ International Research Network, held on
28–29 June 2010 at The Open University’s London Centre in Camden, on
which this edited volume is based. The network forms an important plank of re-
search at the Centre for Research on Socio-Cultural Change (CRESC).
CRESC’s² ‘mission is to understand how socio-cultural processes relate to
our awareness and experience of technological innovation, economic instability
and social inequality’. The specific aim of the Mediating Religion network is to
further such understanding in the field of religion and media by engaging schol-
ars from a range of disciplines—sociology, anthropology, cultural studies, media
studies, religious studies and management studies are all represented in this vol-
ume. The collection pursues CRESC’s mission in relation to the production of
 www.mediatingreligion.org/ The network has founded by Marie Gillespie and David Herbert
at CRESC’s 2005 annual conference, and we would like to thank CRESC and the ESRC for their
enduring support.
 Details of the UK Economic and Social Research Council’s Centre for Research in Socio-
Cultural Change, co-hosted between the Open University and Manchester University can be
found at: http://www.cresc.ac.uk/about-cresc (accessed 21 Sept 2012).
meanings around religion in relation to the shifting boundaries between the sa-
cred and secular in contemporary mass and social media.
In this context, one key question linking socio-cultural processes with tech-
nological innovation and social inequality is raised by Bennett and Campbell in
the first quotation above: to what extent have social media reduced the ‘narrative
power’ of media professionals, challenging the ‘highly centralised system of
symbolic production’ of the media industries, and hence demythologising
what Nick Couldry has called the ‘myth of the mediated centre’ (2003: 45)? Or,
to approach the issue from a slightly different angle (and again engaging Coul-
dry), if the media are indeed the chief source of our knowledge of the world ‘be-
yond our immediate locality’, then to what extent has the growth of social media
resulted in the redistribution of society’s ‘narrative resources’ in the interests of a
‘wider social justice’ (Couldry 2011: 48–9)? Another key question raised by
Lynch in the second quotation above is, what challenges face any public per-
formance of the sacred in contemporary mass and social media rich societies?
Does pluralism undermine public performances of the sacred? Does reflexivity
produce disenchantment with conventional and institutionalized forms of reli-
gion, or can social media create and sustain shared and plural senses of the sa-
cred beyond conventional religious definitions?
The contributions to this collection address these questions from different
perspectives using various methodologies. There are studies which focus on
mass media representations (Chapters 3–5), while others examine the use of so-
cial media to challenge mass media representations (Chapters 6 and 7). Some an-
alyse the use of social media to challenge the monopoly of religious institutions
in defining the meanings and contours of concepts of the sacred, rituals and rites
of passage (Chapters 8, 9 and 11), while one (Chapter 10) examines attempts by
religious leaders to control uses of the Internet among the Baha’í. Lynch’s con-
tribution (Chapter 2) differs in being a theoretical reflection on how best to con-
ceptualise the sacred in contemporary societies, especially beyond conventional
religious definitions and institutions, and how to locate and research the dynam-
ic relationship between mediated sacred forms and wider socio-cultural process-
es.
In Chapter 2 Lynch develops a critical socio-cultural account of the category
of the sacred through an evaluation of the so-called ‘strong program’ within cul-
tural sociology, which argues the case for a meaning-centred social science
(Alexander and Smith 2001). The idea of the ‘strong program’ has its roots in so-
cial studies of science (Latour and Woolgar 1986) and starts from the premise
that scientific knowledge is always pre-structured by culturally embedded cogni-
tive categories of meanings. Following this lead Alexander and Smith outline a
research programme, the central features of which include: recognition of the
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autonomy of culture as an ontological given, acceptance of the methodological
importance of ‘thick description’ of local cultural dynamics (requiring the heu-
ristic bracketing out of wider, non-symbolic social relations), and acknowledge-
ment of the central goal of producing a highly precise account of the causal im-
pact of culture while ‘anchor[ing] causality in proximate actors and agencies’
(2011: 137). Alexander and Smith draw on various previous alternative accounts
of cultural dynamics (e.g., Geertz, Bourdieu, Foucault, the Birmingham School
of Cultural Studies), but in their view each falls short in nailing down causal
processes that can explain cultural and social change.
One example of work inspired by the ‘strong program’ is Eyerman’s (2008)
The Assassination of Theo van Gogh, discussed by Herbert in Chapter 5, which
displays both the strengths and the weaknesses of the approach. Herbert argues
that Eyerman’s ‘strong program’ approach is insightful if selective, emphasising
as it does some aspects of Dutch cultural history (especially military defeats and
humiliation) while ignoring others that are arguably equally significant (depillar-
isation, rapid secularisation, transformation in gender and sexual relations). The
weakness of the approach, he argues, may well be a consequence of the ‘brack-
eting out of wider, non-symbolic relations’, leading to a lack of triangulation of
evidence. This example also suggests that the bracketing out of ‘wider non-sym-
bolic processes’, if not followed by an ‘unbracketing’ to allow structural process-
es back in, may result in a failure to connect important socio-cultural factors that
can account for change. This in turn produces an unhelpful conceptual isolation
of the category of culture. This tendency, argues Herbert, may well be reinforced
by the polemic of ‘strong program’ against other ‘weaker’ approaches to culture,
judging by Alexander and Smith’s account of the ‘strong program’ (2001).
It is possible, however, to adopt the central tenets of the ‘strong program’
and to avoid such pitfalls. For example, its insistence on cultural autonomy en-
courages resistance to reductionism and technological determinism. Its advocacy
of the use of thick ethnographic-style description promotes a thorough investiga-
tion of local and proximate cultural dynamics. And the quest for rigour in inter-
rogating causal processes allows for complex multi-causal explanatory frame-
works and explanations of the relationship between, for example, social
media and religious change. If cultural dynamics are not reducible to structural
factors but enjoy some autonomy in their own right, then it is still perfectly pos-
sible to factor into one’s analysis a range of non-symbolic influences, interac-
tions and processes. Indeed, to produce the best possible account of complex
causal processes, a cultural sociology that embraces the ‘strong program’ with
a focus on meanings and processes should be triangulated with approaches
that can take into account the impact of social structures, political economy
and power relations.
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Lynch’s account, to his credit, advocates the ‘strong program’ but without
such isolationist tendencies towards cultural analysis. In Chapter 2 he analyses
how the sacred is theorized within the ‘strong program’ and examines how it can
help to illuminate the role of ‘public media’ in relation to sacred forms. Drawing
on the further elaborations of the ‘strong program’ in Alexander’s cultural soci-
ology, Lynch develops an understanding of the ‘immanent sacred’ as ‘operative
forms of meaning and value in increasingly secularised or de-Christianised West-
ern societies’. He provides a searching examination of the meanings of the sa-
cred beyond institutional religion, developing a theoretical framework with
which to map
how the celebration and pollution of sacred forms gets acted out through particular social
narratives and dramas, eliciting powerful emotional and collective responses at specific
moments, and generating complex subjectivities and social interactions (Lynch: #).
Such a framework is helpful in linking several themes raised across the volume.
First, it sheds light on the power of the mass media evoked in Couldry’s ‘myth of
the mediated centre’ and challenged by Bennett and Campbell, for the ‘centre’ to
which the (mass) media connects us is the Durkheimian sacred, representations
of which, as Lynch describes, ‘serve as focal points for the fusion of collective
emotion, identity and moral community through the medium of meaningful
and structured collective practices’ (Lynch: #). Couldry’s purpose in Media Rit-
uals is critical demythologising; he sets out to de-bunk the myth of the centre
by exposing its artifice, its pretensions and the thrall it holds us in. Lynch’s per-
spective enables social criticism; but it also provides a more nuanced perspective
on the role of the mass media through Alexander’s (2006) concept of ‘civil re-
pair’, which posits that mass media, as well as exposing breaches of the sacred,
can also provide the means through which restitution can be made. At the same
time, Lynch underlines the fragility of any such restitution. Restitution is fragile
because ‘civil society … is always grounded in practices of inclusion and exclu-
sion, creating an irresolvable tension between the cultural role of sacred forms
for collective and moral identification and the aspiration for an inclusive, global
civil society’ (Lynch: #).
Second, by examining the relationship between social media on the one
hand and mass media, religious institutions and change on the other, this collec-
tion raises the issue of the shifting meanings of and boundaries between the sa-
cred and secular in contemporary, media-rich societies. One perspective on these
issues is to suggest that mass media are taking over religion’s role in mediating
the sacred, whether or not this is conceptualised as linking us to the imagined
centre of society, as in Couldry’s account. Alternatively, media may be seen as
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performing a range of more diffuse ‘functions’, as for example in Hjarvard’s in-
fluential conceptualisation of the ‘mediatisation’ of religion as a process through
which
the media have taken over many of the cultural and social functions of the institutionalised
religions and provide spiritual guidance, moral orientation, ritual passages and a sense of
community and belonging (2011: 124).
Hjarvard also argues that this process of mediatisation
may both encourage secular practices and beliefs and invite religious imaginations typical-
ly of a more subjectivised nature (ibid.: 119).
In contrast to Hjarvard’s substitution model (i.e., where media substitutes for re-
ligion by doing the work religion used to do), for Lynch the sacred is redistrib-
uted or partially relocated (extended to include certain values or categories of
people or places as sacrosanct) rather than absorbed into the media, and the ten-
sion between sacred and profane is rearticulated rather than attenuated in this
process.
The relationship between religious change and media institutions is more
complex than Hjarvard’s substitution account implies. This is reflected in the
chapters in the volume that are based on empirical studies. For example, Thomas
(Chapter 4) analyses responses among audiences and critics to two BBC televi-
sion ‘reality’ series on contemporary monastic life and its appeals and challeng-
es for ‘lay audiences’. The methodology (content analysis of professional critical
responses and semi-structured interviews with a group attending a monastic re-
treat) brings out the complexity of how audiences negotiate meaning. Rather
than substituting for conventional religion, these series led some members of
the audience to a deeper engagement with one of the religious institutions rep-
resented. And rather than accepting TV representations as authoritative, many of
her interviewees demonstrated a highly critical awareness of the relationship be-
tween genre, modes of realism and producer intentions. Yet critical reflection did
not produce a disenchanted disengagement with religion. Rather, varying de-
grees of narrative immersion and engagement with the monastery were evident.
But this was an atypical audience and set of interviewees—committed enough to
go on a monastic retreat and open to being interviewed about the experience. So
one has to be cautious not to extrapolate too much and to caution that research
results can be just as much a result of the research design as a genuine insight
into how audiences-cum-interviewees respond to particular performances of re-
ligion. Nevertheless, this example suggests that critical appropriation of media
resources can go hand-in-hand with involvement, engagement and pleasure.
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Thomas’ insights into the significance of gender for constructions of spirituality
are particularly valuable. In particular, she argues that the significantly more
critical response among professional and lay audiences to The Convent compared
with The Monastery relates in part to gendered constructions of caring and spi-
ritual work.
The Monastery, which was hailed as a ground-breaking representation of religion, in fact
reinforces existing norms of association of the spiritual with the masculine. … [T]he caring
characteristics which seem extraordinary in the monks become ordinary when associated
with women (Thomas: #).
While several contributions to this collection focus on the opportunities for so-
cial media and new media formats to challenge conventional media and reli-
gious narratives (see Chapters 7, 8 and 9), Thomas’ analysis serves as a reminder
of the power of conventional mass mediated narratives about religion (and the
inequalities embedded in them) to reproduce themselves across new formats
and audience segments.
In Chapter 3 Knott et al. analyse representations of Christianity, secularism
and religious diversity in regional and national British media at two junctures,
1982–3 and 2008–9, looking in greater depth at particular media events, such
as the deportation of Geert Wilders and the visit of Pope Benedict in their ac-
count of the second period. They use a concept called ‘the secular sacred’,
which they define as ‘those beliefs, practices and values that are explicitly
non-religious but are nevertheless held to be non-negotiable and often referred
to as “sacred” by those who hold them, e.g., freedom of speech and human
rights’ (Knott et al.: #). The sacred here, then, refers to values that for some citi-
zens should not be compromised and are in need of protection from being vio-
lated. The study sheds empirical light on arguments about the visibility and pres-
ence of religion as a topic in public discourse (Ward et al. 2008; Beckford 2010),
demonstrating a huge increase in references to some religions. References to
Islam, unsurprisingly, increased almost ten-fold across this period; references
to atheism/secularism increased nine-fold; references to Hinduism increased
seven-fold; references to Sikhism increased five-fold; and those to Judaism
and Christianity increased by a more modest 5– 10 %, although these started
from a higher base. No categories of religion showed a decrease. The study pro-
vides empirical support for the contention that public exposure to reporting and
opinion on religion and secularism/atheism has indeed increased, at least for
British readerships and audiences. How are these topics represented? How are
the debates framed? The story here is not straightforward, as the ambivalence
shown in right-wing press representations illustrates. In their study of the Wil-
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ders case, they show that in the right-wing press tolerance of Islam was repre-
sented as submitting to Muslim demands, while Muslims were constructed
‘mainly as hate preachers’, although there was ‘some acknowledgement of …
more moderate Muslims’. In this context, Britain was constructed as a ‘secular
country’ (challenged by Muslim threats to freedom of speech) and as a ‘Christian
country’ (threatened by a perceived threat of ‘Islamisation’). Yet in coverage of
the papal visit, the accent in these newspapers turned against ‘exclusive secular-
ism and atheism’, which were constructed as enemies of ‘people of faith’. Here,
in contrast with the Wilders case, religious diversity was seen as a positive force
in society, with ‘references to interfaith and its enrichment for the whole society’
(Knott et al.: #). There is a consistent tendency towards a positive framing of
Christianity and a negative framing of ‘extremist Muslims’. Religious diversity
is sometimes framed positively, especially where there is co-operation between
religions, while the discourse on secularism and atheism can flip from positive
to negative depending on context. By providing a nuanced picture of media rep-
resentations, Knott et al. help to shift debate beyond generalised claims about
negative media framing of religion as well as giving empirical substance to
claims about the ‘return of public religion’.
Mass media framing is also central to Herbert’s study (Chapter 5) of contro-
versies around Islam and Muslims in the Netherlands. This chapter focuses on
the turbulent period from 2001–2008, which witnessed several concerted anti-
Islam media campaigns, two political murders of anti-Islam campaigners and
the most extensive reversal of multicultural policies anywhere in Europe to
date. Herbert seeks to relate mass media factors to the broader socio-cultural
and political context in an attempt to explain why Dutch ‘culture wars’ became
so intense and why Dutch multicultural reversals have gone so far. A key finding
is that in contrast with Britain, where Knott et al. found that even the right-wing
press tended to maintain a distinction between Islam and its interpretation by
extremists, in the Netherlands, fed by the successive media campaigns of For-
tuyn, van Gogh, Hirsi Ali and Wilders, Islam is ‘Other’ and identified as essen-
tially in conflict with predominant European norms.
Even though mainstream news media were highly critical of Fortuyn and
Wilders, the framing of Islam as essentially opposed to European values limited
the discursive space available for alternative narratives to emerge about Muslims.
Moderate-extremist dichotomies are of course problematic (Mamdani 2004;
Geaves 2005), but at least they disrupt the logic that connects an essentialist no-
tion of ‘Islam’ with problems of Muslim integration. Again compared with Brit-
ain, two other relevant factors include the high political profile given to interfaith
activities by the British government (Beckford 2010), which may explain the fa-
vourable discourse on interfaith found in the right wing British press, and the
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comparative openness of the Dutch political system to new personality-led polit-
ical movements, whose opportunities are more restricted by the power of politi-
cal elites in Britain’s first-past-the-post Westminster electoral system.
Herbert also examines Muslim resistance to dominant media frames of Islam
and Muslims in the Netherlands, among both Dutch Muslims specifically and
broader-based social media activists. Social media usage is highest amongst
young Moroccan Dutch women, one of the country’s least-represented groups
in mass media terms, and the chapter gives an example of this activism being
used to reach a broader public sphere in protests organised against Geert Wil-
ders’ campaign for a headscarf tax. This evidence suggests that for some minor-
ities at least, social media do help to redistribute the balance of narrative resour-
ces, providing a sense of ‘voice’. However, neither action in minority ‘public
sphericules’ (Gitlin 1998) nor more publicly visible protest necessarily shifts
the balance of narrative resources within mainstream public spheres, and
hence does not (at least as yet) serve to redress injustices in terms of broader
public recognition.
Bennett and Campbell’s account (Chapter 6) of the way fans challenge media
representations of celebrities deploys a case study of a Michael Jackson tribute.
This also reflects on the nature of the relationship between mass media and the
resources (in this case narrative and symbolic) of religious institutions. On the
one hand, the study could be interpreted as fitting Hjarvard’s substitution thesis,
because ‘implicit religious’ activity takes place entirely on a secular social media
site. On the other hand, the fans’ construction of Jackson as martyr, saint and
angel – in stark contrast to predominant media representations – shows a re-in-
terpretation of these conventional religious categories which does not dilute
their transcendent dimension; hence Jackson becomes
Michael the angel, depicted by fans as called by God to join him in the afterlife; Michael the
otherworldly messenger, believed by fans to have been sent to spread love and hope to the
world; and Michael the immortal spirit, depicted by fans as being continually resurrected
by their eternal adoration (Bennett and Cambell: #).
The role of religious institutions in promulgating an authoritative interpretation
of these terms is indeed usurped (substitution of media for religion), and reli-
gious imagination becomes more personalised/subjectivised; but this in no
way implies a secularisation of content or disenchantment.
Chapter 6 also contains discussion of the category of the sacred, this time in
relation to ‘implicit religion’. Lord’s definition of ‘implicit religion’, the authors
argue, shifts attention towards ‘the mode of behaviour exhibited, rather than
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the goal towards which the behaviour is directed’ (2006: 206). It is then claimed
that:
From this perspective, a fresh understanding of religion shatters notions of a ‘sacred versus
secular’ dichotomy, such that implicit religion is not deemed authentic because of a link to
the ‘recognisably holy’, but is noted instead in the ‘observable actions carried out by a per-
son, whether random, habitual, impulsive or rational’ (2006: 206). Therefore, in relation to
this understanding, in order for celebrity worship to be considered implicit religion, fans’
actions in veneration of celebrities must be analysed (Bennett and Campbell: #).
What matters, they argue, in defining behaviour as religious is how the worship-
per treats the object of devotion rather than the properties of that object. But it is
not clear how this ‘shatters notions of a sacred-secular dichotomy’. The rest of
the chapter seems to depend precisely on such a distinction. For example, this
is apparent in the argument that ‘for celebrity worship to be regarded as implicit
religion there must be significant evidence that fans apply their understanding
of celebrities to their understandings of the greater world, and that their actions
in reverence of celebrities create a religious experience’ (Bennett and Campbell:
#).
If the distinction between sacred and secular were shattered, there would
presumably be no alternative understanding to apply to the greater world, and
hence nothing special about the ways in which fans respond to celebrities to cre-
ate a religious experience. Rather, what this use of the concept of ‘implicit reli-
gion’ seems to do is to redirect attention away from the object of veneration to
focus on the devotion of the worshipper. This leads the researcher to observe
worship-like behaviour towards objects not previously regarded as ‘recognisably
holy’, and in so doing extends the boundaries of the holy/sacred – perhaps be-
yond what some might regard as tenable. This interpretation would seem to be
supported by the observation that ‘the described reconstructions of the celebrity
draw heavily from Christian belief ’, extending them beyond common (or at least
orthodox) use to relate to new objects of veneration. This move has the effect of
personalising/subjectivising and contesting the meanings of the sacred without
the disenchantment that earlier theorists predicted would ensue as a result of the
pluralisation of beliefs (Berger 1967).
Subjectivisation without disenchantment is also a feature of Nauta’s exami-
nation (Chapter 7) of the phenomenon of Muslim martyrdom (‘suicide bomber’)
videos. These are circulated via the Internet and present narratives explaining
the actions of their protagonists, which challenge predominant media represen-
tations, both in the West and the Muslim-majority world. These narratives also
challenge those produced by established (Islamic) religious institutions and by-
pass religious authorities by using DIY religious arguments to appeal directly to
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an imagined umma. The sharp re-articulation of the boundaries of the sacred
and the profane, the pure (martyrs) and the polluted (world), is also very marked
here, as it is in Pihlaja’s study (Chapter 9) of the discursive construction of group
identity amongst YouTube-based Evangelists. The media representations ex-
plored in Pihlaja’s chapter present another form of direct appeal to congrega-
tions and adherents which bypass religious authorities. There are articulated
in opposition to an essentialised secular world. The YouTube videos also deploy
DIY theology, but this time to address an imagined Christian mission field.While
the content is very different from that of Nauta’s study, in both cases video clips
are posted on social media to self-publicise a counter-cultural message which
sharply divides the social world into the sacred and the profane, the saved
and the unsaved, true religious adherents and infidels or apostates. In contrast
to the dichotomous and confrontational constructions of sacred and profane in
Nauta or Pihlaja’s studies, both Abrams et al. (Chapter 8) and Greenhill and
Fletcher (Chapter 11) show how conventional practices sanctioned by religious
communities are adapted rather than displaced or transformed in online uses.
Greenhill and Fletcher’s study examines Internet-based memorial sites run by
relatives of those who have suffered violent deaths and demonstrates that social
media can enable a more active and on-going form of communal mourning than
conventional institutions (whether media-based [death notices and obituaries],
secular or religious [memorial services and bereavement support]) can provide.
This may be seen as a case of supplementation rather than contestation of con-
ventional forms; yet there is arguably something implicit in the discourse and
practice constructed on these sites that critiques the adequacy of the narrative
and ritual resources of mainstream religious institutions to address the needs
of the bereaved. Similarly, a parallel process of renegotiation of meaning and
challenge to authority is presented in Abrams et al.’s examination (Chapter 8)
of ‘post-denominational’ Jews’ efforts to generate new meanings, adopt different
roles and create new forms of community (beyond those provided by established
religious institutions) by using social media. Both these chapters and Lynch’s
theory challenge Hjarvard’s argument that media replaces religion; rather, the
process is more complicated, involving adaptations of traditions, challenges to
authority and re-negotiations of meaning.
Campbell and Fulton (Chapter 10) focus on the other side of the dynamic be-
tween religious institutions and their adherents, that is on the attempts of a
‘bounded’ religious community (the Bahá’í) to regulate uses of social media
among its members in order to maintain its boundaries and identity against
what the authors describe as ‘the social affordances of digital technology that
can make it difficult to retain a cohesive identity structure’. To do so they use
the ‘Religious Social Shaping of Technology’ (RSST) approach developed by
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Campbell (2010) in relation to other bounded religious groups, which uses four
levels of analysis:
(1) the history and tradition of the community, (2) its core beliefs and patterns related to
media, (3) the specific negotiation processes it undergoes with a new technology, and …
(4) the communal framing and discourses created by them, which are used to define and
justify the extent of their technology use (Campbell: #).
RSST sees the relationship between new technologies and bounded religious
groups as a dialectical one. Rather than simply rejecting new technologies, reli-
gious groups seek to regulate and shape their members’ engagement with them
and,where they have the resources, influence the development of the technology
itself – as with Haredi Jews’ shaping of ‘kosher’ mobile phone models (Campbell
2010). As a relatively small global religious organization, the Bahá’í’s lack the re-
sources to shape social media, so they must rely on appeals to their members to
follow the rulings of the ‘House of Justice’ and the social practice of ‘shunning’
(excluding, rejecting) ‘covenant-breakers’. Indeed, simply accepting a ‘friend re-
quest’ from someone who has set up an unauthorised Bahá’í website is ‘seen as a
community violation, [as] being in association with a covenant-breaker’ (Camp-
bell and Fulton: #).
The authors conclude that Bahá’í attitudes to the Internet reflect a tension.
Internet technologies resonate in some ways with Bahá’í beliefs – indeed they
can be welcomed in official documents as part of ‘a development eagerly antici-
pated by The Guardian when he foresaw the creation of “a mechanism of world
intercommunication (…) embracing the whole planet”’ (BIA [Bahá’í Internet
Agency] n.d). Yet members are warned that witnessing activity on social media
needs to ‘be carried out in light of Bahá’í principles’ (BIA 2007), requiring indi-
vidual and institutional defensive action where necessary. The larger question of
whether the organisation can continue to successfully reproduce its core teach-
ings in this plural discursive environment cannot be answered by a single case
study; but both this case study and those of Pihlaja and Abrams et al. suggest
that their participation in relatively open forms of social media activity does
not in itself have predictable consequences for sustaining religious identities
and community.
The RSST approach and Lynch’s exposition of the ‘strong program’ are com-
plementary in that both see the relationship between structural factors such as
technologies and culture as a dialectical one in which technologies provide ‘af-
fordances’ for developments rather than dictating the direction of religious
change. Hence outcomes are as much shaped by culture and meaning as techno-
logical infrastructures. Technologies and social structures must be taken serious-
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ly as independent variables capable of shaping the pathways along which tech-
nology is developed.
Has the growth of social media resulted in the redistribution of society’s
‘narrative resources’ in the interests of a ‘wider social justice’ in the sphere of
representations of the sacred and secular? Certainly, several case studies pre-
sented in this volume demonstrate a redistribution of resources from mass to so-
cial media to the extent that individuals and groups are using social media to
generate alternative representations of sacred and secular to those of main-
stream media (Bennett and Campbell; Nauta) and mainstream religious institu-
tions (Abrams et al.; Pihlaja). But whether this wider redistribution of digital re-
sources serves a ‘wider social justice’ is more questionable. First, it depends on
how social justice is conceived (an issue beyond the scope of this volume), but
the self-publicity of suicide bombers shows just how pernicious social media can
be and confirms our main point that the meanings and consequences of social
media do not inhere in the technology but in their uses.
Second, there is little evidence here that these experimental social media
forms have yet had an impact on mainstream religious institutions, or indeed
on mainstream public spheres. Rather, as Herbert’s Dutch case study illustrates,
it would seem that online social activism remains primarily a community re-
source, and the public action which has resulted from it does not (at least yet)
appear to have translated into greater public sympathy or understanding. The
consequences of social media for religious change will remain limited as long
as access and use remain confined to the digitally empowered. The ‘digital di-
vide’ continues to reproduce social inequalities, but generational differences
in access to and use of social media and the demographic change in many
parts of the developing world, especially the youth bulge, mean that the impact
of social media on religious change is likely to gather pace in the future.
Case studies such as Greenhill and Fletcher’s, Bennett and Campbell’s and
Abrams et al.’s demonstrate that social media are enabling the formation of net-
works or ‘communities’ providing the means with which to perform activities
which appear to be valuable to their participants, but wider social impact is
not evident. This, however, may simply be a question of scale (collectively,
more case studies might provide some evidence of broader social impact) or pos-
sibly method; for example, it may be that, as Aupers and Houtman have argued
in the case of New Age spirituality, existing methods have failed to capture the
ways in which movements characterised by a rhetoric of radical autonomy and
lacking official organisational hierarchies may nonetheless reproduce their dis-
course, ethos and practices ‘by means of standardised legitimations’ (2007: 201).
The question remains, however, as to whether religious change and senses
of the sacred evoked by social media in chapters 6, 7, 9 and 11 can ‘scale up’
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from ‘shared’ to ‘public’ levels and hence meet the challenges of pluralism and
reflexivity to the public performance of the sacred as presented by Lynch. This is
where Thomas’ study is particularly valuable, because it shows that in spite of a
range of publicly articulated criticisms, mainstream media representations of the
sacred can still communicate a sense of authentic spiritual or religious experi-
ence to at least some of its audience, including critics. However, as a single
case it remains indicative of a possible trajectory of development rather than evi-
dence of a broader trend. Social media and mainstream media intersect in un-
predictable ways rather than displace one another.
There is certainly enough evidence across the chapters to reject the idea that
mainstream and/or social media are taking over the functions of established re-
ligions; rather, it would seem that religious activity is relocated and rearticulated
rather than displaced through its mediation. But this is not to argue that the in-
fluential substitution version of mediatisation suggested by Hjarvard is wrong
per se. It just does not offer a full account of the complex relations between
media and religious change. To make sense of the case studies present here, a
more dialectical model (such as Lynch’s interpretation of the strong program
in cultural sociology) is needed. Larger scale comparative studies which bring
quantitative and qualitative data into dialogue would also help to establish
how new media developments are shaping processes of religious change.
Social media embody the paradox of empowerment and surveillance. The
advent of freely available software packages for analyzing our social media
traces and trails—social media monitoring, data mining, natural language deci-
phering and sentiment analysis—mean that large-scale religious congregations
using social media can be studied with greater accuracy and precision than
ever before. Religious organisations can now monitor their congregations and
their practices via analyses of ‘big data’ and thus exercise new kinds of powers.
But useful as these software packages are for ‘big data’ analyses of, for example,
digital sacred texts, they cannot analyse the quality of social media conversa-
tions and uses from a local or ethnographic perspective. But if we combine qual-
itative and big data sets,we can begin to get a much more complete and complex
picture of the demographic and discursive aspects of these new spaces of com-
munication and their implications for changing religious practices.We can bring
the snail’s eye and the bird’s eye view into dialogue, or in Max Weber’s terms,we
can arrive at verstehen—understanding—by begreiffen—grasping the bigger pic-
ture.
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Gordon Lynch
Media and the Sacred:
An Evaluation of the ‘Strong Program’
within Cultural Sociology
In his influential book The Invisible Religion, Thomas Luckmann (1967) chal-
lenged sociologists of religion to move beyond their pre-occupation with tradi-
tional, institutional forms of religion to analyse the operative forms of meaning
and value in increasingly secularised or de-Christianised Western societies.
Some forty years on, Luckmann’s call to study the ‘new social form of religion’
beyond the structures of traditional religious institutions has still only been par-
tially answered. In part, this is because mainstream religious traditions in North
America proved more robust than Luckmann had anticipated, albeit often in re-
structured forms (Wuthnow 1988; Miller 1999), and key research funders for the
sociology of religion in the United States remained primarily interested in the
changing nature of religious congregations and the role of religious institutions
as actors in civil society. In part, it is because the field of religious studies in
North America remains defined largely around the study of substantive religious
traditions, which provides little encouragement for thinking about the ‘religious’
beyond mainstream traditions, despite the well-established critique of ‘religion’
that underpins this disciplinary formation (see e.g., McCutcheon 2003). Partly, it
is because, in more secularised European contexts, the study of new religious
forms beyond traditional institutional structures has commonly focused on
new religious movements, the ‘new age’ or other alternative religions (e.g.,
Wicca, neo-Paganism) whose public profile belies the fact that only small frac-
tions of the population have any active involvement with them.¹
More recently, though, new possibilities have emerged for responding to
Luckmann’s challenge to sociologists of religion, with the return to an interest
in theories of the sacred as a social phenomenon. For much of the twentieth cen-
tury, the study of the sacred was framed by the work of scholars such as Rudolf
Otto (1923) and, most influentially, Mircea Eliade (1959), who argued that the ‘sa-
cred’ referred both to a transcendent ontological reality and to the universal
human capacity to experience and represent this through common cultural
forms (i.e., myth, ritual, sacred space, cosmologies). The recent post-structuralist
and post-colonialist turn in the study of religion has led, however, to a sustained
 For a fuller discussion of this, see Lynch 2007.
critique of this essentialised concept of the ‘sacred’, based partly on attempts to
show how concepts in the study of religion more generally have emerged through
a particular period of Western intellectual, cultural and political history (see
e.g., King 1999; Fitzgerald 2000; Carrette 2007) as well as critiques of the polit-
ical connotations of Eliade’s views, which reference his early association with
fascist politics in Romania (see e.g., McCutcheon 2003: 191–212). In the wake
of this critique of Eliadean concepts of the sacred, there has been a growing in-
terest in alternative ways of theorising the sacred, including the sacred as a
boundary marker of identities and fundamental commitments (Anttonnen
1999; Knott 2005), the sacred as that which is accorded ultimate value within
a culture (Fitzgerald 2000, 2007) and the sacred as a powerful form of collective
experience divorced from the framework of the cultural memory of traditional re-
ligions (Hervieu-Leger 2000). In the study of media and religion, the edited vol-
ume by Lundby, Summiala-Seppanen and Salokangas (2006) reflects the diverse
ways in which the term ‘sacred’ is used in this field at the moment, from a syn-
onym for ‘religion’, to denoting religious properties or significant moral commit-
ments beyond institutional religion, to more developed theoretical accounts of
the sacred in relation to cognition, emotion, collective identity and cultural prac-
tice.
Within this emerging field, the turn away from Eliade has created the condi-
tions for a renewed interest in neo-Durkheimian understandings of the sacred.
This theoretical tradition draws on the fundamental insights of Durkheim and
Mauss’ (1903) Primitive Classification and Durkheim’s (1912) The Elementary
Forms of the Religious Life, namely that the sacred (and its polluting profane)
play a central role in structuring cultural systems of symbolic classification,
and that representations of the sacred serve as focal points for the fusion of col-
lective emotion, identity and moral community through the medium of meaning-
ful and structured collective practices. Within the neo-Durkheimian tradition it-
self, there has been extensive critique of the limitations of the uses of Durkheim’s
work as a general theory of society (Alexander 1988b) in tending to emphasise
social integration over conflict (Lukes 1975a), in failing to take account of the
range of other, non-sacred forces in maintaining social bonds (Shils 1975) or in-
deed the evolutionary and ethnographic assumptions that underpin Elementary
Forms (Lukes 1975b). At the same time, as this chapter will discuss, the emer-
gence of a new approach to cultural sociology rooted in this Durkheimian tradi-
tion has made possible a theoretical account of the historically contingent nature
of sacred forms; the relationships between the sacred, power, conflict and mod-
ern social institutions; the moral ambiguities of the sacred as a social force; and
the place of the sacred within a wider theory of society. The aim of this chapter is
to explore how a particular movement within cultural sociology – the ‘strong
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program’ – might support a constructive response to Luckmann’s challenge by
helping us to see the ways in which sacred forms intersect with media in contem-
porary society.²
1 The ‘strong program’ within cultural sociology
Over the past twenty years, ‘cultural sociology’ has become an increasingly sig-
nificant sub-field within sociology, reflected in the growth of the culture section
of the American Sociological Association becoming one of the largest sections in
that organisation as well as the production of monographs, edited books and
specialist journals (see Inglis et al. 2007 for an overview of these developments).
The wider movement of cultural sociology includes a range of approaches, such
as the sociological study of culture (in the sense of the defined social spheres
such as media, the arts and creative industries) and the broader study of culture
using existing sociological theories and methods. This has generated a range of
theoretical and methodological perspectives on the sociological study of culture,
including the ways in which cultural forms might be used to provide causal ex-
planations of social life, such as Swidler’s (1986) theory of ‘strategies of action’.
Within this broader interest in sociology and culture, a more specific body of
work has developed which seeks to theorise the ways in which attention to cul-
tural meaning might generate a distinctive approach to sociological analysis and
interpretation.³ The development of this ‘strong program’ of cultural sociology is
particularly associated with the work of Jeffrey C. Alexander, as well as a net-
work of other colleagues and former students of Alexander, focused around
the Center for Cultural Sociology at Yale University (see Inglis et al. 2007; Cordero
et al. 2008).
The ‘strong program’ is oriented around the claim that cultural meaning
should not be seen as an epiphenomenon of an underlying ‘reality’ of social
 In doing so, this chapter will bracket off discussion of another important academic trajectory
in the discussion of media in relation to Durkheimian theory, namely the extensive discussion of
media rituals set in motion by the work of Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz (1992). For a discussion
of the relevance of this literature for thinking about the performance and circulation of sacred
forms through public media, see Lynch 2012.
 Thus,whilst the ‘strong program’ shares Swidler’s interest in the role of culture in sociological
explanation, it diverges significantly from Swidler’s primary focus on action (in which meaning
and ideology is relatively untheorized) by focusing on the performance of cultural meaning-
systems.
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structures and material relations but as an ‘independent variable’ within socio-
logical analysis. Culture is thus ‘not a thing but a dimension, not an object to be
studied as a dependent variable but a thread that runs through […] every con-
ceivable social form’ (Alexander 2003: 7). Cultural meaning is therefore socially
generative, shaping subjectivities, institutions, interactions and processes. One
can therefore speak of the ‘relative autonomy of culture’ in the sense that culture
is not simply determined by social structure; this autonomy is relative in that cul-
ture does not exist as free-floating symbolic systems or pure ideas, but always in
relation to social and historical instances of agency, structure and practice
(Alexander 2005: 21–3; Cordero et al. 2008: 527). The central aims of the ‘strong
program’ include both the attempt to offer theoretical accounts of the role of
meaning in social life and to provide empirical justification of the value of
such theories for understanding the social. Beyond this, cultural sociology has
also been presented as a form of ‘cultural psychoanalysis’, seeking to bring to
awareness formative and deeply assumed cultural meanings: ‘[W]e must learn
how […] to reveal to men and women the myths that think them so that they
can make up new myths in turn’ (Alexander 2003: 4). To move beyond such cul-
tural influences is never possible – social life is always conducted through mean-
ing. But by being able to name these influences, the strong program seeks to
identify the operative cultural structures that shape social life, better under-
standing both the implications when these are shattered through collective trau-
ma and their role in social conflict as well as helping ‘groups and actors separate
themselves from an unthinking fusion with social performances’ (Cordero et
al. 2008: 528). The influence of semiotics, structuralism and post-structuralism
on the ‘strong program’ is evident in its framing of culture in terms of language
and text. Cultural sociology thus moves from a Parsonian emphasis on ‘values’ –
critiqued as having limited explanatory value for understanding culture and so-
ciety (Cordero 2008: 525; see also Swidler 1986) – to thinking of culture in terms
of texts, constructed on the basis of wider symbolic codes (typically organised
along lines of binary opposition). Such codes do not have any meaningful exis-
tence as disembodied symbol-systems but become social phenomena through
their embodied performance by social actors. As such, these texts and codes
are always historically situated, formed and performed in the context of partic-
ular social structures, conditions and processes. These cultural meanings are not
immutable, but rather they are ‘shifting cultural constructions’ subject to the
means of symbolic production which are ‘fatefully affected by the power and
identity of the agents in charge, by the competition for symbolic control, and
the structures of power and distribution of resources’ (Alexander 2003: 33).
The task of cultural sociology then becomes to understand the cultural texts
and codes that shape social life, thinking about these not in simplistically causal
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terms but in terms of their significance for interpreting structures, subjectivities,
practices and processes within particular social contexts.
Although the ‘strong program’ bears the influence of a range of theoretical
sources,⁴ the later work of Emile Durkheim, from Primitive Classification and
The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life onwards, remains of fundamental im-
portance. In part, this Durkheimian legacy is rooted in the claim that Ferdinand
de Saussure attended some of Durkheim’s lectures on systems of classification
around the time that he was beginning the work that later became known as
the Course in General Linguistics (Smith and Alexander 2005). Durkheim and
Mauss’ interest in classificatory systems is thus seen as one source that fed
the Saussurian linguistics which played a foundational role in the development
of semiotics and structuralism. But more specifically, Durkheim’s later interest in
the sacred plays an important role for much work done through the ‘strong pro-
gram’. As Alexander (1988a: 3) wrote in the introduction to an important early
collection of essays in cultural sociology:
In a series of profound and probing discussions of education, politics, professional organ-
ization, morality and the law, Durkheim demonstrated that these modern spheres must be
studied in terms of symbolic classifications. They are structured by tensions between the
fields of the sacred and the profane; their central processes are ritualistic; their most sig-
nificant structural dynamics concern the construction and destruction of social solidarities.
Although explicit reference to the sacred has become less evident in Alexander’s
most recent work – such as his major re-theorising of civil society, The Civil
Sphere (Alexander 2006a) – this is not because the concept has become less im-
portant in his work. Rather it has become an increasingly assumed part of his
theoretical work, evident in the gravitational pull that it exerts on other related
concepts such as justice, social solidarity, pollution and the definition of exclu-
sionary social and moral boundaries.
 Alexander has cited the influential role that the symbolic anthropology of Clifford Geertz,
Mary Douglas and Victor Turner played in his development of cultural sociology, an influence to
which he became more open in the 1980 s through the structuralist and semiotic theories of
Claude Levi-Strauss, Roland Barthes and Marshall Sahlins (Cordero et al. 2008: 524–5). In
addition to this, Alexander has also had a long-standing interest in the relationship between
macro-level structures and micro-level practices and interactions, led by his engagement with
symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology (see e.g., Alexander 1988c; Cordero et al. 2008:
526). He has, however, been critical of the uses of the latter in sociology in ways that emphasise
pragmatic, instrumental and individualist uses of culture, and which fail to recognise the in-
fluence of broader cultural meanings in shaping practice. Instead, he has turned to performance
theory as a way of thinking about the enactment of culture (Alexander et al., 2006).
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2 The concept of the sacred within the
‘strong program’
In the context of Luckmann’s call for sociologists of religion to attend to opera-
tive forms of meaning in contemporary society, the ‘strong program’ offers impor-
tant theoretical insights into the nature of the sacred as a social phenomenon.
Four points will be noted here.
Firstly, the sacred becomes a focal point in the structuring of cultural sys-
tems of meaning. There is, unlike Eliade, no notion here of a transcendent onto-
logical reality, but rather the sacred is a type of signifier (or signification) asso-
ciated with forms that are regarded as profound sources of meaning, truth, value
or power within a particular cultural system. The content of what is regarded as
sacred can therefore vary across and within societies, and as we shall note
below, cultural forms can be subject to historically contingent processes of
both sacralisation and de-sacralisation. The signifier of the sacred simultaneous-
ly constructs its other, the ‘profane’, a context-specific vision of the evil that
threatens or pollutes the sacred form. Indeed sacred forms,which are often deep-
ly assumed parts of cultural life, may come into consciousness particularly at
moments when there is some kind of polluting breach of that form. Such pollu-
tion of the sacred is typically experienced as a painful wound, eliciting powerful,
collective emotion and generating a desire for some form of restitution. The sa-
cred and the profane therefore underpin cultural systems of classification, pro-
viding emotionally charged orientation towards constructions of good and evil in
ways that shape interactions between individuals, groups and institutions.
Whilst recognising the sociological significance of the cultural construction of
the sacred, the ‘strong program’ does not make this the entire basis of its social
analysis. Alexander has, for example, been critical of the idea that Durkheim’s
later interest in the sacred provides an adequate general theory of society and
has argued instead that it is better understood as a ‘special theory referring to
specified kinds of empirical process’ (Alexander 1988b: 190– 191). There are,
for example, other forces which hold societies together, such as the mundane in-
fluences of friendship, habit, the logics of local practices and assumed ties of
kinship and nation (see e.g., Shils 1975).⁵ The operation of the sacred also
needs to be understood within a wider theory of society, in which due attention
is given to issues of power, stratification and social differentiation, as discussed
further below (see Alexander 2005). But within this wider context, the concept of
 Nonetheless, such mundane ties can be problematic, in Alexander’s view,when they establish
hierarchies and exclusions that impede the extension of social solidarity (2006: 195).
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the sacred provides a useful means for thinking about operative forms of mean-
ing. Unlike notions of ‘values’, which appear to operate as a consistent and sta-
ble back-drop to social action, the concept of the sacred potentially provides a
better framework for thinking about how the celebration and pollution of sacred
forms gets acted out through particular social narratives and dramas, eliciting
powerful emotional and collective responses at specific moments and generating
complex subjectivities and social interactions. The recognition of the simultane-
ous presence of sacred forms in contemporary society also makes it possible to
think about how these generate complex negotiations within the individual and
between groups. It offers a way of thinking about both significant meanings op-
erative at moments of particular cultural intensity and the ways in which these
meanings are performed through particular ways of thinking, feeling and acting.
As such, it adds considerable sociological texture to the more general concept of
meaning used by Luckmann in The Invisible Religion.
Secondly, forms of the sacred are historically contingent.What is taken to be
sacred in a given cultural context changes through time, through a process of in-
teraction between social agents, operations of power, regulative and communi-
cative institutions, social movements and wider social conditions. The historical
contingency of sacred forms had been earlier recognised by Edwards Shils (1975),
who noted that the sacred significance of the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II
was dependent upon the specific social conditions of a collectively oriented Brit-
ish society still deeply formed by the experience of the Second World War. Robert
Bellah’s (1967) notion of civil religion similarly recognised the historical partic-
ularity of the sacralisation of a particular vision of nationhood in the conditions
of the formation of modern republics such as the United States and revolutionary
France (see also Hunt 1988). Within the ‘strong program’, however, there has
been more sustained attention to the ways in which sacred forms change through
time. Particularly influential in this regard has been Alexander’s discussion of
the emergence of the Holocaust as a sacred moral symbol (Alexander 2003,
2009). In this, he describes a process which took place over a period of years fol-
lowing the liberation of the concentration camps in 1945, in which the weaken-
ing of anti-Semitism in Western culture allowed for greater identification with
the Jews as human victims of the Holocaust and the emergence of the Holocaust
as a unique cultural symbol of moral evil, compared to its initial framing as just
one more war crime commissioned through the evil of German nationalism. At-
tention to the historical conditions through which particular sacred forms attract
broader identification and come to shape social life thus represents an important
part of the ‘strong program’s’ treatment of the sacred. Inviting more collaborative
work with social and cultural historians, such a focus may also help us to under-
stand instances in which the relative power of different sacred forms changes
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over time within a given social context. One important such case is the ongoing
controversy over the abuse and neglect of children in Catholic institutions in Ire-
land, which reflects the waning of forms of the sacred associated with the Cath-
olic church in relation to the growing cultural influence of the sacralisation of
the care of children through the twentieth century (see Zelizer 1985). Such histor-
ical sensitivity produces a more dynamic understanding of the sacred and social
change than the more static understandings of meaning and value offered by
Bourdieusian notions of habitus.
Thirdly, the ‘strong program’ recognises that the sacred is a morally and so-
cially ambiguous force. The colloquial use of the ‘sacred’ as a synonym for reli-
gion and the Eliadean notion of a sacred ontological reality have tended to rein-
force an implicit normative association between the sacred and the good. Even in
Robert Bellah’s work on civil religion there is an elision between the sacred and
the normative good. Despite his early recognition of the possibilities for the dis-
courses of civil religion to be used to legitimate the evils of American imperial-
ism, Bellah remained convinced that civil religion at its best ‘is a genuine appre-
hension of universal and transcendent religious reality as seen in or, one could
almost say, as revealed through the experience of the American people’ (Bellah,
1967: 12). The association of civil religion with morally repugnant practices was
understood by Bellah either in terms of the ‘demonic distortions’ (Bellah 1967:
12) of its pure moral vision or the tragic structural failure of American society
to live up to its high democratic vision (Bellah 1992: 184). The ‘strong program’
adopts a more critical stance than this. In general, the sacred is used as a de-
scriptive category that does not carry intrinsic normative implications. Nazi
anti-Semitism can, for example, be understood in terms of the operation of a par-
ticular sacred vision of the German nation and Volk. More specifically, though,
there is recognition within the ‘strong program’ that the structural properties
of sacred forms render them morally ambiguous. In his recent work on the
civil sphere, for example, Alexander (2006a) argues that civil society is struc-
tured around cultural symbol-systems that define who is to be treated as a
full person and citizen. Sacred visions of the ‘public’ which provide the symbolic
content of civil society are, like any sacred signifier, constituted on the basis of
the binary opposition of the polluting profane. At the same time as they enable
moral and collective identification – the experience of solidarity – in the civil
sphere, sacred visions of the public exclude individuals, groups and traits iden-
tified as profane. Civil society is therefore always grounded in practices of inclu-
sion and exclusion, which have typically been accentuated in relation to the im-
agined collectivity of the nation-state (Alexander, 2006a: 196–8). The normative
project of the ‘strong program’s’ construction of the civil sphere is therefore al-
ways to be attentive to these processes of exclusion and to seek the extension
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of social solidarity. But a purely inclusive civil society is never possible, because
the inclusive properties of sacred identifications on which the symbolic construc-
tion of the ‘public’ rests, and upon which the moral solidarity of the civil sphere
depends, are structurally inseparable from their exclusion of the profane. As
Alexander (2006a: 84) puts it, ‘[D]ichotomous evaluations of persons and events
continue to be made, for pollution and purification are structural features of civil
society as such’. There is, then, an irresolvable tension between the cultural role
of sacred forms for collective and moral identification and the aspiration for an
inclusive, global civil society. Whilst we might celebrate the extension of social
solidarity represented, for example, by the women’s movement or the civil rights
movement for African-Americans, processes of exclusion inevitably remain in-
tact, suggesting a fundamentally tragic propensity for conflict in human society.
At its worst, the exclusionary nature of sacred forms means that ‘civil society is,
at its very origins, fragmented and distorted in what are often the most heinous
ways’ (Alexander 2006a: 202).
Fourthly, the ‘strong program’ uses the concept of the sacred in the context
of a wider theory of society. As we have noted, Alexander sees the sacred con-
struction of the public as central to the symbolic content of civil society. This ob-
servation functions within a broader theoretical understanding of the civil
sphere as both symbolic and performed in relation to regulative institutions
(i.e., the legal system and political structures) and communicative institutions
(i.e., media and voluntary associations) in ways that are sedimented through
time, space and social stratification in particular physical, cultural and social
contexts (Alexander 2006a: 69–212). Beyond these institutions of civil society
lie a range of ‘non-civil’ spheres – economics, science, religion, the family –
which both challenge and are challenged by the symbolic performances of inclu-
sion and exclusion within the civil sphere, and which also carry their own spe-
cific constructions of the sacred (e.g., the sacred as constructed in the symbol-
systems of particular religious groups).Within this framework, social movements
act as carriers of change in the civil sphere, mobilising in ways that provide a
critical focus on injustices bound up with processes of symbolic exclusion or
draw on expanded notions of solidarity in the civil sphere to critique injustice
in non-civil spheres such as economic or domestic relations.Whilst still the sub-
ject of critical discussion and empirical exploration, Alexander’s theory of civil
society does important work in retrieving and defining the civil sphere as a rel-
atively autonomous dimension of society, providing a framework for thinking
about the nature of justice in real societies as opposed to the imagined social re-
lations in the work of political philosophers such as Habermas and Rawls. More
specifically, it situates an understanding of the sacred in relation to a broader
theory of differentiated social institutions and social change in ways that may
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prove valuable for understanding the interaction of multiple sacred forms in
complex modern societies.
3 The ‘strong program’ and the mediation
of the sacred
Part of the challenge that Luckmann presented to sociologists of religion in The
Invisible Religion was to revise the institutional focus of their work, to shift be-
yond the traditional interest in church, synagogue, mosque and temple, to
think about a wider array of institutional structures through which significant
contemporary meanings are mediated. The ‘strong program’, through its atten-
tion to the relationship between cultural meaning and broader social structures,
provides one framework for developing this task. In particular, the ‘strong pro-
gram’ has given sustained attention to the role of public media in this regard.
In The Civil Sphere, for example, Alexander (2006a: 75–84) discusses both the
role of fictional entertainment media and factual news media in the circulation
of symbols and narratives which construct good and evil, and thus the bounda-
ries of inclusion and exclusion, in particular civil societies. Fictional media, he
suggests, have the potential both to circulate such categories in banal, assumed
ways (for example, through representations of gender, sexuality and ethnicity in
television sit-coms) as well as the capacity to generate narratives that powerfully
dramatise the injustice of particular forms of exclusion in ways that can mobilise
wider social movements (such as the role of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s
Cabin in mobilising support for the abolitionist movement). Factual media,
whilst typically claiming an impartial perspective on actual events, are also in-
volved in a fundamentally interpretative exercise, according to Alexander. Their
roles in circulating symbols of the sacred and the profane are particularly impor-
tant, given the role of news media as primary sources of everyday social knowl-
edge. ‘For most members of civil society, and even for members of its institution-
al elites, the news is the only source of firsthand experience they will ever have
about their fellow citizens, about their motives for acting the way they do, the
kinds of relationships they form, and the nature of the institutions they might
potentially create’ (2006a: 80). The immediacy and ‘reality’ of events to which
news media refer can make the framing of these events in terms of the sacred
and profane codes of a society particularly influential in evoking immediate re-
sponses from their audiences and stimulating broader social and political action.
This is particularly the case given that dramatic breaches of sacred forms (such
as the abuse of children, the denial of human rights or the undermining of de-
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mocracy) are precisely those kinds of events that may be considered newswor-
thy.⁶
Beyond this broad interest in public and social media as a central structure
for the circulation and negotiation of cultural meaning, the ‘strong program’ has
also conceived of media in two more specific ways in relation to sacred forms.
Firstly, within the recent turn to performance theory in the work of Alexander
and others (Alexander et al. 2006), media are understood as playing a central
role in the staging and circulation of sacred drama. This dramaturgical under-
standing of the performance of the sacred makes analogical use of the notion
of scripts (cultural codes constructed around the sacred/profane), directors
(elites seeking to shape codes or construct particular narratives through them),
actors (the social agents drawn into the enactment of the sacred drama) and
mis-en-scene (the particular social setting in which the drama is enacted). The
public effects of such performances of the sacred are inseparable from their dis-
semination through media. For example, Alexander (2006b) discusses the at-
tacks of 9/11 in terms of a drama enacted in relation to the construction of the
sacred within a particular Islamist ideology, directed by influential figures within
Islamist networks, enacted through the social agents of the attackers, their vic-
tims and a wider public audience, and staged at the particular sites of the attack.
The symbolic force of this event was inseparable from the media coverage of the
attack, a point of which the directors of the attack were well aware. Similarly, the
sacred ‘counter-performance’ staged in identification with the victims through
public speeches, vigils, charitable collections and re-telling of accounts of the at-
tacks (including the recorded phone messages left by those trapped in the Twin
Towers) was enacted and made possible through public media across the world.
The performance of sacred dramas through public media in late modern society
is not, however, uncomplicated. As Dayan (2010) and Katz (Katz and Liebes
2010) later acknowledged in relation to their theory of media rituals, audiences
in pluralist and culturally reflexive societies are more likely to engage with such
 The ‘strong program’s’ recognition of the importance of public media in the circulation of
sacred symbols has meant that case studies within this approach have often used media texts as
data (Alexander 1990, 2009; Eyerman, 2008). One of the most detailed studies of public media
within this approach has been Ronald Jacobs’ (2000) Race, Media and the Crisis of Civil Society,
which uses an analysis of African-American newspapers to demonstrate the role of such spe-
cialist news media in circulating the social interpretation of black writers and commentators
whose views are rarely heard within a racially stratified society and media. Through his detailed
analysis of media representation of the Watts uprising and the Rodney King case, Jacobs also
demonstrates how the circulation of cultural meanings is tied not only to racial and class
stratification but to physical and imagined geographies, the economics of the media industry
and the practices and technologies of media professionals.
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presentations of sacred drama in critical or detached ways. Alexander (2006b:
96) therefore argues that such reflexivity and plurality makes it difficult for
any public performance of the sacred not to evoke scepticism from sections of
its public audience who regard it as inauthentic, instrumental or based on an in-
adequate form of the sacred. Ritual leaders are no longer the ‘unproblematic, au-
thoritative disseminators of meaning that they were in the past’ (Alexander and
Mast 2006: 15). Such scepticism towards the performance of sacred drama
through media is, in part, related to the media’s own deconstruction of such
dramas; the royal wedding of Charles and Diana (taken as an exemplary
media ritual by Dayan and Katz) was, as we know, later followed by Martin Ba-
shir’s television interview with Diana, which presented a very different account
of the marriage to its earlier, fairy-tale construction. It is also, to some degree, a
result of the increasing segmentation of public media which makes possible a
wide range of performances and critiques of different sacred drama. Audiences
may prefer media that respect their sacred commitments – whether The Guardian
or Fox News. But identification with a given sacred drama loses its taken-for-
grantedness in social contexts in which many different sacred performances
are enacted and forms of the sacred are plural and contested. In such a context,
‘participation in, and acceptance of, ritual messages, are more a matter of choice
than obligation’ (Alexander and Mast 2006: 17).
A second important role for public media in relation to the sacred identified
within the ‘strong program’ is that of the media acting as a structure for restitu-
tion of breaches of the sacred. A seminal discussion of this within the literature
is Alexander’s analysis of the role of the media in relation to the Watergate scan-
dal (Alexander 1988b; 2003: 155–59; Alexander and Jacobs 1998). Here Alexand-
er argues, with reference to a range of polling data, that public reaction to the
Watergate break-in in June 1972 was relatively muted and, six months after the
break-in, most Americans did not regard it as a crisis or believe that it had influ-
enced their vote in the elections that year.Within two years, however,Watergate
had become a deep crisis in American political and cultural life, leading to the
eventual and unprecedented decision of the incumbent President, Richard
Nixon, to resign. The capacity of Watergate to acquire the symbolic status of a
crisis depended on a range of historically contingent factors (including the ap-
peal of a new centrist rhetoric in the wake of the decisive defeat of the Left in
the 1972 Presidential election and the post-election mobilisation of cultural elites
previously alienated in Nixon’s first term of office). But it was the live televising
of the Senate Select Committee’s hearings on Watergate that proved decisive in
engaging a wider public audience in a drama in which the sacrality of American
democracy had been polluted by the actions of Nixon and his political associ-
ates. Within the first two months of the televising of the hearings, the number
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of Americans regarding Watergate as a crisis significantly increased. In this con-
text, then, public media, in collaboration with a coalition of political and cultur-
al elites, functioned as a ‘counter-centre’ of the sacred, a structure through which
it was possible to critique the breach of the sacred in other central institutions.⁷
Within the ‘strong program’, this case has been interpreted as illustrating the
broader capacity of public media to critique breaches of the sacred in other areas
of social life and potentially to provide means for restitution of this breach, or
‘civil repair’ (Alexander and Jacobs 1998; Jacobs 2000). Recent examples of pub-
lic media acting in this way include media coverage of the expenses scandal in-
volving British politicians in 2009, the ongoing role of public media since the
1990 s in circulating stories about the physical and sexual abuse of children
within Catholic institutions and even the global controversy sparked by Jade
Goody’s racist bullying of Shilpa Shetty on the UK’s Celebrity Big Brother. Such
a capacity for critique is increasingly understood, implicitly or explicitly, as an
important element of news journalism by media professionals inspired by Mur-
row⁸ and Woodward and Bernstein,⁹ who conceive of their work as being honest
brokers in holding other social actors to account for the breach of the sacred.
Such an understanding of the media has been critiqued in terms of the way in
which the media is accorded the status of giving privileged access and insights
into the sacred centre of society (Couldry 2003). In pluralist societies, the ten-
sions that broadcasters face between reproducing particular sacred forms and
maintaining impartiality also generates controversy when their news coverage
represents breaches of the sacred, but the broadcaster pulls back from support-
ing symbolic restitution (as illustrated in public anger over the decision by the
 This notion of the ‘counter-centre’ was developed by Alexander in relation to Edward Shils’
(1975) understanding of the relationship between the sacred (as a ‘central values system’) and
key social institutions – where this association between the sacred and powerful social in-
stitutions created a symbiotic relationship of mutual legitimation and aura. Shils argued, ho-
wever, that the routinisation of institutional life could produce a widening gap between in-
stitutional norms and practices and central sacred forms, leaving them vulnerable to others able
to utilise the symbolism of those sacred forms to fashion a radical institutional and social
critique.
 Edward R. Murrow’s television program on CBS in 1954 is seen as significantly contributing to
the end of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy’s communist witch-hunt in the USA (Hilliard and Keith
2005; see also CBS 1954).
 Famous for the Watergate investigations from 1972– 1976, the Washington Post’s Bob Wood-
ward and Carl Bernstein brought to light a system of political ‘dirty tricks’ and crimes that led to
the conviction of dozens of Republican party officials, including White House employees, and
eventually to the resignation of President Richard Nixon (see Gettlin and Colodny 1991; Kutler
1997).
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BBC not to broadcast a humanitarian appeal for those in Gaza during Israel’s
military assault in 2008/9; see Lynch 2012). Nevertheless, despite occasions
when the media themselves become tainted by the pollution of the sacred, pub-
lic media continue to be constructed both by media professionals and their au-
diences as counter-centres of the sacred at moments of political and cultural cri-
sis. This role means that public media can reasonably be claimed to be a primary
social institution engaged in the reproduction, celebration and contestation of
sacred forms in late modern society.
4 The media, the sacred and the ‘strong program’:
a critical evaluation
The ‘strong program’ therefore gives substance to Luckmann’s (1967) claim that
we should attend to the role of a much wider range of social institutions, beyond
traditional religious structures, when thinking about the circulation of operative
forms of meaning and significance. In particular, the ‘strong program’ provides a
heuristic framework for thinking about the role of public media and sacred forms
in ways that may help to interpret the intersections between cultural meanings,
social agents, historical-contingency, the media and other institutions in the con-
text of pluralist and stratified societies. In doing so, it provides a more theoret-
ically advanced, and sociologically situated understanding of the sacred than
that offered by those working within the post-Eliadean recovery of the sacred
within the study of religion.
Whilst the theoretical development and heuristic value of the ‘strong pro-
gram’s’ understanding of media and the sacred are to be welcomed, a number
of areas for critical reflection remain within this approach. Two particular issues
will be noted here.
Firstly, there is some slippage in terms of the way in which the ‘sacred’ is
used within the ‘strong program’. At times, it is clearly used as a ‘special theory
referring to specified kinds of empirical process’ (Alexander 1988b: 190), in
which there is a fusion of classificatory categories, collective emotion and iden-
tification, moral sentiment and meaningful (ritualised) practice. Alexander’s
analysis of the response to the Watergate scandal and the emergence of the
moral symbolism of the Holocaust are clear examples of this, situating sacred
processes in historically situated empirical cases. At other points, however, the
sacred is used in a far more limited, semiotic way, to refer to that which acquires
sacred signification within a given system of cultural meanings – for example,
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Alexander’s (1990) semiotic analysis of the media construction of information
technology in terms of the sacred and profane. Whilst both uses of the sacred
are clearly meaningful within the interpretative project of the ‘strong program’,
the problem with the latter, purely semiotic usage is that it can lead to the ‘sa-
cred’ being treated simply as a synonym for the ‘good’. Aside from Durkheim’s
observation that the distinction between the sacred and the profane is far
more radical than the separation between good and bad, to treat the sacred sim-
ply as synonymous with the good is largely to empty its value as an analytical
concept. The heuristic usefulness of the way in which the sacred has been
thought about within the ‘strong program’ is precisely in its ability to make con-
nections between cognition, moral sentiment, collectivities and practices in ways
that help us to make sense of specific social interactions and processes. The con-
cept of pollution and the ways in which the breach of the sacred is represented
also provide a framework for thinking about interactions between symbols, emo-
tion, institutions and action. The emphasis on cultural meaning within the
‘strong program’ distinguishes its contribution to sociological research, but the
concept of the sacred functions most effectively within this approach when it
is understood very specifically as a particular form of cultural meaning, associ-
ated with empirically-observable processes.
A more general problem here, though, is what criteria one uses to define
whether a given cultural form should be considered sacred or not. Can ‘nature’
be considered a sacred form in contemporary society? The nation-state? The
‘self ’ (and if so, the self in what regard)? Can gender categories be seen as invest-
ed with sacred significance? Is the family a sacred form, or more specifically the
care and nurture of children? It is such apparent difficulty in defining the criteria
for what constitutes a ‘sacred’ form that leads Hervieu-Leger (2000) to declare
the sacred to be an impossible concept, unhelpful for sociological analysis be-
cause its applicability to specific social phenomena appears to lie entirely in
the eye of the beholder. In one sense, such objections can overreach themselves.
We can think, for example, about the sacred in terms of the particular intensity of
the nexus of meaning, emotion, collectivity and action. To suggest, for example,
that football teams represent sacred forms is unconvincing in this regard. People
may kill for the nation-state or in response to the experience of the transgression
of gender categories. People do not typically kill for their football team. I can ex-
perience profound shock and disgust at an account of the physical abuse of a
child, but I would feel no sense of violation or pollution if someone were to
dig up the turf in my team’s stadium or even assault one of the players. Whilst
this property of intensity is not something amenable to objective measurement
– given that it is experienced through emotional structures that are culturally
and historically specific, rather than immutable social realities – it is neverthe-
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less one indicator of the kind of phenomena that we might think of as sacred.
Furthermore, there is a sense in which such intensity is also necessarily associ-
ated with the subjectivity of the concept. When I have heard researchers from
other countries present studies on sacred forms or moments in their cultures –
for example, on media coverage of the murder of Anna Lindh in Sweden or
the killing in China of a working-class student from a poor background as a re-
sult of careless driving by a young man from the new economic elite – I have
been struck that there is an emotional content to these narratives which I can
understand but do not experience as directly as the researchers themselves. Sim-
ilarly,when talking to other researchers, our awareness of sacred moments in our
own cultures is often tied to instances where we felt compelled to feel or act in
extra-mundane ways – to grieve the loss of a public figure, or to engage in public
protest at some instance of the violation of human rights. There is a sense in
which an appreciation of sacred forms can involve a researcher’s own emotional
identification with those forms. This is not to say that the sacred is whatever a
researcher wants to call the sacred. Rather, the researcher’s own awareness of
his or her cognitive, emotional, embodied response to particular social phenom-
ena can provide evidence of the intensity that marks sacred forms which, when
triangulated with other accounts or performances of such intense identification,
may provide stronger grounds for using the concept of the sacred. This is,
though, an initial proposal, and defining the criteria for identifying sacred
forms will remain an ongoing task for the ‘strong program’.
A second issue for critical reflection is the extent to which the ‘strong pro-
gram’ takes adequate account of issues of aesthetics, materiality and embodi-
ment. In its more strongly semiotic forms of expression, the ‘strong program’
risks reducing social interaction to a range of linguistic and textual concepts:
code, symbol, langue, parole, text, script, binary distinction. Whilst supporting
analysis of the content of cultural meanings present in a given situation, such
linguistically derived concepts do not necessarily help to make connections be-
tween cultural meanings and subjectivity, materiality, embodiment or action. The
use of performance theory has provided one way of thinking about the ways in
which cultural texts are enacted, as has the use within the ‘strong program’ of
speech-act theory. But there is scope for expanding an appreciation of the aes-
thetic and material within cultural sociology beyond this. Alexander has recently
started to address this issue through developing the concept of ‘iconic conscious-
ness’, which occurs when ‘an aesthetically shaped materiality signifies social
value’, generating ‘understanding by feeling, by evidence of the senses rather
than the mind’ (2008: 782). From this perspective, cultural signifiers are extend-
ed beyond the linguistic/cognitive to allow for the possibility of the experience of
cultural meaning through aesthetic processes. Such processes do not reflect a
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deep engagement with the essence of material objects themselves in a Heideg-
gerian sense, but rather ‘the aesthetic construction of material surfaces and
their experience via feeling consciousness’ (Alexander 2008: 783). The aesthetic
meaning of an object is not simply inherent in the materiality of the object itself
but in the ways in which it is experienced aesthetically through cultural frame-
works of meaning. Importantly, Alexander’s position moves beyond an instru-
mental understanding of the material object as a carrier of pre-determined cul-
tural meanings and recognises the ways in which cultural meanings themselves
are always implicated in the qualities of particular material objects and sensu-
ous forms of engagement with them.Whilst this represents a significant develop-
ment in attempting to move beyond semiotics’ relative failure to address the ma-
terial and the aesthetic, there are still areas of ambiguity in Alexander’s
discussion. The use of the sacred/profane cultural binary is reflected in his ten-
dency to use similar, generalised, aesthetic categories – the beautiful, the sub-
lime, the banal. But, given his recognition of the specificities of material forms
and aesthetic regimes, it would seem more profitable to make use of concepts
from the study of religious mediation, such as the ‘sacred gaze’ (Morgan 2005)
or ‘sensational forms’ (Meyer 2008), which provide a more flexible structure
for thinking about how particular experiences of the sacred are implicated in
particular cultural traditions, aesthetic practices and the material properties of
media. Alexander is also cautious about placing too much emphasis on the ef-
fects of the material in structuring culture, reflecting the strong aversion to ma-
terialist theories of society within the strong program. He has, for example, ar-
gued that actor-network theory has little to offer cultural sociology because
‘its ontology is relentlessly material [and] there is no symbolic imagining to
speak of ’ (Alexander 2008: 783), rejecting it because of its over-emphasis on
the concrete, pragmatics and immediate experience. But there is scope for asking
whether this rejection is too strong. Could it be conceded that the nature and per-
formance of sacred forms are shaped by the materiality of spaces, objects and
technologies – not in a deterministic way, but in terms of the affordances that
those material forms make possible? One example of such influence can be
found in Jacobs’ Race, Media and the Crisis of Civil Society, in which he argues
that part of the reason for the ongoing marginalisation of the African-American
press (and thus of cultural meanings grounded in the experience of black com-
munities in America) relates to the information technology used by journalists.
In a media age of tight copy deadlines, information technology is an essential
journalistic tool for accessing data needed for a story, including previous stories
published in the press. One of the main databases that support the search of
media archives is Lexis-Nexis, which makes possible a range of different kinds
of searches across thousands of news print media. African-American newspapers
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are not included in the Lexis-Nexis database, however, which means that the use
of this very convenient data source by journalists in major commercial newspa-
pers recursively reproduces the exclusion of black perspectives already rein-
forced by other sources of racial stratification. Although not simply determining
the way cultural meanings circulate by itself, Lexis-Nexis as a technology embed-
ded in a particular kind of cultural practice is implicated in the shape taken by
such patterns of circulation. More generally, then, we might ask what role the af-
fordances of different media play in the ways in which the sacred is encountered,
celebrated, or contested in contemporary society. Alexander’s emphasis on cul-
tural meaning leads him only to acknowledge the ‘illusion’ of the agency of ma-
terial objects at this point (Alexander 2008: 784), but the ‘strong program’ could
reasonably expand its sense of the material and aesthetic further to allow that
cultural meanings – and sacred forms – emerge in the context of fields of agency
in which social actors, cultural symbols, material objects and aesthetic regimes
all interact to shape the nature and significance of the mediated sacred (see
Schofield Clark 2009; Miller 2010: 110–34).¹⁰ Such attention to the material
and the aesthetic has the potential both to add greater ethnographic richness
to the ways in which the ‘strong program’ understands the relationship between
cultural meaning and the practices of social life and to move beyond thinking
about the representation of sacred forms in media texts to thinking about the ex-
perience of the sacred in the embodied and aesthetic uses of media.
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Kim Knott, Elizabeth Poole and Teemu Taira
Christianity, Secularism and Religious
Diversity in the British Media
Britain is a Christian, secular and religiously diverse country (Weller 2008). All
three of these aspects are visible in the media portrayal of religious issues,
but they are not covered equally and not treated in the same manner. This chap-
ter examines these three aspects, their coverage in the British press and on tele-
vision, and the way in which they are handled in particular news topics or media
events. Based on the quantitative analysis and comparison of systematically col-
lected media samples from 1982–3 and 2008–9, we show first that there is in-
creased visibility of religious diversity, secularism and atheism in British society
and the media. Two media events are then analysed in which Christianity, secu-
larism and religious diversity were very considerably intertwined. The first of
these is from February 2009 and concerns the deportation of the Dutch MP,
Geert Wilders, who was refused entry to the UK to show his anti-Islamic film,
Fitna (he was later admitted in 2010). The second is the Papal visit to Britain
in September 2010. The representations of Christianity, secularism and religious
diversity – and their interrelationships – are analysed and explained.
This chapter is based on research conducted in 2008– 10 on ‘Media portray-
als of religion and the secular sacred’ (in association with a major UK research
programme on religion and society).¹ Data was collected from mainstream
media, from a systematic sample of selected newspapers and television channels
– The Times, The Sun, The Yorkshire Evening Post, BBC1, BBC2 and ITV1.² A
broader selection of news material – from online sources as well as other news-
papers and TV channels – was consulted for the analysis of the two key events.
 ‘Media portrayals of religion and the secular sacred: A longitudinal study of British new-
spaper and television representations and their reception’, AH/F009097/1, part of the AHRC/
ESRC Religion and Society Programme, conducted at the University of Leeds from 2008–10 by
Kim Knott, Elizabeth Poole and Teemu Taira.
 The selection of media outputs was driven by the need to replicate the methodology used in
an earlier study: ‘Media portrayals of religion and their reception’, conducted at the University of
Leeds from 1982–3 by Robert Towler and Kim Knott (Knott 1984).
1 The rise of religious diversity and secularism in
British society and the media
In their coverage of religion, the media do not aim to reflect with any exactitude
the number of adherents of religious traditions in Britain, nor do they try to
please those who claim to have no religion at all. But they cannot ignore trans-
formations in the religious landscape. As statistics have shown, Britain has
changed from being a broadly homogeneous Christian country to one that is
more secular and increasingly religiously diverse (Office for National Statistics
2006). This has not led to a complete decline of Christianity or its role in public
life. Neither has Christianity disappeared from the British media. Rather, in re-
cent decades, conflicts and controversies between defenders of Christianity, sec-
ularists and adherents of religious minorities have become more visible in public
discourse, including the media.
1.1 Changing religious patterns and their impact on media
coverage
According to the Census in 2001 (Office for National Statistics 2006; cf. Weller
2008: 8–58), Christianity was by far the largest religious group, with 71.6 % of
the British population claiming to be Christian (of whom approximately 67.5 %
were Anglican, 13.8 % Catholic, 6.9 % Presbyterian and 3.1 % Methodist, with
other denominations accounting for less than 1.2 % each). Muslims were the
largest non-Christian religious group at 2.7 % of the population, with slightly
more adherents than Methodism. Hindus accounted for 1 %, Sikhs 0.6 %, Jews
0.5 % and Buddhists 0.3 %. The category ‘Other religion’ (0.3 %) included mainly
different kinds of Pagans (self-identified as Pagan, Wiccan, Druid and Astarus)
but also Jains, Bahá’ís and Zoroastrians. Even though the majority of the popu-
lation identified with a religious tradition (76.8 %), 15.5 % reported that they had
no religion. The remainder, 7.3 %, did not answer the question. From these per-
centages we can deduce that somewhere between nine and fourteen million peo-
ple in the UK (between 15.5 % and 22.8 %) in 2001 were non-religious.
However, it is important to remember that 2001 was the first time a religious
question had been asked in the UK Census. The figures tell us how people wished
to self-identify for public purposes. They give a notional sense of the size of
broad religious groups or communities, but they reveal nothing about actual
practice or belief, membership of religious organisations or degree of commit-
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ment at that time. It is not possible to predict how the religious landscape may
have changed since then.³
Additional evidence of the presence and increase of religious diversity can
be found in the number of places of worship. The number of mosques rose
from 193 in the 1980 s to 708 in 2004, and the number of Sikh gurdwaras from
90 to 190 in the same period. At the same time the number of Christian churches
declined by 815 (Weller 2008: 32–42, 63). However, there were still more than
44,000 churches in the UK, illustrating that, despite the tendency towards in-
creasing diversity, Christianity continues to dominate the landscape.
These statistics show that Britain is Christian, but significantly secular and
increasingly religiously diverse. Christian denominations dominate just as they
did at the time of our earlier research study in the 1980 s, but to a lesser extent.
Other religions now have a significant role in political and cultural life as well as
in personal and community identities. Islam in particular, despite its relatively
small numerical base in Britain, is increasingly on the national as well as global
agenda in relation to debates about international policy, conflict and terrorism,
and migration and integration. Furthermore, these changes have also had an im-
pact on how religion is seen more widely in society and in the media. With an
increase in the number of non-religious people or ‘nones’, the discussion of athe-
ism, secularism and secularisation has risen up the media agenda at the same
time that religion has again become more visible in public life. Secularism as
well as religion is debated in discursive struggles over identities and privileges.
And all of these issues are now addressed – directly and indirectly – in news re-
porting and commentary, editorials, cultural discussion, drama, comedy and en-
tertainment.
The presence of British Muslims, in particular, began to be felt in the media
following the Rushdie Affair in the late 1980 s (Weller 2009; Knott 2010). As proc-
esses of globalisation and migration led to a reassertion of religious identities at
a local level, it was then that the question about the loyalty of Muslims and their
ability to integrate began to be raised. Since then, studies have demonstrated the
increase in coverage of Islam and Muslims in the British press, a visibility that
exploded post-9/11 (see Figure 1) (Poole 2002; Richardson 2004; Moore, Mason
and Lewis 2008).
Our own study demonstrates the huge increase in references to Islam, from
just 38 in the press and television sample in 1982–3, to 306 in 2008–9. Studies
have repeatedly shown the emphasis on Muslims as a cultural issue and, more
 The same religious question was asked in the UK population census in 2011. The results were
released in 2012 but will not be analysed here.
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recently in relation to British Muslims, as a security threat, with reporting largely
focused on terrorism, conflict, extremism and cultural incompatibility. Coverage
demonstrates the significance of Islam politically as nation states experience in-
securities in the context of a changing globalised world.
Secularism and atheism have been present in the media in different ways.
While secularism is a political doctrine or principle for organizing society rather
than an identity as such, atheism is often expressed as an identity to be defend-
ed, promoted, represented and challenged in the media. Examination of the
newspapers with the help of search engines shows that the words ‘atheism’
and ‘secularism’ have been used increasingly over the last decade. In addition,
even though the numbers of references are far fewer, the rate of increase has
been faster than it has been for related subjects, such as ‘religion’, ‘faith’,
‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’.
The most obvious aspect of this new visibility has been the so-called New
Atheism. Even though atheist books and pamphlets have been published
throughout the past 200 years, none of them have had the impact of recent
books by Sam Harris, Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett and Christopher Hitch-
ens. Atheist, secularist and humanist interest groups have been revitalised,
and membership rates have increased in the last few years. Whilst making
clear they are not anti-religious, some politicians have now publicly admitted
their atheism: Liberal Democratic leader Nick Clegg, for example (Bullivant
2010).
Atheism and criticism of religion have been popular topics in a variety of
media. Television has aired documentaries such as Atheism: A Rough History
Figure 1: Articles on Islam in The Times and The Guardian 1994–2003 (Poole 2002)
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of Disbelief (BBC Four 2004), The Root of All Evil? (Channel 4 2006) and Faith
School Menace? (Channel 4 2010). BBC Radio 4’s early morning slot, Thought
for the Day, has not opened itself to non-religious voices, though this has
often been debated (see BBC ‘Should Thought Stay Sacred?’ 2009). 2009 was im-
portant in other ways, too. The atheist bus campaign, in which the advertisement
‘There’s probably no God. Now stop worrying and enjoy your life’ was placed on
buses in Britain’s major cities, took place in January and was soon copied in
many European countries. Camp Quest UK, a summer camp for the children of
atheists and non-religious people, was launched for the first time in Britain
that summer. In November, public billboards – pointedly directed against reli-
gions – showed children saying, ‘Please don’t label me. Let me grow up and
choose myself ’. These events were widely covered in the mainstream media.
1.2 Changing media portrayals: the quantitative evidence
During our research in 2008–9 we collected and analysed references from a se-
lection of British newspapers and terrestrial television channels and compared
these to a similar sample from 1982–3. The selection in both periods included
one month’s newspapers from The Times, The Sun and the Yorkshire Evening
Post, one ‘broadsheet’ or serious daily, one tabloid and one local paper. Also in-
cluded was one week’s television (excluding children’s programmes) from BBC1,
BBC2 and ITV1 (two other terrestrial channels, Channel 4 and Channel 5, were
deselected for study in 2008 because they were not in existence at the time of
the previous study in 1982).⁴ Although our systematic sample was based on a rel-
atively narrow selection of media sources, it had some evidential power and
breadth and was supplemented with a broader selection of sources in the anal-
ysis of the two events (the Geert Wilders case and the Papal visit). Although we
collected data on multiple key words relating to conventional religion, common
religion and non-religion, our analysis below is restricted to the principal themes
of Christianity, religious diversity (religious traditions other than Christianity)
and secularism/atheism.⁵
The dominance of Christianity in the media coverage of religion, as well as
the rise of secularism, atheism and religious diversity, can be seen in Figure 2
and Table 1 below. The first indicates clearly the fact that, in terms of religion,
 Channel 4 began operating later in 1982, after our period of data collection had been com-
pleted.
 For more discussion of media references to conventional and common religion, see Knott
(1984), Taira et al. (2012).
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references to Christianity still dominate the media. It also shows the significant
rise in references to Islam (a key element of religious diversity). Furthermore, it
offers evidence of the increased media visibility of secularism and atheism, even
though the absolute number of references is far behind Christianity and Islam.⁶
Table 1 demonstrates that the increase in references to religious diversity is
not limited to Islam, even though it is the most visible and most referenced re-
ligious tradition other than Christianity. It shows that references to atheism and
secularism have increased more than references to Asian traditions, Judaism and
New Religious Movements.
 These totals for secularism/atheism include some references to other ‘secular sacred’ con-
cerns such as humanism and secular spirituality. More than half of the references (59) were to
secularism and atheism, however.
Figure 2: Media references to religion 1982–3 and 2008–9
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These two charts provide evidence of the increase in references to religious
diversity as well as atheism and secularism. Quantitative data has two significant
limitations when it comes to interpretation, however. The increase in the number
of references may not automatically mean that the theme has become more pub-
licly significant. In our view, given the recent political climate, the increase in the
number of references to Islam has been significant. But the same holds true in
the case of atheism and secularism, much more than for Buddhism or Judaism,
for example. The discussion of atheism and secularism is largely an elite debate
covered in quality broadsheets rather than popular papers. References to athe-
ism and secularism are found mostly in The Times (32 in 2008–9), with the dis-
course being almost entirely absent in The Sun and the local paper. It is spread
more evenly among different television channels. Furthermore, the theme is not
addressed lightly with passing references (which is sometimes the case in re-
spect of terms denoting particular religions).When mentioned, atheism and sec-
ularism are often main issues in articles or television programmes. References
appear generally in news and current affairs and in editorials and comments.
Juxtapose this with the fact that, in 2008–9, Judaism was frequently referred
to in obituaries (in The Times), and that approximately half of the newspaper ref-
erences to Buddhism were in announcements/listings (in The Times and York-
shire Evening Post).We suggest that, when compared with other increasingly ref-
erenced religions, there is a qualitative difference in how atheism and secularism
are conceived and discussed.
Having provided statistical information and general data on media referen-
ces to Christianity, religious diversity and secularism/atheism, we turn now to
 In 1982–3 the category ‘Other World Religions’ included references to Shintoism, Confucia-
nism, Bahai and Zoroastrianism. In 2008–9 it also included references to Taoism and Jainism.
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our analysis of the first of two media events in which these themes were repre-
sented, the Geert Wilders event.
2 The Geert Wilders case, 2009
Geert Wilders, the Dutch Member of Parliament for the Party for Freedom (PVV),
was thrust back into the public eye on 13 February 2009 when he was refused
entry to Britain on public order grounds. He had been invited to a screening
of his own film, Fitna, in the House of Lords by Lord Pearson of the UK Inde-
pendence Party (UKIP).⁸ The Home Office denied entry under an EU law
which allows member states to do so on the grounds that the person constitutes
a threat to public policy, security or health. The anti-Islamic film espousing Wil-
ders’ views, combined with his personal presence, was deemed by the then
Home Secretary (Jacqui Smith) to be threatening community harmony and there-
fore public security. Despite being aware of this judgement, Wilders chose to fly
into London Heathrow knowing he would be turned back at the airport, thus cre-
ating a huge publicity coup.
Since producing Fitna,Wilders’ activities have been newsworthy for stimulat-
ing the expression of opinions and discourses about the role of religion in soci-
ety and its relation to national identity. This salience is demonstrated by the
amount of newspaper coverage of this event, 159 articles in all. In accordance
with the media analysis of an earlier Papal visit (1982), all British national news-
papers were analysed in addition to two local papers, The Yorkshire Post and the
Yorkshire Evening Post. Articles published in the print edition and online as well
as public letters and comments were included.
The event was largely interpreted as an issue of freedom of speech (a key
value in what we refer to as the ‘secular sacred’),⁹ with different newspapers dis-
playing different degrees of commitment to this. The event demonstrated domi-
nant responses to increased religious diversity in the UK, particularly in relation
to Islam, with different sections of society preferring to reinforce either Christian
or secular identities. All the newspapers used the event to attack the New Labour
Government’s decision to ban Wilders.
 In 2008, Wilders produced a short film, Fitna (variously translated, but in the UK press
rendered as ‘discord’ or ‘strife’), which juxtaposes violent images of extreme Islamism with
verses from the Qur’an. It was widely and globally criticised as Islamophobic.
 By ‘secular sacred’ we mean those beliefs, practices and values that are explicitly non-
religious but are nevertheless held to be non-negotiable and often referred to as ‘sacred’ by those
who hold them, e.g., freedom of speech and human rights.
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2.1 Christianity
The case allowed the conservative press to illustrate what it saw as the increas-
ing ‘Islamification’ of the UK, due to liberal policies of tolerance (equated by
some journalists with submission and appeasement) and the resulting ‘margin-
alisation’ of Christianity. Whilst the newspapers distanced themselves from Wil-
ders to avoid being labelled racist, the attention given to him and his arguments
provided an outlet for saying the unsayable (about Islam) in the guise of claims
of double standards and freedom of speech.
The construction of Wilders varied according to the degree of sympathy with
his views. For The Daily Mail he was a ‘democratically elected Dutch MP’ (13/2/
2009), but to The Guardian he was ‘virulently anti-Islamic’ (11/2/2009). For the
conservative press, the attention to free speech appears to have been expedient,
given their frequent demands to deport ‘preachers of hate’ and their stance on
censorship in relation to other issues. Ironically, then, the curtailment of free
speech was seen to have been brought about by liberal authoritarianism (in
the form of political correctness). Liberal thought was therefore held to be re-
sponsible for the ‘Islamification’ of society and erosion of British, including
Christian, values. Here, universal values (freedom) were localised and placed
in opposition to Islam, which was constructed as naturally censorious (all of
the papers highlighted the violent protests against the film, Fitna, across the
Muslim world). In banning Wilders, the government was presented as submitting
to the will of Muslims.
The preferential treatment awarded to Muslims at the expense of Christianity
and British values was a common theme more generally. This was encapsulated
by The Daily Express in Leo McKinstry’s commentary, ‘Why Christianity is on the
ropes in Labour’s Britain’ (16/2/09): ‘If we in the West fail to stand up for our own
values of liberty, freedom of speech, tolerance and democracy, they will be swept
away by the growing demands of Islam which, Wilders argues, is incompatible
with European values.’ Elsewhere in the paper, columnist Julia Hartley-Brewer
argued that ‘Wilders is not Abu Hamza. His film doesn’t preach hate, it preaches
that tolerance of the intolerant will ultimately lead to the end of tolerance and,
with it, our civilisation.Wilders may be wrong about a lot of things but he’s not
wrong about that’ (The Daily Express 15/2/09).
For The Telegraph, the main purpose of its coverage of Wilders was to focus
attention on the diminishing role of Christianity and secondary treatment of
Christians within the UK (whilst, according to the paper, Muslims are appeased).
This was the theme of six articles. Its position is summed up in the editorial, ‘The
priorities of a Christian country’:
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Although many state officials seem determined to forget it, Britain still has a state religion
[…] That is why the stories that we publish today are so surprising, for they suggest that
there is a concerted attempt by some officials to marginalise and to diminish the Christian
faith […] [F]or many state officials, the most important goal is to avoid offending any reli-
gious sensibility except Christianity […] Christianity is and should be in a privileged posi-
tion in Britain. (14/2/09)
This Christian identity was held most strongly by The Daily Express, The Tele-
graph and The Daily Mail (and is also evident at times in The Sun, but less so
in coverage of this case). The Times, Financial Times, Yorkshire Evening Post
and Yorkshire Post represented Britain as secular first, then Christian.
A discourse of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ was constructed, with Wilders on the outside,
but the conservative press largely reinforcing his views. By constructing Britain
as a Christian country, Muslims were excluded. The emphasis on ‘freedom of
speech’ by the conservative press was instrumental. It operated as a means of
emphasising a cultural clash and further placing Muslims on the outside of Brit-
ish society.
2.2 Secularism
There were a few explicit references to secularism in the liberal press, but gen-
erally it was implicit in the text. For example, well-known secularists were invit-
ed to comment, as in the case of Johann Hari, who noted that ‘generations of
British people fought to create a secular space’ (The Independent 13/2/09). A.
C. Grayling depicted religion – but not secularism – as an identity position:
‘all religions have their extremist minorities’ (The Guardian, 13/2/09).
Overall, the press drew on liberal values to make sense of what had hap-
pened. Freedom of speech was given an almost absolutist position and treated
as unconditional. The Guardian, whose poll encapsulated its coverage by formu-
lating the question within the framework through which the event would then be
interpreted, asked, ‘On the grounds of free speech should he [Wilders] be let in?’
(12/02/09); 84.4 % of Guardian Online readers voted ‘Yes: It goes against the prin-
ciples of free speech to ban him’. The Guardian’s commentary ran for a further
nine days online following the last print article. Its website sets an industry stan-
dard in online news, providing extensive debate on a range of issues. However, it
is the unevenness of this commentary that is of interest here. The Guardian’s po-
sition was that freedom of speech should be an absolute, with no exceptions: ‘We
cannot pick and choose what freedom we defend’ (12/2/09 online). Its two edito-
rials made this explicit; in one, ‘Ban on Wilders was folly’ (The Observer 15/2/09),
it is claimed that ‘Opinions, however odious, cannot in themselves be criminal’,
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while the other is self-evident: ‘Britain’s political establishment has in an unwit-
ting, collaborative effort of stupidity and democratic illiteracy presented itself as
an accomplice to extremisms and enemy of free speech’.¹⁰ However, there were
no significant appeals for freedom of speech in response to the Phelps church,
a virulently homophobic US Christian sect, which threatened to picket a play
about the murder of a gay man in the UK. Another liberal paper, The Independ-
ent, did acknowledge the limitations to free speech. Its editorial on 13/2/09 ar-
gued, ‘There are, it must be accepted, limitations on those freedoms. The Govern-
ment has a responsibility to preserve the safety of minority groups in Britain’.
However, it then went on to say that, in this case, the line had not been crossed.
Both these papers demonstrated greater inclusivity than others, with occa-
sional Muslim voices and counter discourse. For example, The Guardian includ-
ed an article from Lord (Nazir) Ahmed (a Muslim peer), ‘Wilders ban is in Brit-
ain’s best interests’, in which he defended his own position of support for the
ban and pointed out something largely ignored elsewhere in the press, that Mus-
lims too have been banned (13/2/09). However, this further reinforced a dichot-
omising discourse whereby Muslim illiberalism was presented as at odds with
liberal democracy, the core of British identity, again positioning Muslims as out-
siders. In emphasising the value of freedom of speech and locating this as both
British and secular, Britain was implicitly constructed as a secular country.¹¹
2.3 Diversity
In the case of the reporting of the Geert Wilders case, religious diversity is not
represented in a positive light. Whilst there are some acknowledgements of the
possibility of moderate Muslims in the conservative press (two references each
in The Sun and The Daily Mail), Muslims are mainly conceptualised in their ex-
treme form as ‘preachers of hate’. Lord Ahmed is named as the instigator who
alerted the Home Office to the film screening (thus implying that Muslims are
troublemakers); but he is also presented as having double standards in ‘inviting
an al Qaeda fundraiser into Westminster’ (The Sun 13/2/09).
No Muslim voices featured at all in The Times or The Daily Mail. However,
there is a distinction in The Times between ordinary Muslims and Islamists:
‘There is a world of difference between Islam the great religion and Islamism
 The Observer is The Guardian’s Sunday newspaper.
 This construction can be compared to sections of the American press (Newsweek, The New
York Times), where the case was interpreted as an attack on Muslims who should be defended
(Poole, forthcoming).
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the ideology of submission’ (in a commentary by Michael Gove, 16/2/09). The
Telegraph made a similar distinction in an article by Charles Moore (13/2/09).
However, the rest of this piece was then used to attack the negative features of
Islam:
The unpleasant power of Fitna is that the atrocities it depicts and the preaching it shows
are real and recent, and they were all carried out or uttered by Muslims acting, explicitly,
in the name of their faith. You could not, in our age, compile any comparable clips of Jews
or Christians. As a matter of plain fact, Islamic terrorism exists. Another plain fact about
current Muslim culture is the use of the angry demonstration, the constant agitation to
ban a book or insist on the veil, the bristling search for offence. So it would be silly to pre-
tend that there is no problem about Muslim attitudes to a plural, free, democratic society.
(The Telegraph, 13/2/09)
The two liberal broadsheets provided more space for Muslim voices, with five
each, in The Guardian as writers and in The Independent as three writers and
two sources. Yet, in its extensive coverage of this story, The Guardian made sur-
prisingly little reference to Muslims. Is its way of dealing with promoting freedom
of speech without offending Muslims to cancel them out of the discussion?
Whilst these liberal newspapers are clearly not anti-Islamic, Muslims were prob-
lematised in their secular human rights stance (in which religious freedom was
opposed at the expense of other freedoms). This ‘exclusive liberalism’ was more
evident in The Independent and was demonstrated in a strongly anti-religious,
pro-secularist, pro-freedom-of-speech piece written by regular commentator, Jo-
hann Hari. The purpose of the article was to defend an item he had written in
The New Statesman in India on a similar topic, which provoked ‘four thousand
Islamic fundamentalists to riot outside their office’ (13/2/09). This article clearly
set up an opposition between the secular and rational who protect human rights
and the religious and fanatical who abuse them: ‘If we leave the basic human
values of free speech, feminism and gay rights undefended in the face of violent
religious mobs – many many more people will be hurt’ (The Independent, 13/2/
09).Whilst it cannot be said that this piece necessarily represented the stance of
The Independent, it is an example of the kind of voice it provides space for.
In the reporting of this case, British values were clearly defined, and Mus-
lims were repeatedly constructed in opposition to these. The press polarised
the debate, choosing to ignore evidence that minorities may seek to be part of
it. The lack of integration of Muslim minorities was represented as the result
of incommensurable cultural and religious differences. For the press, the Wilders
case highlighted the problem of Muslims in British society as one of a ‘clash of
cultures’ (The Daily Mail 12/2/09).What was represented then was an anti-multi-
culturalist stance, aligned with an anti-immigration discourse. There were some
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explicit references to this. In The Mail on Sunday, John Laughland (15/2/09) de-
clared himself to be incredulous regarding multiculturalism, which he interpret-
ed as ‘demanding […] Britain renounce all traditions in favour of those of new-
comers’. He went on: ‘Multiculturalists may say you cannot impose your views
on others but they are frighteningly good at imposing theirs on all of us’.
This story shows that immigration and religious diversity are still construct-
ed as a problem for the UK. What is interesting is the convergence of views
amongst liberals and conservatives. The secular liberal hegemony cannot accom-
modate the public and assertive nature of popular religious (Muslim) political
agency within its conception of equality (which was previously based on
race). The mirroring of the political activism of equal rights groups by Muslims
has reopened questions about the place of religion in the public sphere, ques-
tions that were previously thought settled. In the reactions of these socio-polit-
ical elites, various political hegemonies are reinforced in terms of either an exclu-
sive nationalism or, amongst the secular elite, an exclusionary multiculturalism.
Neither position is helpful to the workings of a multicultural democracy, given
that they exclude Muslims from a conceptualisation of British citizenship. The
reaction by the New Labour government was to replace multiculturalism with
an assimilationist ‘cohesion’ agenda – witnessed in the citizenship policies in-
troduced in the years following the inner-city disturbances of 2001. The political
causes of the current situation at home and abroad were obscured as religio-cul-
tural differences and were brought to the fore and blamed in ‘the clash of civi-
lisations’ discourse.
3 The Papal visit, 2010
If Christianity, secularism/atheism and religious diversity are the three key
themes in the media coverage of religion generally, the media coverage of the
Papal visit was no exception.
In September 2010 Pope Benedict XVI flew to Britain for a four-day state visit
at the invitation of the government. This was the first Papal visit since 1982,when
the previous Pope, John Paul II, had undertaken a six-day pastoral tour (the sub-
ject of an earlier study; see Knott 1984). During the 2010 visit, the full range of
daily newspapers were collected systematically for six days – starting one day
before the Pope’s arrival and finishing one day after his departure. The primary
material consisted of nearly 600 articles and more than 600 images. In addition,
television programmes – almost 13 hours of live coverage by the BBC, four doc-
umentaries, and news and talk shows – were examined before and during the
visit.Websites, particularly the official one for the Papal visit and the sites of in-
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terest groups such as the National Secular Society and the British Humanist As-
sociation, were also monitored.
The papal visit turned into a celebratory media narrative as pre-visit uncer-
tainties and controversy melted away during the tour and finally transformed
into sympathy, relief and joy: from a tale of doubt to one of success. One of
the reasons for pre-visit reservations in 2010 was financial; many thought
that, at a time of huge cuts, public funding could have been spent more wisely.
Another reason for doubt was the Catholic child abuse controversy, which over-
shadowed the pre-visit coverage. It is telling that, of the six million British Cath-
olics, more than half were in favour of the visit, whereas only 14 % of the nation
at large supported the visit (The Daily Mirror 15/9/10).
One additional doubt was the personality of the Pope himself. If Benedict
has been labelled as a Pope of content rather than image, it is partly because
his predecessor John Paul II was thought to be a charismatic celebrity. However,
all of the newspapers as well as the BBC deemed the 2010 visit to have been a
success; ‘God’s Rottweiler’ was overturned by the image of a ‘warmer, more
human and less rigid’ Pope (The Independent 20/9/10). The whole trip was ‘a re-
sounding success’ (The Daily Telegraph 20/9/10), ‘beyond all expectations’ (The
Times 20/9/10). Some weeks after the visit The Daily Telegraph columnist, Chris-
topher Howse, wondered what had changed and suggested it was the reputation
of the Pope from a conservative and rigid man to one who was a little shy and
thoughtful (23/10/10).
Even though the overall media coverage of the Papal visit was positive, there
were some visible differences between newspapers. Some of these will be ad-
dressed in the following sections on the three key themes, but the general pat-
tern was that the popular conservative British newspapers were also pro-Christi-
an and pro-Pope. The conservative tabloids (the Labour-supporting The Daily
Mirror being an exception) took a defensive stance towards critics of the Pope.
They were keen to highlight the Pope’s message on the marginalisation of Chris-
tianity in secular Britain. The most popular broadsheet, The Daily Telegraph, cov-
ered the visit with interest and adopted an extremely positive approach. The
Times was mainly positive, though it dealt with some critical issues, too. Other
broadsheets, whose circulation is smaller and whose political support is liberal
or left wing, were more critical of the visit and of the Pope himself. The Guardian
gave some positive coverage, but balanced it with critical commentary. By giving
voice to the victims of child-abuse, The Independent was more directly critical
(but stopped short of siding with public atheists like Richard Dawkins, as will
be shown later).
We have noted that Christianity, secularism/atheism and religious diversity
(particularly in relation to Islam) are key themes in the media coverage of reli-
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gion generally. However, in each case these themes are made meaningful in dif-
ferent ways.We will now explore how the media emphasized these three themes
during the Pope’s visit.
3.1 The marginalisation of Christianity
According to the newspapers, the marginalisation of Christianity was Benedict’s
main message to Britain. The Pope said that he ‘cannot but voice [his] concern at
the increasing marginalisation of religion, particularly of Christianity’, and con-
tinued that ‘there are those who would advocate that the voice of religion be si-
lenced, or at least relegated to the purely private sphere’ (The Daily Express 18/9/
10).
The main target of his complaint was understood to be ‘aggressive secular-
ism’, but religions other than Christianity were also presented as a cause for con-
cern. For instance, the Pope suggested that celebrating Christmas in a Christian
way was under threat because it was seen to offend ‘those of other religions or
none’ (The Daily Express 18/9/10). Some newspapers took the Papal view as evi-
dence of diversity gone too far, but, in the tabloids particularly, his opinion was
used to bash the ‘political correctness’ of ‘atheist Left-wingers’. For example, The
Daily Express (18/9/10) ran the headline, ‘Pope’s plea to help save Christmas from
the PC brigade’.
Even though ‘marginalisation’ was sometimes printed with scare quotes,
suggesting that the paper did not necessarily condone the expression, the idea
gained surprising agreement in many papers. More secular-minded journalists
thought that the warnings were far-fetched, but there was nevertheless strong
support for the Pope’s message. Nick Ferrari, a columnist from The Sunday Ex-
press (19/9/10), concluded with support for a society which ‘embraces all peoples
and allows them to celebrate their many religions and enjoy their Hanukkah,
Eid, Diwali or whatever else it might be, while all the time accepting that this
is a Christian country with Christian core beliefs and values’. Furthermore,
The Daily Star (17/9/10) editorial suggested that ‘we have a strong history for wel-
coming all cultures to our shores. But there’s a growing sentiment across the
country that our traditions are being slowly lost’. These views reinforced the dif-
ference and hierarchy between ‘their cultures’ and ‘our Christian tradition’, the
latter being valued highly and seen to be in need of defence from marginalisa-
tion.
The Pope’s defence of Christianity’s role in public life led some in the media
to desire equivalently authoritative British voices. A comparison was made with
the Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams. The Daily Mail (20/9/10) argued
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that the Archbishop is ‘so cowed by the forces of secularism that he no longer
poses any threat to their bleak vision’ and wondered ‘if only the Archbishop
dared to speak with a fraction of Benedict’s authority’.
It is perhaps not surprising that there was no equivalent discourse on the
marginalisation of Christianity at the time of the earlier Papal visit in 1982.
Pope John Paul II’s concerns about marginalisation were focused on the sick,
elderly, handicapped and unemployed, not those in a hegemonic position in
British society. The difference between the two Popes was certainly a matter of
personality, but time and context made their own demands. By 2010 it was
felt necessary to reclaim the position once held by Christianity and to justify it
in public discourse against (real or imagined) threats posed by increasing diver-
sity and more audible atheism and secularism.
3.2 Secularism and atheism: aggression and unholy warlords
Before the visit, campaigning secularists and atheists were responsible for re-
peated provocation in the media, the best-known example being the widely pub-
lished call by Richard Dawkins to have the Pope arrested (originally printed on
the front page of The Times, 11/4/10). These voices were further aroused on the
eve of the visit, when Catholic Cardinal Walter Kasper was quoted as warning
of the rise of a ‘new and aggressive atheism’ in Britain and of suggesting that ar-
riving at Heathrow was like ‘landing in a third world country’. This was taken as
an offence against cultural and religious diversity. Most newspapers condemned
Kasper’s views and named him ‘The Pope’s Dope’ (The Daily Mirror 16/9/10; The
Sun 16/9/10). The statement was seen by right-wing, pro-Christian papers as ‘a
gift to the […] left-wing atheists’ (The Daily Mail 16/9/10). Furthermore, in his
opening speech the Pope seemed to reinforce his Cardinal’s point by referring
to the ‘atheist extremism of the 20th century’, which – though unarguably a ref-
erence to Nazi Germany – was intended as a comment on the current British sit-
uation.
The day before the visit started, an ‘atheistic protest letter’, signed by Ri-
chard Dawkins, Stephen Fry, Terry Pratchett, Philip Pullman, Susan Blackmore,
AC Grayling and 49 others, was published in The Guardian (15/9/10). It argued
that the Pope should not have been given the honour of a state visit because
the organisation of which he was head had been responsible for opposing
equal rights. The letter was covered in many newspapers. There were follow-
up articles dealing with these celebrities and public intellectual figures, accom-
panied by pieces on ordinary protesters (mainly the victims of child abuse and
their representatives). The tabloids gave space to the topic but condemned the
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letter as ‘spitting venom’, ‘a celebrity vendetta’, written by ‘the Left-wing chorus’
and motivated by ‘empty hatred’. All the anti-Papal voices were lumped together
as atheist Left-wingers, multiculturalists and PC killjoys (see The Sun 18/9/10 to
20/9/10). They were undoubtedly far from homogeneous, but it is significant to
note the manner and intensity with which the pro-Pope tabloids presented
and condemned them, even though some columnists in the same papers
found the Pope’s references to aggressive atheism rather odd.
Even the broadsheets had ambiguous attitudes to the outspoken atheist and
secularist criticism of religion. The views of Dawkins and others were published,
but they were also criticised in the media – and not simply by avowedly religious
journalists. For instance, Janice Turner, who spoke of a non-aggressive ‘true sec-
ularism’ which promotes an alliance with progressive and liberal religious
groups against conservative voices, called Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitch-
ens and Stephen Hawking ‘macho atheists’ and ‘unholy warlords’ (The Times
18/9/10). A similarly well-known atheist, Julian Baggini, wrote in The Guardian
(18/9/10) that campaigning does not work if it simply makes as much noise as
possible without trying to bring dissatisfied Catholics along with the common
cause. A similar message was voiced when The Independent (18/9/10) published
a comment by Richard Ingrams, who suggested that ‘atheism could do without
Dawkins’.
Richard Dawkins often succeeds in getting his message across in the British
media, despite the fact that his views are criticised by religious and non-religious
journalists, readers and intellectual figures alike. On this occasion there was
good reason for Dawkins and others to be criticised, as this directed more atten-
tion to those with genuine cause for acknowledgment; empathy was expressed
for the victims of Catholic child abuse and their contrast with the self-promotion
of celebrities and intellectual figures, making the arguments of the latter look
even more hollow than in normal circumstances.
3.3 Religious diversity: from ecumenism to interfaith
The 1982 Papal visit had been framed principally in Christian terms. John Paul II
offered an ecumenical approach, talked about the ‘restoration of unity among
Christians’ and signed a declaration for improving Christian dialogue. In the of-
ficial souvenir guide he was described as ‘a pilgrim of Christian unity’ (Knott
1984: 36). The Pope was seen as a wave in the tide of an ecumenical movement
supported by all the newspapers. They gave him a ‘Protestant welcome’ but in-
vited ecumenism as a positive and inevitable trend for overcoming disagreement
between Catholics and Protestants (Knott 1984: 37–48).
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This Christian ecumenical tone had altered to one focused on religious diver-
sity and interfaith relations in the media coverage of the 2010 visit. A Sikh man
was recorded as saying that the Pope spoke beyond Catholics and to be religious
today was to be inter-religious (BBC1 16/9/10); BBC1’s Look North ran a story
about Muslim children who participated in the choir that sang for the Pope
(15/9/10); The Times (15/9/10) published an article on Muslims welcoming the
Pope to Britain; The Daily Mirror (18/9/10) ran the headline ‘A Man for All Reli-
gions’ and suggested that he ‘speaks to us all […] not just Catholics’ (17/9/10).
Furthermore, the Prime Minister, David Cameron, was quoted as saying that
the visit was a ‘unique opportunity to celebrate the good works of religious
groups’ (The Daily Telegraph 15/9/10) and one that furthered ‘intercultural and
interreligious dialogue for the enrichment of the entire community’ (The Guard-
ian 20/9/10). This emphasis was by no means evident from the Pope’s general
attitude or speeches. Crucially, it was the media that highlighted diversity and
constructed this as an interfaith event.
The promotion of religious diversity and an interfaith attitude does not re-
quire full equality to be attributed to all traditions. Instead, it operates by mak-
ing a distinction and favouring moderate (good) over extreme (bad) forms of re-
ligiosity. It is Islam that has been used as the prototypical media example of
extremism, though discourse on Islam has focused on moderate as well as ex-
treme dimensions.We can see this discourse at work in stories about the ‘Muslim
plot to kill Pope’ (The Daily Express 18/9/10, front page).
On 18 September the media reported that the police had arrested six male
cleaners suspected of attempting to assassinate the Pope. Their houses were
searched, and they were released after the police had found nothing suspicious.
The whole ‘plot’ turned out to be a false alarm, but it served as an opportunity to
reinforce the connection between Islam and terrorism. Some papers were embar-
rassed to have exaggerated the story, while others hurried to defend themselves
by claiming that there had been a serious threat. Nevertheless, most papers
made news out of the ‘plot’. Because there was little information, the actual
story was filled with speculation, particularly about the ethnic origin and reli-
giosity of the cleaners. The Independent was an exception. It did not feature
the story on the front page and avoided sensational headlines when it reported
on security issues, the arrests and the lack of evidence.
This case showed how eager the British newspapers were to demonise Islam
when an appropriate occasion arose. But it was also a good example of the way
in which the media handle the changing religious context and increased diver-
sity. A positive image of religious diversity is constructed by including all reli-
gions whilst continuing to privilege Anglican Christianity and to exclude unac-
ceptable (Islamist) extremism. But those who are included – moderate
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Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, Jews and other Christian denominations –
are presented in a fairly positive light, because they are seen as non-threatening
and potentially able to contribute to public policy (‘the Big Society’) through so-
cial action (cf. Beckford 2010).
4 Christianity, secularism and religious diversity:
three themes, multiple discourses
In terms of the discursive representations of Christianity, secularism and reli-
gious diversity, how did the media coverage of the banning of Geert Wilders
and the visit of Pope Benedict compare?
In the Wilders case, Britain was constructed primarily as ‘a Christian coun-
try’ (in opposition to the ‘Islamification of society’ and the imagined preferential
treatment awarded to Muslims), especially by the right-wing papers. The liberal,
left-leaning press employed discourses of secularism in defence of liberalism in
general and freedom of speech in particular; they implicitly constructed Britain
as ‘a secular society’.Wilders himself was labelled as both virulently anti-Islamic
and a voice against a censorious Islam, reflecting the location of the case within
a struggle over issues of religious diversity. In the right-wing papers, tolerance
towards Islam was interpreted as cowardly submission, and Muslims were con-
structed with reference to hate preachers, though there was some acknowledge-
ment of the possibility of a moderate Islam. The case was also used to lambast
Labour government policy (in refusing entry to Wilders whilst letting Muslim
‘preachers of hate’ stay in the UK).¹²
These three themes were also significant in media coverage of the Papal
visit. Concern over the marginalisation of Christianity was expressed, and Britain
was constructed in the right-wing tabloids as a Christian country. Despite the fact
that they did not condone the most conservative aspects of the Pope’s message,
these papers constructed an exclusive secularism and ‘aggressive atheism’ as the
enemies of ‘people of faith’ and as threats to people’s hopes and enjoyment.
Contrary to the case of Wilders, religious diversity was represented as a positive
force for society through benign images of Catholics, Sikhs and Muslim children
and references to interfaith relations and their enrichment for the whole society.
The reporting of public statements by Prime Minister David Cameron helped to
endorse this message.
 Labour were the political party in Government until the election of May 2010, when they
were superseded by a Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition.
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During the visit the media treatment of the three themes illuminated several
broad changes in relation to discourse on religion: Christianity was seen, rightly
or wrongly, as marginalised, thus reflecting a situation in which none of the tra-
ditions could be taken for granted as they must all justify themselves publicly.
Identifying the ‘enemies of religion’ also contributed to the increased public vis-
ibility of atheism and secularism, barely acknowledged at the time of the previ-
ous Papal visit in 1982. Furthermore, at that time, public controversy had focused
on relations between Protestants and Catholics, for which ecumenism was seen
as the solution; interfaith relations had replaced ecumenism by 2010, reflecting
the need to cope with increased diversity and make sense of it in terms of a com-
mon framework of ‘faith’ rather than ‘religion’ (Smith 2004).
All three themes have been witnessed – with two increasing in prominence
since the 1980 s – in the media representations of the role and place of religion
in contemporary British society, though their meanings, functions and relation-
ships vary, depending on both the case and the media standpoint. A concern for
the marginalisation of Christianity at the time of the Wilders case was supersed-
ed by a reassertion of the visibility of Christianity during the Papal visit, though
it could not to be said to have emerged covered in glory (with accusations of
abuse and conservative anti-liberalism tempering more positive coverage). If
the Wilders case highlighted the ‘secular sacred’ value of freedom of speech, dur-
ing the Papal visit the focus shifted to human rights. The atheist agenda was also
presented, whereas during the Wilders case it was secularism that merited cover-
age. And in terms of religious diversity, the two events were constructed very dif-
ferently, with a negative Islamophobic media orientation in the earlier case and
diversity and interfaith relations celebrated in the latter, partly – and somewhat
ironically – in response to the Papal attack on British secular pluralism.
According to both the quantitative evidence and detailed exploration of
these two recent events, the media continue to present Britain as Christian,
but increasingly secular and religiously diverse. The dominant discourse in the
popular media is of an engagement between traditional Christianity and moder-
ate secularity, which allows for a certain degree of cultural, including religious,
diversity. Although the common view (certainly among religious commentators)
is of a secularist, anti-religious British media, this is not mirrored in actual
media portrayals (except in some coverage in left-leaning newspapers). A broad-
ly positive attitude towards religions is displayed, especially to Christianity,
though less so to Islam. It is important to remember, however, as our analysis
of these two events has shown, that the British media is not homogeneous; nei-
ther are its reporters, presenters and commentators when it comes to covering
religion.
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These findings offer further evidence that religion is back on the agenda of
public life in Britain (Woodhead and Catto 2012) and that the media are increas-
ingly interested in religion as well as its antithesis – secularism and atheism.
This does not necessarily mean that the social significance of religion has in-
creased or even that there is a resurgence of religion. Its increased visibility is
connected to the changing configuration, role, place and function of religion
and other ideological formations in society. Any glib assumptions about the di-
rection of travel of religion in contemporary Britain – whether the decline of
Christianity, the Islamification of society or the unrelenting process of seculari-
sation – are challenged in a media environment that variously narrates the cur-
rent context with reference to the three separate poles of Christianity, secular-
ism/atheism and religious diversity.
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Lyn Thomas
Religion for a Postsecular Society?
Discourses of Gender, Religion and
Secularity in the Reception of BBC2’s
The Monastery and The Convent
1 Introduction
In The Monastery (BBC 2005) the Benedictine monks of Worth Abbey in Sussex
welcomed five ‘ordinary men’ into the monastery and their monastic routines for
six weeks. The programme was a surprise success, attracting an average of 2.4
million viewers and a 10 % audience share across its three broadcasts (Deans
2005) and generating a follow-up programme, The Monastery Revisited (2006),
and two ‘sequels’, The Convent (2006) and The Retreat (2007). A further pro-
gramme, The Big Silence (2010), focused on the then Abbot of Worth, Christopher
Jamison, introducing the concept and experience of silence to the lives of five
men and women through sojourns at Worth and at a Jesuit Retreat Centre in
Wales. An American remake of The Monastery was also broadcast on the ‘Learn-
ing Channel’ in 2006 (Tiger/Tigress Productions 2006). In this chapter I aim to
analyse the meaning of this success and its significance in terms of debates
about the relationship between religion (in this case, Christianity) and secularity
in contemporary British culture.
My approach is premised on the view that the success of The Monastery is
both a discursive construction and a real phenomenon, with thousands of view-
ers visiting the website of Worth Abbey after the broadcast and hundreds subse-
quently going on retreats at Worth. Here I focus on the discursive nature of the
success through a study of the press reception of the programme, which is then
contrasted with that of the sequel programme The Convent. This comparison in-
troduces the important lens of gender to the discussion as well as an exploration
of the relationship between gender and ‘desirable’ representations of religion.
The second part of the chapter analyses a small group of engaged viewers in
their appropriations of, and relationships to, these two programmes. ‘Engaged’
here is defined in part through the mode of recruitment at four retreat weekends
at Worth Abbey held in May, June and July 2006, immediately prior to and during
the broadcast of The Convent on BBC2; these respondents had all watched The
Monastery and The Convent with high levels of interest and enthusiasm, and
some of them described their presence at Worth as a direct result of watching
The Monastery. The responses analysed here take the form of talk and written
text (emails and open-ended questionnaires), but the material dimension of
the response to the programmes, in the form of journeys from all over Britain
and Ireland to Worth Abbey, is also borne in mind. This discussion is thus, in
this sense, concerned with a modern form of media-influenced pilgrimage (Coul-
dry 2003).
My analysis here is based on Ward and Hoelzl’s work (2008) on the new vis-
ibility of religion, defined as a ‘new awareness of religion’ rather than the re-
emergence of traditional religions after a decline. It is also in this sense that I
am using the term ‘postsecular’; that is, not in terms of a return to religion
after a secular age, but rather to suggest both that the postsecular is itself a con-
struct and to describe a culture where a strong secular current is accompanied by
a new visibilisation of religion. The emphasis is thus on visibility and the forms it
takes, and my aim is to explore what Ward and Hoelzl (2008: 5) call ‘the differ-
ences between the phenomena, the seeing of these phenomena, where they are
being seen, who is making them seen, and how they are evaluated’ through the
study of the reception of two recent ‘religious’ programmes which achieved some
measure of audience and critical success. How do these programmes and their
reception make religion visible? How does gender inflect these representations
and their reception? How do they participate in broader discourses and represen-
tations of religion and secularity in contemporary British culture?
2 The programmes
The Monastery, first broadcast in May 2005, was arguably a hybrid of reality tele-
vision and documentary forms, even though its producers were strongly resistant
to any connection with reality TV:
There were no stunts, no contests, no votes, no faked scenes, no hidden cameras, no shoot-
ing scripts, essentially no formalised ‘format’ – all of which, more or less, are elements of
what is known as ‘Reality TV’. Indeed it was because we set our face against those modern
TV tricks that we secured the confidence of, and access to the host organisations, and thus
made the programmes possible. (Solomon 2006)
Despite this, the five participants were required to leave their ordinary lives and
the accoutrements of modern living, such as mobile phones, and, of course, to be
filmed regularly over the six week period. Like Big Brother this was an experi-
ment in living at close quarters with strangers, surrounded by cameras, with
the crucial difference, as discussed elsewhere, that the experience and the rela-
tionships were mediated by the sensitive and caring interventions of the monks
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(Thomas 2011: 558–572). The programme-makers attempted to differentiate this
programme from reality TV formats and to inscribe it as ‘quality’ television by
adopting high production values such as background music in the classical reg-
ister (combined with the monks’ ethereal chants), location filming of a land-
scape and setting worthy of a heritage film, and slow, lingering shots of the
monks and men at prayer, objects such as candle flames and the Abbey Church.
These effects were compounded by the middle-class educated language of the
voice-over commentary, much of the monks’ and the men’s talk and the Abbot’s
reflections on the men’s progress. The focus on ‘quality’ in the production of The
Monastery suggests that class is one of the elements in its success – I will return
to this theme later in the chapter.
Perhaps, however, the most innovative aspect of The Monastery is the film-
ing of moments of silence; in the first programme of the series, one of the monks,
Father Luke, asks the men to listen to the silence in the Abbey Church; the pro-
gramme then develops this theme, which perhaps reaches its apogee in what
was described by the viewers/retreatants I interviewed as ‘Tony’s white stone
moment’. In this scene, in a final meeting with his mentor, Father Francis,
Tony describes a strange state that he has never experienced before and that
he can only comprehend as the presence of God. He says he is struggling to
find words to describe this, and Father Francis advises him not to bother. The
camera then focuses on Tony’s expression of awe and wonder for several mi-
nutes, and nothing is said. Finally, Father Francis gives Tony a blessing. This
is in sharp contrast to the constant verbalisation and movement required of par-
ticipants in reality TV shows, who are often castigated for being too quiet or in-
active by programme presenters and the press. Moments of silence are clearly
unusual for the medium generally, and, as we will see, this daring scene was
much remarked on.
The Convent was an altogether noisier programme than The Monastery, de-
spite the nuns’ spiritual and quiet lives. The men in The Monastery do indeed
have conflicts, and even at one point a shouting match, but this is framed by
the quietness I have described, which is present but more fragmented in The
Convent. The four women participants in The Convent are represented as being
at a crisis point in their lives, and there is a great deal of rule-breaking, soul-
searching and crying. The Convent seems to be offering different pleasures,
those of a high level of affective expression, rather than the tranquil scenes
and settings of The Monastery; the ‘soap opera’ narrative of the women’s lives
and stay in The Convent is stronger here than the claims to ‘quality’ television
we see in The Monastery. These differences are already indicated by the trailer
for the programme, which billed it as ‘detox for the soul’ and constructed a
pink and beauty-products-oriented version of femininity through images of
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‘pampering’, which must have seemed a far cry from the realities of their lives to
the nuns, ever busy with domestic duties or calls to prayer. The change in pro-
duction team necessitated by the imperative to maintain an all-female environ-
ment at the convent may in part explain these differences.
Religion, then, becomes visible here in highly gendered form. The monks are
not shown engaging in domestic tasks,whereas the nuns are; the monks officiate
at mass, whereas of course the nuns must rely on the good offices of the local
parish priest. The filming of the vast space of the Abbey Church and extensive
grounds at Worth creates an image of austere but transcendent spirituality, tradi-
tionally associated with masculinity (Woodhead and Sointu 2008: 259–276). The
nuns inhabit a smaller space and are more confined than the monks, who go out
into the world as priests, teachers and nurses; a claustrophobic quality is con-
veyed through the filming of that space and of the women participants’ rebellion
against their confinement within it. In what follows I will consider the extent to
which the reception of the programmes is marked and differentiated both by
gender and class and how it participates in the construction of ‘postsecular Brit-
ain’.
3 The press reception of The Monastery and
The Convent
My analysis of the press reception of the two programmes is based on samples of
newspaper reviews or short comments at the time of or immediately preceding
the broadcasts, collected using the Lexis Nexis database. In this time frame,
The Monastery was reviewed in nine national papers and six regional or Scottish
ones, and there were in total 29 press reviews or short comments, with most (21)
appearing in the national, mainly ‘broadsheet’ press. The Guardian, The Tele-
graph, The Times and The Observer all reviewed the programme four times,
while The Mirror mentioned it only once, The Mail on Sunday published one re-
view and The Sun ignored it completely. The ‘quality papers’ (The Guardian, The
Telegraph, The Times, The Observer and The Independent) thus constitute 62 % of
this sample of the press reception of The Monastery and also provide almost
four-fifths of the positive reviews of the programme. Overall 22 of 29 (i.e.,
76 %) of the reviews are positive, four are negative, and three are mixed or neu-
tral (24 %). The negative reviews are concentrated in the regional and Scottish
press: two in the Glasgow Herald, one in the Evening Standard and one in The
Scotsman.
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The theme of the quality of the programmes, and particularly their quality in
relation to other examples of reality television, is present in 45 % of the pieces
and thus is arguably the dominant discourse. Interestingly, most critics have few
qualms about referring to The Monastery as reality television whilst simultane-
ously praising its quality features, unlike the programme-makers for whom, as
we have seen, this was anathema. Mark Lawson (2005: 17) writing in The Guard-
ian commented, for instance: ‘Gabe Solomon’s elegant and thoughtful series has
already achieved a miracle: restoring the reputation of reality TV’. Here reality
television has been elevated to a higher cultural status through the acquisition
of a named auteur, the co-producer, Gabe Solomon. The then Abbot of Worth,
Christopher Jamison, was also identified as a kind of auteur by critics; Lawson,
for instance, described him as combining an ‘actorish voice and looks with a
kind of brain that has recently been more or less banned from television’,
while Kathryn Flett (2005: 20) in The Observer found the Abbot ‘almost unbear-
ably charismatic’. The programme was connected by critics with other ‘quality’
productions of various kinds; Mark Lawson suggested that, like Brideshead Re-
visited, The Monastery might result in an upsurge of recruitment to the Catholic
Church. This comparison is clearly highly significant, since Brideshead was a
landmark programme with all the characteristics of ‘quality’ TV: literary adapta-
tion, classically inspired theme music, filming of heritage settings – Oxford and
Castle Howard in Yorkshire – and ‘serious’ actors such as Jeremy Irons speaking
Evelyn Waugh’s original words in honeyed tones and perfect received pronunci-
ation English. Kathryn Flett (2005: 20) commented that the Worth Abbey Church
was ‘lovely (as in Grand Designs lovely)’, linking The Monastery to the Channel 4
programme about people (mostly middle-class professionals) building their own
architecturally innovative houses. The mapping of the press reception thus far
confirms that at one level the success of The Monastery is a discursive phenom-
enon – and that this discursive success is classed, that is, created by middle-
class agents in papers read mainly by middle-class readers. In this sense we
can see a match between the producers’ intentions to distinguish themselves
from ‘modern TV tricks’ and the critical reception, which essentially congratu-
lates them on this.
The second most recurrent theme in the reviews was the adoption of a scep-
tical position in relation to religion – with a third of these critics adopting such a
stance. This could be combined with praise or criticism of the programmes, but
in either case, it allows the critic to identify him- or herself with a rationalist po-
sition, which in itself is a mark of education and status in many spheres of mid-
dle-class British culture. In this way, despite his obvious enthusiasm for the aes-
thetic pleasures of the programme, Mark Lawson retains his status as a liberal
intellectual by arguing for a critical stance in relation to established religion:
Religion for a Postsecular Society? 63
‘Like the coverage of the papal funeral, The Monastery tends to be too generous
and gentle’. Nancy Banks-Smith (2005: 22) of The Guardian also adopted a scep-
tical position, maintaining her habitual irony: ‘Worth has the feel of an excellent,
if austere, public school. They teach silence, obedience and humility here’. Other
critics adopted a more aggressively secularist stance, identifying strongly with
modernity and science: ‘What they’re after is a kind of stealth proselytising
[…] I am now doing whatever the atheist equivalent of praying for Tony’s soul
might be, since one doesn’t like to see a man squander the priceless Darwinian
gift of rationality like this’ (Sutcliffe 2005: 46). In one review, published in a Scot-
tish paper, the classed nature of the style of the programme (and perhaps its at-
mosphere of Englishness), as well as the religious content and aims, is remarked
on and leads to rejection: ‘I probably haven’t got the hang of the spiritual life, but
I can’t help noticing the resemblance between Worth Abbey and a rather decent
health farm. Stick a golf course on the place and you could call it a country club.
A contemplative regime may have its rigours, but the Benedictine monks don’t
appear to have thought of testing their faith in the inner city’ (Bell 2005: 19).
However, this is very exceptional, and the majority of the reviews identify posi-
tively with the classed culture of the programme.
Alongside this sceptical position, there is also a significant positive response
to the religious and particularly the spiritual content of The Monastery. One crit-
ic, who had a long history of visiting Worth Abbey, placed herself at the opposite
pole to the rationalist position: ‘I was seduced. I let go of the ways of thinking I
had held so dear and allowed myself to be transformed through their mystical
vision of God’ (Ind 2005: 10). Another journalist spent two days at Worth just be-
fore the broadcast and wrote a positive account from the perspective of a fasci-
nated and respectful outsider in The Telegraph (Brook 2005: np). The critics’ in-
terest in the spiritual dimension of the programmes is also expressed through the
fact that several commented on Tony’s spiritual experience (the ‘white stone mo-
ment’) in the final programme:
Did you catch the last episode of The Monastery last week? It was amazing. The viewer ob-
served what can only be described as a spiritual awakening, caught on camera. (Matthews
2005: 18)
Even Nancy Banks-Smith, after describing Tony as ‘having the look of a small
boy who has seen a spaceman and can’t make anyone believe him’, concluded
that ‘the intelligence, patience and gentle amusement of the monks was as
soothing as the hypnotic swaying of their robes as they processed to church’.
Only ‘the odd chromosome’ prevented her from ‘giving it a go’ (Banks-Smith
2005: 22). Here again, religion is represented as having a hypnotic and seductive
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quality that can only be resisted by the invocation of science and the materiality
of human life. Stephen Pile of The Telegraph concluded that The Monastery was
‘the best and most constructive piece of religious broadcasting in recent televi-
sion history’, and that ‘Tony’s final meeting with his spiritual advisor was re-
markable for the fact that it contained prolonged periods of television silence
as they wrestled with thoughts that were beyond words’ (2005: 19). Like those
adopting a secularist stance, this group of critics see religion as desirable, or po-
tentially desirable, in the contemporary conjuncture, attributing powers of influ-
ence and persuasion to it; unlike them they see this as a force for the good, and
its mysteries as benign. Alongside the need to demonstrate secular or even sec-
ularist credentials, we can then observe in these reviews a representation of re-
ligion as a seductive force, whose attractions lie in dimensions that cannot be
explained by words: silence, mysticism and spirituality.
The positive response to spirituality in the press coverage of The Monastery
is in itself representing the programme as evidence of a postsecular climate.
While several reviews comment on the surprise success of the programmes, it
is interpreted by some as an indication that ‘spirituality is now in’, or that
‘there is still demand out there for what the Church offers’ (Gledhill 2005: 26).
Maggie Brown in The Observer surveys positive audience responses to a range
of recent religious broadcasting, including The Monastery, under the headline:
‘Viewers’ prayers answered as religion enjoys a dramatic television comeback:
From martyrs to monks, the appetite for spiritual topics is ravenous and the
BBC aims to go on feeding it’ (Brown 2006: np). The critic in the Sunday Express
claimed that ‘young people particularly are responding to the series’ and quoted
a spokesperson for the Catholic Enquiry Service: ‘[M]any young people are seek-
ing direction in life and The Monastery has fed that hunger’ (Fitzherbert 2005:
21). Alongside these images of spiritual hunger, the theme of ‘spiritual journey’
is also invoked in the reviews of The Monastery: ‘It was twenty-nine year old
Tony’s journey from cynical soft pornographer to wide-eyed believer that cap-
tured the spirit of the experience’ (Flett 2005: 18; emphasis added). The idea
of the journey towards personal fulfilment and self-expression is, as I have dis-
cussed elsewhere (Thomas 2011), ubiquitous in lifestyle and reality television,
particularly in a culture based on individualism and consumerism generally,
and in this way the critics are making connections between this representation
of religious experience and broader cultural trends. The reception thus illustrates
both the continuing strength of the secular in British culture and the ‘postsecu-
lar’ moment, in that it combines this with a profound interest in these represen-
tations of spirituality. In this context the programme’s high cultural qualities
perhaps give permission for affirmation of the spiritual, of what is ‘beyond
words’.
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The press reception of The Convent demonstrates how successfully The Mon-
astery kindled the sparks of critical interest, since the sequel attracted signifi-
cantly more press coverage: 54 as opposed to 29 reviews. The distribution of
the reviews is very different from that of The Monastery, in that they are less con-
centrated in the quality press (43 % as opposed to 62 %), and there are corre-
spondingly more reviews in the regional and tabloid press, which constitute
33 % and 24 % of the sample, respectively. This may simply be expressive of
the broader interest in the sequel resulting from the earlier programme’s success.
However, the press reception of The Convent is far less positive than that of The
Monastery,with 43 % of the reviews positive (as opposed to 76 %) and 24 % neg-
ative (as opposed to 10 %). The location of the positive reviews also contrasts
with those of The Monastery in that only 22 % are in the national ‘quality’ pa-
pers, with most (43 %) in the regional press and 35 % in the tabloid press.
Thus the most striking aspect of the comparison is that, unlike The Monastery,
The Convent fails to capture the imagination of the ‘quality’ press but has a
broader appeal than the former programme, with more positive responses in
the regional and tabloid press. Clearly, this generally more critical reception
by the press raises the question of why this representation of religion is deemed
less desirable and how gender is informing this dynamic.
The discourse of a ‘postsecular’ society hungry for religion, present in the re-
views of The Monastery, is reprised again here by some reviewers, with one critic
asking, ‘So could it be that society has reached a peak of excess and is ready to
re-examine its values?’ (Jones 2006: 6). The opposite pole, a secularist distrust of
religion, is also expressed here: ‘Alarming to see how quickly their new sur-
roundings force these women to question their belief systems’ (Proud 2006:
81). However, perhaps the most striking feature of the reviews of The Convent
is the sense of disappointment – that it does not deliver the quality features
or spiritual atmosphere of The Monastery. The notion that the second programme
is an attempt to ‘cash in’ on the success of the first is one aspect of this trend:
‘Television producers, as we know, cannot let a good idea lie […] So it comes
as no surprise that The Monastery – last year’s quiet hit in which five blokes
went to live among monks and reassess their approach to life and spirituality
– has been adapted to feature women living in a convent’ (Ridgway 2006: 42).
Cynicism about the programme-makers’ motivations was a theme in many arti-
cles on The Convent, particularly in terms of the choice of the women partici-
pants: ‘They may well have all been on quests to find meaning in their lives,
but one had the sneaking suspicion that they really had been chosen because
the producer thought they were a lively mix and would make good television’
(Matthew 2006: 65).Whereas The Monastery was reviewed as ‘quality’ television,
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or as ‘quality reality’, The Convent is pushed firmly back into the reality stable by
reviewers:
If The Convent’s makers hadn’t already succeeded with a show entitled The Monastery […] I
reckon their newie might have been called Big Sister. […] [T]hese self-same programme-
makers evidently consulted Big Brother’s Bumper Book of Rules, honing in on the first com-
mandment of modern-day reality TV: ensure that your participants comprise a freak show.
(Belcher 2006: 21)
As this comment suggests, criticism of the women participants is a major feature
of the reception. Whilst the nuns are almost universally praised for their pa-
tience, kindness and wisdom, the women are variously described as ‘petulant,
paranoid, emotionally indulgent, neurotic, petty and self obsessed’ (Heggie
2006:44), ‘naughty schoolgirls’ (Johns 2006: 27) and guilty of ‘wilful behaviour
– a deliberate flouting of the rules’ (Chater and Jackson 2006: 61). An ironic
tone in describing the women is also prevalent: ‘Iona – the only Christian of
the group – was wetter than Wet Wet Wet singing “Raindrops keep fallin’ on
my head” underwater in Seaworld’ (Virtue 2006: 29); ‘Debi was abandoned by
her mother as a sobbing five-year-old and is still a sobbing five-year-old, trying
so hard to be a good girl’ (Banks-Smith 2006: 32). The differences between the
programmes that I have described must in part account for the more negative re-
sponse to The Convent, which fails to appeal, particularly to the ‘quality’ press,
because it lacks some of the aesthetic qualities of The Monastery. However, the
vehement criticism and irony deployed in descriptions of the women participants
are in sharp contrast to the positive and even affectionate terms used to com-
ment on the male participants in The Monastery. In one review the women are
compared to the men and found to be lacking in spiritual qualities: ‘Unlike
the men in The Monastery who took it all very seriously, these women seemed
to have no spiritual component whatsoever’ (Pile 2006: 19). The turning points
in the ‘spiritual journeys’ of the women do not impress the critics in the same
way as Tony’s ‘white stone’ moment. In one instance (Thomas Sutcliffe in The
Independent), the ‘moment’ is discussed as a televisual construction, rather
than in spiritual terms, as had been the case for Tony: ‘Iona’s spontaneous mo-
ment of religious transcendence must have involved gaffers and cameramen
clomping around switching lights on and off and directors cueing her up so
that the long reverse zoom would end with the right framing’ (Sutcliffe 2006:
22). Again, an ironic tone dominates in these reviews: ‘[D]oubtless they’ll all
be donning habits and sniffing incense by the end of the series’ (Stephen
2006: 59); ‘How about a second series called Vocation, Vocation, Vocation?’
(Hitt 2006: 18).
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The nuns, although spoken of in the main with respect by the press, are not
seen as spiritual leaders in the same way as the monks, and a cultural reaffirma-
tion of the connection between masculinity and spirituality and femininity and
relational work seems to be evidenced in these receptions. More precisely, whilst
the monks are seen as demonstrating unusual capacities for relational work, and
praised for this, the nuns’ kindness and patience do not suffice to ‘lift’ the pro-
gramme to the level of success of The Monastery as a positive representation of
religion: something seems to be lacking. In some reviews the nuns are described
as excessively tolerant, for example in relation to one of the women participants
who is married and in an ‘open relationship’, sharing her time between her hus-
band and a lover. There is also the occasional hint in the reviews that the nuns’
understanding of the women and the situation may be limited: ‘The nuns’ in-
sight into the women, however, is rather simplistic. “It’s not your fault” the Ab-
bess told Debi, who had chosen her as her mentor. Well, blow me down with a
rosary’ (Stephen 2006: 59). There are only two physical descriptions of the nuns
in the reviews, but both are in stark contrast to Lawson’s evocation of the Ab-
bot’s ‘actorish good looks’; Nancy Banks-Smith (2006: 32) in The Guardian refers
to the nuns as ‘brown as field mice in their habits’, while Paul English in The
Daily Record comments, ‘there’s always the chaste nuns with their beards and
brown teeth’ (English 2006: 31). Although this is not a dominant strand in the
reviews, it is nonetheless significant that here religious women cannot escape
being judged in terms of their appearance; the image of brown mice is particu-
larly telling – associating the nuns with an image of humble, tiny creatures, rem-
iniscent of a Beatrix Potter story. Whilst many reviews imply that the nuns’ pa-
tience and tolerance stems from their spiritual lives when confronted with
guests who flout the rules of the convent and even abuse their hospitality,
only one makes a clear connection between the nuns and the kind of transcen-
dent spirituality which Woodhead and Sointu (2008) argue is more frequently as-
sociated with masculinity: ‘In last night’s opener, the nuns came across as
charming, gentle but tough, articulate, attentive, funny and without a trace of
smugness – as though, in fact, they had access to a deep source of bliss denied
the rest of us’ (Heggie 2006: 44). However, even here the ironic tone rapidly re-
turns, with the reviewer commenting that, if it was all an act for the camera, the
nuns are good enough to get their own series: ‘Spirit Doctor, maybe, in which
they go round suburban homes teaching the transforming power of self-denial
and silence?’ (Heggie 2006: 44). This sentence concludes the paragraph and re-
inscribes the nuns in the domestic through the comparison with House Doctor, a
series focusing on preparing houses for sale by ‘dressing’ them appropriately;
the effect is further reinforced by the adjective ‘suburban’, which, with its
links to ‘housewife’, connects the nuns to traditional female roles and to a deval-
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ued cultural context. This, again, is in sharp contrast to The Monastery’s associ-
ation with architecture and innovation through the Grand Designs comparison.
Despite the predominant praise of the nuns in the press, The Convent lacks
the allure of the first series for the critics; there is no talk here of being swayed
or seduced, and this representation of religion, which is more about the women’s
emotional lives and struggles, is perhaps less attractive because it is perceived as
failing to provide the spiritual and aesthetic imagery which had attracted posi-
tive comments on The Monastery.
4 Retreatants’ responses to The Monastery and
The Convent
What then of the responses of viewers? To what extent do they mirror those of
professional critics, both in terms of gender and the construction and expression
of a ‘postsecular moment’? The viewing figures suggest that the audience, like
the critics, was less impressed by The Convent than The Monastery: the latter pro-
gramme attracted 2.57 million viewers on its first broadcast, and retained 2.39
and 2.35 in the next two, whereas The Convent started well with 2.75, most prob-
ably because of its forerunner’s reputation, but then dropped each week, to 1.8,
1.65 and 1.61 (BARB 2006). These figures, though still impressive in the context of
religious broadcasting, seem to express something akin to the disappointment
that dominates the press reviews. Clearly, however, they can tell us little beyond
this in terms of the feelings and responses of viewers. In order to explore such
responses, I attended four retreats at Worth Abbey in May, June and July 2006,
after negotiations with the Abbot and Retreat Leader at Worth, Father Patrick
Fludder. At these retreats I presented myself as a researcher but also as a partic-
ipant, both in the time-honoured tradition of participant observation and as a
fairly accurate reflection of my own position, for like many of the retreatants I
had felt drawn to Worth by the experience of watching The Monastery (in my
case on video, in January 2006). The retreats I attended – ‘Finding Faith’ and
‘Finding Sanctuary’ – were designed by the monks as a ‘follow-up’ to the pro-
gramme, a way of responding to the wave of enquiries about coming to Worth
which followed it. The retreats coincided with the broadcast of The Monastery
Revisited and The Convent, and there was lively discussion of all three pro-
grammes, often in the informal spaces of the retreats, over coffee or at meals.
However, as the retreats took place one year after the first broadcast, what is
not captured here is the initial response to The Monastery. According to the
then Abbot of Worth, Christopher Jamison, many retreatants who came to
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Worth immediately after the broadcast were entirely new to religion. My respond-
ents, on the other hand, were mostly lapsed Catholics or Protestants, or practis-
ing Catholics or Protestants in need of spiritual renewal – fourteen of the re-
spondents identified themselves as Catholic (including lapsed), and the rest
included Church of England, Baptist and Quaker, or general Christian.
I offered several ways of participating in the research – a semi-structured in-
terview or discussion group during the retreat (at a time when most people went
for walks or had naps to recover from the early morning start), or an open-ended
questionnaire, which some people filled in at the time and others emailed later.
In these ways a total of nineteen responses were collected. Of these nineteen
people, fourteen were women and five were men; eleven were White British,
seven were Irish or British Irish and one was Lithuanian. The age range was
quite broad, with four under 35, four in their 40s, six in their 50s, and five
over 60. Most were in or had retired from upper or lower middle-class profes-
sions, and about two-thirds were educated to degree level or above. Again we
can observe that The Monastery is a middle-class cultural success. The high per-
centage of women in the group (and attending the retreats generally) is consis-
tent with other research, such as Heelas and Woodhead’s (2005) findings on the
significant numbers of women participating in both congregational religion and
alternative spiritual practices. I have given a full account of these responses else-
where (Thomas 2011); my discussion here revolves around the extent to which
they are consistent with or in contrast to the press reception, and how they
emerge from the context of the retreats.
Of course, whilst my nineteen respondents do not in any way represent ‘the
audience’, they are an element of the engaged audience – those for whom, in
most cases, the television broadcast has played some role in their decision to
come to Worth on retreat. Some respondents made a very direct connection be-
tween watching the programme and making the journey to Worth:
The Monastery programme has brought me closer to my Catholic faith and I was so influ-
enced by the programme and the love emanating from the monks that I wanted to experi-
ence a retreat at Worth Abbey for myself (F, late 40s, White British, company director).
I was absolutely hooked. It was the way the monks treated the men. There was something
special about them. I thought it would be wonderful to be in their presence. […] It was as
though watching The Monastery seemed to draw me to Worth. It was a journey I somehow
just had to make (F, early 70s, White British, retired secretary).
In these cases, retreatants seem to express a desire to enter the diegesis or nar-
rative world created by the programme and to receive the same attention from
the monks that the men in the programme benefited from. In this way, going
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on retreat at Worth becomes a form of pilgrimage to the filmed site, which ac-
quires an added dimension of spiritual significance because it has been filmed
and, perhaps more importantly, because of the way it has been filmed. The pro-
gramme’s high production values – the music, setting and slow pace of the film-
ing – make this possible for these predominantly (though not exclusively) mid-
dle-class viewers; there is nothing here to offend or jar, and the programme
corresponds to an aesthetic that appeals to their cultural backgrounds. If, as
Nick Couldry (2003: 77) argues, media pilgrimages are ‘an acting out in space
of the constructed “distance” between “ordinary world” and “media world”’,
this is compounded here by the fact that the media site is also a sacred space,
e.g., one consecrated for worship, and in that sense is also extraordinary. Coul-
dry (2003:77) argues that we cannot fully make sense of such journeys unless we
also consider their relationship to the ‘domestic space from which the media pil-
grim sets out’. Interestingly, the second respondent cited above explained to me
that she had taken bed and breakfast accommodation for the night before and
the night after the retreat. Her motivation was clearly practical in that her jour-
ney home was a long one by coach to the opposite end of the country, but at the
same time, the BandB seemed to be providing a transitional space that would
enable her to re-adapt to a less heightened reality, to ordinariness; she described
its homely comforts and how the woman owner would be keen to talk to her
about her experiences – perhaps providing some of the ‘love’ that my respondent
had imagined coming from the monks, and a framing of the at times demanding
retreat experience.
Others, as I have described elsewhere, talked about their ordinary lives in
terms of the exhaustion of working in a neoliberal regime, often in a caring
role (Thomas 2011). The domestic spaces were not entirely havens but were in-
vaded by struggles with bereavement, with personal and professional caring re-
sponsibilities and even, in the case of a (woman) vicar and a vicar’s wife, with
being, in some sense, professional Christians, never off-duty. The programme
had allowed these retreatants to imagine a space where they could be cared
for by the monks, like the men, but also a space of ‘other-worldliness’. Once
on the retreat, it was clear that many were fascinated by the monks, who were
simultaneously available and not available, ‘in the world but not of it’. This ef-
fect, clearly resulting from the monks’ vocation, which placed clear boundaries
around their interactions with retreatants, was intensified by the fact that they
had also appeared on TV and thus also in this sense represented distance
from ordinariness. The monks appeared from the closed space of the monastery
at the offices, chanted ethereally and then disappeared, just as they had trav-
ersed the television screen. The retreat leader, Father Patrick, slept in the retreat
house, and he and one or two other monks shared meals with the retreatants, so
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that ordinariness was at times restored in encounters over toast and cornflakes.
Nonetheless, there was a shared feeling of being in a special place. Retreatants
commented on the powerful atmosphere of the Abbey church, and some sat in
the church late at night in the darkness; others were moved by recognising
some of the chants from the programme or by seeing monks they recognised
from the television at the offices. The experience of the retreat seemed to be in-
tensified by being in the space where silence and mystery had been made ‘visi-
ble’. Significantly, almost all the respondents singled out Tony’s ‘white stone mo-
ment’, which was also remarked on by the press, as memorable:
I was transfixed by each individual journey. Tony’s moment was something which I still
find extremely moving. (F, early 20 s, Irish British; childcare worker)
Tony’s strange experience with Francis – the ‘white stone’ moment. (F, early 50s, Irish)
Tony’s revelation – very moving. (M, early 50s, Irish British)
My favourite image however was the one when the monk gave one of the men the white
stone and said it was something they did, following the book of revelations. That moment
it felt like all the talk of faith which could seem alien to non-believers was made real. (F,
early 30s, White British, administrator)
The last of these comments illustrates precisely how the programme has suc-
ceeded in making religious experience visible and real in a sometimes inimical
cultural context. For the retreatants, as for some of the critics, the representation
of spirituality and of mystery is a key element in making this representation of
religion desirable.
For another respondent, watching the programme had put religion back on
the agenda and acted as a reminder of a long-held desire to re-engage with Ca-
tholicism:
I was also impressed with the intellectual capabilities of pretty much all the monks. At the
point of watching I was very much a ‘resting’ Catholic having been unable to reconcile the
rational historical nature of the studies I had been engaged in for some considerable time
with the leap of faith needed to remain a believer. (F, late 50s,White British, administrator)
One of the striking features here is the comment on the intellectual abilities of
the monks, which, along with the aesthetic qualities of the programmes, seem
to give permission to be moved by the representation of faith (Thomas 2011).
The secular, or even at times secularist, elements of the press reception are a sig-
nificant aspect of the cultural context in which the middle-class believers and
spiritual seekers interrogated here are operating. It is not surprising if they
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found in The Monastery a form of religion that they could match with middle-
class taste and a source of support in secular cultural milieus:
For myself I had many of my views reinforced. I was given permission to hold views I have
only felt able to share with few people in the past. (F, early sixties, White British, retired
social worker)
The programmes are used as a resource, not only in the sense of surviving in a
predominantly secular world, but also in a spiritual sense; they can be watched
over and over again because of their aesthetic and spiritual qualities:
Initially I thought what beautiful grounds Worth is situated in, and then gradually I became
impressed with the sincerity and gravitas of the monks. […] Sprog also recorded the pro-
grammes and we have watched them many times since. I use them as a kind of chilling
device. (F, late 50s, White British, administrator)
In contrast, The Convent is not seen as functioning in this way or as offering
these pleasures and support. The retreatants are at least as critical, and in
some cases more critical, of the programme than the press reviewers. Like the
latter, they are almost entirely positive in their comments on the nuns but very
critical of the women participants and of the programme-makers, whose motiva-
tions they distrust:
I felt that the makers of The Convent were trying to create ‘titillating TV’ by putting in char-
acters such as the woman who lived with two men and contrasting her with the nuns in the
cloistered convent, i.e., trying to shock the nuns. Having these characters in the pro-
gramme totally detracted from the good things that could have come out of the programme.
(F, late 40s, White British, company director)
Feelings of irritation and anger with the women meant that the programme was
the opposite of a ‘chilling device’; for these retreatants, in search of spiritual
space and nurture, watching four disturbed and at times rebellious women strug-
gle with a regimented life was not relaxing. The phrase ‘titillating TV’ also sug-
gests that The Convent has not met the requirements for quality television that
The Monastery so amply delivered.Whilst the monks were seen as more than ca-
pable of dealing both with the programme-makers and the men (whose most re-
bellious moment was when two of them ran down to the village to buy sweets),
the nuns were seen as vulnerable to exploitation:
My daughter and I have discussed The Convent and we both felt irritated / angry with the
women, respectful of the nuns, and slightly worried that the nuns, unlike the monks, were
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being exploited both by the female participants and the programme makers. (F, early 50 s,
Irish, consultant in health sector)
As alluded to in the press reviews, there was also a feeling that the nuns were
not entirely in control of the situation:
For their part, the nuns were out of their depth with these neurotic and manipulative
women, so week by week the viewer had to watch the nuns floundering. The nuns were
far too kind and compassionate when they needed to be firm and compassionate. (F,
early 60s, White British, retired social worker)
Clearly, ‘watching the nuns floundering’ does not provide the experience of spi-
ritual nurture that was found in The Monastery. A crucial element of that nurtur-
ing is the sense of structure and authority associated with the monks, and par-
ticularly the Abbot. This seems to result in part from the fact that the women
participants do rebel more than the men – they are constantly late for offices,
drink and talk in their rooms at night and even go to the pub. However, despite
equally caring and cogent analyses of their guests’ behaviour, the nuns are not
seen as authoritative figures in the way the monks are; authority is thus associ-
ated with masculinity and found to be lacking in femininity.
5 Conclusion
As the analysis above suggests, both the representation of religion in these pro-
grammes and its reception are highly gendered;The Monastery offers an image of
transcendent spirituality through a representation of masculinity that combines
caring with power, whilst in The Convent, the nuns are equally caring but are
seen as victims or potential victims of the programme-makers and their rebel-
lious guests. This threat to the sacred space of the real and filmed convent is dis-
turbing for some viewers, who are then unable to find in the programme the spi-
ritual comfort and resource that they sought and found in The Monastery. In this
sense The Monastery, which was hailed as a ground-breaking representation of
religion, in fact reinforces existing norms of association of the spiritual with
the masculine. Similarly, The Convent emphasises the cultural connections be-
tween femininity and affect verging on hysteria as well as between femininity
and domesticity.
In some ways the programmes are grappling with a problem that is inherent
in Christianity itself, e.g., the gendered nature of Christian virtues: relational
work is still women’s work, and putting others before oneself is a requirement
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of many feminine roles. Thus the caring characteristics which seem extraordina-
ry in the monks become ordinary when associated with women. In one review of
The Convent, published in The Guardian, sociologist of religion Kristin Aune ar-
gues that the women participants’ rebellion in The Convent is illustrative of a
general trend of women being dissatisfied with the church because it does not
provide spaces for anything other than traditional feminine roles: ‘Since indus-
trialisation, the church has operated alongside the private sphere of the home.
Home-centred women without careers have been its backbone, running coffee
mornings, visiting sick parishioners and teaching at Sunday school’ (Aune
2006: 32). Both the experience of watching The Monastery and the retreats at
Worth offered an escape from this domesticated participation in religion,
which has traditionally been expected of women, to my mainly women respond-
ents. Off-the-record conversations with some made it clear that feminist critiques
of the patriarchal structure of the Catholic Church were being put ‘on hold’ in
order to become immersed in the quiet and nurturing situation offered by the re-
treat experience. For these women, as Aune suggests, the realities of parish life
may be less alluring than the ‘extraordinary’ spaces of the retreat and the pro-
gramme. The latter are even more extraordinary because of their masculinity,
which in time-honoured manner is associated with spirituality and, more inno-
vatively, with caring (Thomas 2011).
Both programmes, then, raise the unresolved question of gender in spiritual
lives and experiences in religious cultures in contemporary Britain; they also il-
luminate some of the tensions between secular and religious currents in British
society. In particular, the press reception of The Monastery expresses a tension
between the adoption of a secular (or even secularist), ironic mode and a dis-
course of ‘being seduced by religion’ and of finding something in the programme
that is lacking in contemporary consumerist ways of life. The version of religion
that is attractive to reviewers in the ‘quality’ papers and to my mainly middle-
class retreatants is focused on prayer and silence, offering an escape from, or
containment of, the affective excesses of much contemporary lifestyle and reality
television; it is also aesthetically pleasing. This finding is consistent with the in-
crease in attendance at cathedral services as opposed to ordinary parish serv-
ices, where attendance is in decline (Thinking Anglicans 2011); it seems that a
desirable version of Christianity in a context where a secular stance is often
the mark of education and ‘middle-classness’ needs to be both spiritual and
spectacular. The success of The Monastery with professional critics and audien-
ces is in part explained by its combination of these two elements with caring
masculinities.
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Post-liberalism and the Dismantling of
State Multiculturalism in the Netherlands:
The Role of Mass and Social Media
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, politics and everyday life in the Netherlands
became polarized, under the influence of several conservative and populist movements that
reflected a growing distrust of government and ‘politics as usual’, and a xenophobic and
cultural conservative attitude towards migrants and migration, more specifically of Mus-
lims and Islam. Politics took on the shape of a cultural war. (Boomkens 2010: 307)
The liberal center, not just the illiberal periphery, believe Muslim minorities still give their
loyalty to their country of origin, not the one they now live in. (Sniderman and Hagendoorn
2007: 42)
[By] November 2006 […t]he new policy of the Dutch government had become so imbued
with Fortuyn’s points of view that the ‘familiar’ image of the open and tolerant Nether-
lands, such as in the case of the aliens’ policy and social security, was no longer recognised
abroad (Margry 2007: 130)
Despite similar rhetorical rejections of multiculturalism by leading politicians
elsewhere in Europe,¹ the ‘cultural war’ (Boomkens 2010) in the Netherlands
has arguably had the most far-reaching political consequences. These have in-
cluded the formation of three political parties on a principally anti-Islamic plat-
form since 2000 (Leefbar Nederland [Livable Netherlands], List Pim Fortuyn and
Partij voor de Vrijheid [PVV – Freedom Party]), each of which has enjoyed con-
siderable electoral success and influenced the mainstream political agenda (Mar-
gry 2007), resulting in the dismantling of key aspects of institutional multicultur-
alism (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010: 3–4), including (remarkably) the
cessation of ethnic monitoring of labour market participation, the withdrawal
of national-level funding for minority group organisations and the introduction
of immigration processes which discriminate against social conservatives (Meer
and Modood 2009: 474; Butler 2008: 3). Given the Netherlands’ international rep-
utation for tolerance and social progressivism (Cherribi 2010: 3), this turn of
events is both troubling and puzzling.
 These include the French, German and British leaders, Sarkozy (France24 2011), Merkel
(Weaver 2010) and Cameron (New Stateman 2011).
It will be argued here that Dutch anti-Islam mobilisation has a distinctive
profile. Successive populist Islamophobic campaigns (led by Fortuyn, van
Gogh and Hirsi Ali, and Wilders) have come not from the traditional far right,
but rather from figures who represent themselves as defenders of secular, liberal
values ̶ including being explicitly pro-gay ̶ in contrast not only to American but
also to other European anti-immigrant groupings (Vossen 2010: 27). Indeed,
these figures are difficult to place in conventional political categories, including
the labels ‘conservative’ and ‘populist’ used by Boomkens’ above (Vossen 2010:
27); here, the term ‘post-liberal’ will be preferred, since these leaders are self-
identified liberals, yet their attitude toward Muslim migrants is illiberal. Similar-
ly, amongst the wider Dutch public, suspicion of Muslim minorities is not con-
fined to traditional supporters of the far right but arguably extends to the ‘liberal
center’ (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007: 42), meaning a wider and more influ-
ential support base, which may help explain why the reversal of institutional
multiculturalism has extended further here than elsewhere. Such evidence sug-
gests that the Netherlands is manifesting a new, ‘post-liberal’ politics of preju-
dice, with the potential to spread elsewhere amongst increasingly secular Euro-
pean populations (Norris and Inglehart 2011: 153).
It will be further argued that modern mass and social media are central to
the rise and spread of post-liberal, Islamophobic attitudes, but also to their con-
testation. Thus social media are integral to contemporary journalistic practice,
for example providing the means through which targeted advance publicity for
broadcasts or features can be circulated and dominant cultural memories can
be articulated and refreshed (Cherribi 2010: 146; Margry 2007). But they are
also vital to the articulation of discourses of resistance and to the organisation
of counter-cultural solidarities (D’Haenens 2007; Leurs et al. 2012).
Methodologically, this chapter seeks to advance the study of social media by
situating them in the context of their interconnections both with mass media and
with broader social and political processes. It does so through a retroductive
analysis (Danemark et al. 1997: 96– 106) of a range of alternative explanations
that have been advanced for the rise of Islamophobia and the dismantling of
multiculturalism in the Netherlands, triangulating these with evidence on the
role of mass and social media to conclude that media play a much more central
role than most commentators think, and by implication may do so elsewhere.
First, it will be useful to clarify some key terms. ‘Religion’ in this account fea-
tures both as an ascribed identity, constructed by the mainstream media, and as
a ‘resistance identity’ (Castells 1996: 356–7), articulated in response to dominant
representations but not reducible to a reaction to them. The controversial term
‘Islamophobia’ (Iqbal 2010; Bleich 2011) is used here to mean ‘indiscriminate
negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims’ (Bleich 2011:
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1581). Hence it does not mean just any criticism of Islam or Muslims (however
well- or ill-founded), but only the indiscriminate attribution of negative charac-
teristics on the basis of an ascribed identity. ‘Secularisation’ is used here to mean
a decline in the social significance of religion, a process connected in the Dutch
case with the collapse of the Dutch pillar (verzuiling) system. In the relatively
short period since the 1960s, Christianity in the Netherlands shifted from a
key principle of social organization to a factor considered personally important
by only an eighth (12.5 %) of the population, roughly a quarter of the figure for
British (21 %) and half that for American (47.4 %) populations respectively (van
der Veer 2006;World Values Survey 2006–9 wave, henceforward WVS 2006–9).
Four uses of the contested term ‘multiculturalism’ are distinguished here.
First, ‘empirical multiculturalism’ refers to the simple fact of cultural diversity,
in this case in Europe, primarily as a result of labour markets and immigration
policies since the 1960s. Second, ‘institutional multiculturalism’ refers to (pri-
marily) state-led responses to cultural diversity and is understood as ‘a range
of institutional initiatives […] aiming to: reduce discrimination; promote equality
of opportunity and overcome barriers to full participation in society; allow un-
constrained access to public services; recognise cultural identities (as opposed
to assimilation), and foster acceptance and cultural understanding of all groups’
(Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010: 3–4). Third, ‘philosophical multiculturalism’
consists of philosophical arguments which seek to justify and define the legiti-
mate scope of such initiatives (e.g., Taylor 1994). Fourth, what Gilroy (2006)
calls ‘everyday multiculture’ refers to the unplanned product of social interaction
in contexts ranging from work to education to leisure and sport, including both
face-to-face and virtual encounters. The focus in this chapter is mostly on the
second use.
1 Possible causes of the Dutch culture wars
Commentators disagree passionately about the causes of the Dutch culture wars.
Some dismiss media factors, arguing that ‘the media […] do not have the power
to set an agenda that is not [already] broadly shared by their audience’ (Enzting-
er 2009: 827), whereas others assign media a central role (Shadid 2006; Cherribi
2010). Some argue that multicultural policies have generated popular resistance
because they have failed to promote integration, either producing communal
separatism by subsidising linguistic and cultural difference (Koopmans 2010:
1) or provoking majority resentment by over-emphasising identity claims (Snider-
man and Hagendoorn 2007). Others argue that Dutch and international commen-
tators have exaggerated the extent and generosity of the Dutch multiculturalism
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and ignored the strength of institutional and societal racism (Vasta 2007: 713).
The importance of the legacy of the Dutch pillar system is also contested, with
some challenging the widespread view that it provided a model for post-1960s
immigrant integration (Vink 2007: 337), arguing that instead of integration on
equal terms, new migrants were subordinated in a system of ‘minorisation’
(Rath et al. 1999). Some have stressed the role of cultural memory in Dutch re-
actions (Eyerman 2008), others the rapid secularisation of Dutch society (van
der Veer 2006), and still others the responsibility of politicians in setting the
tone of public debate, producing a negative spiral in which elite discursive polar-
isation feeds popular demands for assimilationist policies (Shahid 2006: 20).
Following a critical assessment of these arguments, this chapter will argue
that while the media are often mentioned and discussed in depth in particular
cases (Uitermark and Gielen 2010; Cherribi 2010), their overall impact has
been underestimated and under-theorised. It will then be argued that the
media (both mass and social, in interaction) play two key roles:
1. Influencing the agenda of public discussion by providing a negative framing
of Islam and Muslims;
2. Personalising politics in a way that has enabled independent populist poli-
ticians (from Fortuyn to Wilders) to have a significant impact on national
politics.
These media processes are common across many contemporary societies, but in
the Dutch case they have had a particularly powerful impact on the political sys-
tem because of their articulation with two specific features of the Dutch context,
namely:
1. The openness and responsiveness of the Dutch political system means that
populist politicians can have a rapid and significant impact. Although the
institutionalisation of new political parties has been subject to the same
weaknesses and limitations as elsewhere (e.g., the collapse of List Fortuyn),
they have been able to exert an unusual degree of political pressure through
significant electoral successes.
2. The unusually high value placed on personal and cultural autonomy (in
global and even Western European terms) and general scepticism of any
form of external authority amongst the Dutch (WVS 2006–9 wave) has
made the Dutch particularly susceptible to accepting the media framing of
Islam as the archetypical heteronomous and illiberal religion. This cluster
of values may in turn be related to an unusually rapid, thorough and recent
experience of secularisation (van der Veer 2006). But it may also be a sign of
things to come elsewhere, as attitudes which are widespread across the
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Dutch population are becoming more common amongst younger cohorts
elsewhere in Western Europe (Norris and Inglehart 2011: 153).
The interaction of these four factors has enabled the agenda of ‘new realist’
(Prins and Suharso 2008: 365) anti-multiculturalism and Islamophobic ideas to
affect Dutch politics to an unusual degree, leading to once marginal political
ideas being implemented by mainstream parties of government (Margry 2007:
130).
2 Accounts of the dismantling of Dutch
institutional multiculturalism: a critical
appraisal
[M]ulticultural policies, which grant immigrants easy access to equal rights and do not pro-
vide strong incentives for host-country language acquisition and interethnic contacts when
combined with a generous welfare state, have produced low levels of labour market partic-
ipation, high levels of segregation and a strong overrepresentation of immigrants among
those convicted for criminal behaviour. Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands, which
have combined multicultural policies with a strong welfare state, display relatively poor in-
tegration outcomes. (Koopmans 2010: 1)
It is necessary, proponents of multiculturalism contend, to go beyond “mere” tolerance be-
cause the heart of the matter is that the majority honor the claims of minorities to their own
identities. This ordering of tolerance and identity, we will argue, gets things wrong all the
way down. Bringing issues of identity to the fore undercuts support for the right of religious
minorities to follow their own ways of life. (Sniderman and Hagenhoorn 2007: 16)
To assess the significance of media factors on the rise of Islamophobia and the
reversals in context, it is necessary to locate them in relation to other factors that
may be involved. As the above quotations illustrate, some empirical studies sup-
port the argument of post-liberal politicians that reversals in Dutch multicultural
policies are justified because such policies are failing to achieve their aim of pro-
moting integration. Thus Koopmans (2010) argues that multicultural policies in-
hibit immigrant integration by reducing incentives for language acquisition and
labour force participation, while Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007: 16) contend
that multicultural policies undercut majority support for minorities by highlight-
ing differences rather than commonalities through their focus on identity. This
section will critically examine these arguments, arguing that the limitations ex-
posed point to the role of media factors. It will also consider alternative ac-
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counts, including those based on ‘cultural trauma’ (Eyerman 2008) and rapid
secularisation/de-pillarisation (van der Veer 2006).
First, how extensive was Dutch institutional multiculturalism? While this is
contested (Vasta 2007; Rath et al. 1999), a fair summary would seem to be that
while it never amounted to the Dutch state’s funding of a fifth ‘pillar’ (zuil) for
immigrants to Dutch society (Rath et al. 1999: 59), the 1983 Minorities Memoran-
dum initiated a series of measures which meant that, by the late 1990s, the Neth-
erlands had one of the highest levels of institutional multiculturalism in the
world. These included extension of the same rights to public subsidy as other
‘identity groups’ in the areas of broadcasting, education and other aspects of
welfare, including subsidised broadcasting for Muslims in 1985 and Hindus in
1994, Muslim (1988) and later Hindu primary schools, and the involvement of
specified (ethnic and national) minorities in government consultations on a reg-
ular basis, formalised in the Law on the Consultation of Minority Policy (1997). In
employment, the Equal Treatment Act of 1994 established a powerful Equal
Treatment Commission, and in 1998 the Labour Market Stimulation Act provided
for the employment of ‘corporate minority advisors’ to work with the national
employment service, with the goal of achieving more equal minority representa-
tion across the labour market. Hence the recent reversals represent significant
policy shifts.
So, was Dutch institutional multiculturalism too generous? As indicated
above, Koopmans (2010) points to international comparative data which associ-
ate lower integration with higher levels of welfare provision and institutional
multiculturalism. However, in the Dutch case, trend data points to a convergence
between minority and majority Dutch attainment on several indicators (educa-
tion, labour participation, Dutch language) between the mid-1990s and mid-
2000s, suggesting increasing integration (Musterd and Ostendorf 2009: 254).
So it seems difficult to explain increased hostility to institutional multicultural-
ism during this period purely on the grounds of policy failure, as integration (at
least on key measures) actually seems to have been improving.
Second, there are problems with some of the indicators Koopmans uses to
measure integration and segregation. For example, he uses residential concen-
tration of minority population as a measure of segregation. Yet residential con-
centration alone tells us little about contact with the majority population or par-
ticipation in society. In fact, in the Dutch case, researchers have not found a
negative effect of living or being educated in areas/schools with high minority
concentrations on the social career, educational achievement or self-image of mi-
nority Dutch (Karsten et al. 2006; Gramberg and Ledoux 2005: 19–24). Rather, it
may be argued that high minority concentrations may be helpful, both for minor-
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ities seeking resources to aid settlement, integration and cultural support and
for authorities seeking to address disadvantage (Simpson 2005: 665).
But if Dutch institutional multiculturalism does not seem to have failed so
spectacularly in terms of conventional measures of integration as to explain
the attacks on it, might another explanation be that it has undermined public
support by highlighting differences rather than commonalities between minority
and majority populations, as Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007) contend? Draw-
ing on a telephone survey conducted in 1998, they provide evidence of majority
Dutch negative perceptions of Islam and Muslims, even before 9/11, Fortuyn’s
anti-Islam campaign (2001–2) and the killing of Theo van Gogh by a Dutch Mus-
lim immigrant in 2004. Thus a majority (53.6 %) agreed or strongly agreed
(30.5 %) with the proposition that ‘Western and Muslim ways of life are irrecon-
cilable’, almost 90 % agreed that Muslim men in the Netherlands dominate their
women, and 75.9 % agreed that Muslims in the Netherlands raise their children
in an authoritarian way. In addition, they found that ‘a third of the Dutch pop-
ulation view immigrant groups as criminal, dishonest and violent – a negative
image to say the least’ (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007: 48). This prejudice
is distributed across the political spectrum (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007:
70), while ‘threat’ to culture is perceived as twice as important as any other single
factor, including individual or societal economic well-being (Sniderman and Ha-
gendoorn 2007: 89). Overall, they conclude that:
Substantial numbers of the majority intensely dislike immigrant minorities. There is noth-
ing subtle about their feelings towards minorities, or the positions they take based on them.
Prejudice, our findings make plain, has the power to induce people to reject publicly the
most fundamental form of equality for minorities – not equal outcomes or even equal op-
portunities, but equal rights. (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007:66–7)
But where does this negativity and hostility come from? First, they argue that
negative perceptions of ‘the Other’ are reciprocated between majority and Mus-
lim minority populations, from which one may hypothesise a negative spiral of
mutual misperceptions (Entman and Rojecki 2001: 120). However, their evidence
on Muslim attitudes is undercut by the poor construction of the questions to
their Muslim sample and does not, in any case, provide much evidence of minor-
ity hostility (Herbert, forthcoming). So how else might majority negativity arise?
An important clue – though not an inference drawn by the authors – is
found in their study of the volatility of majority opinion. Part of their survey ex-
amined ‘how much support could be generated for extremist policies if a politi-
cian attempted to mobilize support for a policy beyond the pale’, using the hypo-
thetical example of a ‘legally segregated school’ in which majority and minority
children were forbidden to sit together (Herbert, forthcoming: 107). The research
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question was, ‘How much support can be won for a policy [….] by appealing to
authority?’ (Herbert, forthcoming: 108). The hypothesis was that those who value
social conformity more highly would be more likely to change their mind under
some kind of appeal to authority than those with low social conformity scores.
They found that while appeals to authority produced a 4 % change for low social
conformists, this rose to 18 % for high conformists. This finding is significant for
two reasons. First, it suggests that public opinion can be manipulated by chang-
ing the information available – thus highlighting the role of the media in forming
public opinion. Second, it sheds light on how populist figures, such as Fortuyn
and Wilders, might influence public opinion through rhetorical appeals to au-
thority and be especially influential amongst certain segments of the population.
However, it is not only high social conformists who are subject to media in-
fluence. Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007) also identify a body of opinion
amongst their respondents as ‘critical liberal’. This is a politically significant
group because they are relatively affluent and politically engaged, hence likely
to be disproportionately influential in political agenda setting, as compared
with those who simply dislike Muslims and immigrants and who tend to be
poor and politically marginal. Critical liberals express no ‘global hostility’ to
Muslims as such, but object to (what they perceive to be) Muslim norms. In
spite of these objections, they tend to support the right of Muslims to follow
their own way of life in the Netherlands; there is more than a 90 % chance
that they will do so, almost the same as among those who do not object to Mus-
lim norms (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007: 38–9). Their differentiation be-
tween Muslims (no hostility) and their practices (disapproval) is quite robust
and holds up even under experimental conditions where interviewer reaction
is controlled for (so they tend to be low social conformists) (Sniderman and Ha-
gendoorn 2007: 35). However, compared with those with no objection to Muslim
norms, critical liberals are more than twice as likely to think that immigration
should be made more difficult (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007: 31), four
times as likely to regard Muslim immigrants as ‘politically untrustworthy’ (Sni-
derman and Hagendoorn 2007: 41) and twice as likely to support assimilation,
with a more than a 50 % chance that they will do so (Sniderman and Hagen-
doorn 2007: 38).
The authors’ interpretation of these findings is that this group is basically
tolerant and would be natural supporters of a culturally diverse society, if it
were not for the undue attention drawn to cultural differences by a multicultural
ideology which ‘insists on fundamental differences between majority and minor-
ity’ (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007: 42). But is this the most likely explana-
tion? First, it is difficult to see how multicultural policies could have sufficient
practical impact on the lives of critical liberals to make them question the polit-
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ical loyalty of Muslims or wish to seek to restrict their immigration. Given their
residential locations, occupations and social class profiles, critical liberals and
Moroccan and Turkish immigrants are unlikely to be in any regular contact,
let alone enough to discuss politics or observe domestic gender differentiation.
Indeed, one of the benefits of residential segregation research has been to reveal
just how isolated white groups, especially middle classes, are in empirically mul-
ticultural societies (Simpson 2005: 666). Therefore, it is important to attend to
the mediating processes through which groups’ opinions are formed.
However, before turning to the media directly, other explanations of Dutch
‘cultural wars’ require review. Using a theory of ‘cultural trauma’ derived from
the recent work of Jeffrey Alexander, Ron Eyerman argues that ‘to gain a deep
understanding of reactions to the murder of van Gogh one has to grasp the emo-
tional effects of significant events in Dutch history, at least since the Second
World War’ (2008: 167). Dutch identity has been constructed, he argues, from
narratives that reflect the complex legacy of that conflict (suffering, resistance,
collaboration, loss of most of the Jewish population), the loss of colonial posses-
sions and forced repatriation of Dutch civilians, pride in economic recovery and
success, and the failure of Dutch UN peacekeepers to protect the Muslim popu-
lation of Srebrenica in 1994. He contends that the significance of these events is
best understood through this theory of cultural trauma, defined as ‘a tear in the
fabric of the social order precipitated by a shocking occurrence that sets up a
meaning struggle that demands reparation’ (2008: 163). Van Gogh’s murder by
a Dutch Moroccan Muslim can thus be read as an another event in this historical
series, finding supporting evidence in Fortuyn and van Gogh’s comparison of
Islam with fascism.
Eyerman’s account is useful in highlighting the importance of an analysis of
Dutch identity in understanding the public response to the traumas of the early
noughties, but there are at least two critical problems with his argument. One is
timing: as Sniderman and Hagenhoorn (2007) show, the Dutch public showed
widespread suspicion and dislike of Muslims at least as far back as 1998, before
these traumatic events. The second is selectivity: he presents a highly selective
account of the formation of Dutch identity. In particular, while the ‘traumatic’
loss of colonies is mentioned, the legacy of specifically Dutch and more gener-
ally European colonialism for Dutch perceptions of Muslims is not. Neither is
the very dramatic change in Dutch public attitudes toward gender roles and sex-
uality since the 1960s, nor the similarly dramatic decline in church attendance
and the public influence of Christian religion, whether Catholic or Protestant,
from the same date.
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Fortunately, each of these factors has been taken up by van der Veer (2006).
Noting that ‘most discussions in the Netherlands […] have been about the nature
of Islam and global terrorism’, he argues rather that:
What needs to be explained is the aggression of the Dutch against a Muslim minority that
forms some 7 percent of the Dutch population and is by and large a socially and culturally
marginal group (van der Veer 2006: 112).
He locates the origins of this ‘aggression’ in the legacy of the 1960s, a ‘turning
point’ in Dutch culture, during which ‘Holland [sic] was transformed from a
highly religious to a highly secular society’ (van der Veer 2006: 118). The verzuil-
ing system of tightly integrated pillars ̶ ‘when I grew up during the 1950s and
1960s, I was raised as a Protestant, and we had our own church, political
party, sports teams, schools, shops and welfare organisation’ (van der Veer
2006: 118) ̶ fell apart. He identifies the key factors in this collapse as ‘the sexual
revolution, the student revolt, and the rise to power of postwar babyboomers’
(van der Veer 2006: 118). Seen in this context, the Dutch problem with socially
conservative Muslim immigrants, with their restrictions on young people, head-
scarves, demands for prayer rooms and regular mosque attendance, is that:
Muslims stand for theft of enjoyment. Their strict sexual morals remind the Dutch too much
of what they have so recently left behind. There is indeed very little difference between
strict Christian ideas about sexuality and enjoyment and strict Muslim ideas about these
matters (van der Veer 2006: 119).
Mepschen et al. (2010) add another layer to this cultural analysis by arguing that
Dutch gay politics ceased to be ‘queer’ (that is, oppositional) when Dutch homo-
sexuals achieved equal civil rights in the 1980s; as a result, Dutch gay society
has been largely assimilated within Dutch ‘heteronormativity’, enabling the mo-
bilisation of Dutch gay identity in the cultural othering of non-European immi-
grants, especially Muslims, in a process they describe as ‘the instrumentalisation
of gay rights’:
In order to criticize Muslims as backwards and as enemies of European culture, gay rights
are now heralded as if they have been the foundation of European culture for centuries
(Mepschen et al. 2010: 965).
So is the reason for widespread Dutch aversion to Islam and Muslim culture its
social conservatism, which reminds the Dutch of their recent, religious and so-
cially conservative past? The World Values Survey would seem to provide
some support for at this contention.
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Compared with two other advanced industrial Western societies – the US
and the UK – the Netherlands emerges as the most secular in a number of
ways. For example, it is has the fewest respondents saying that religion is impor-
tant in their lives (12.5 %, compared with 21 % in Britain and 47.4 % in the US)
(WVS 2006 Wave) and the lowest levels of confidence in the churches (WVS 2006
Wave). Similarly, fewer Dutch respondents considered someone for whom tradi-
tion is important to be like or very much like them (24.4 %, compared with
43.5 % US and 47.8 % in Britain). This perhaps suggests that Dutch society has
less cultural capital available to draw on for an empathetic response to those
for whom religion or tradition is important. Also fitting the pattern of cultural
change sketched by van der Veer (2006) and Mephschen et al. (2010), the Neth-
erlands has the lowest levels of prejudice against homosexuals, with less than
5 % objecting to living next door to homosexuals, compared with 18.8 % for Brit-
ain and 26 % for the US. Yet on the same level, in the neighbour test for ‘living
next door to people of a different race’, the Netherlands (8.5 %) comes out as less
tolerant than Britain (5.4 %) and the US (4.1 %), with similar patterns emerging
for ‘different religion’ (Britain 2.1 %, US 2.6 %, Netherlands 3.2 %) and ‘different
language’ (Britain 6.3 %, Netherlands 10.7 %; US 11.1 %). This evidence (WVS
2006 Wave) would seem to confirm that Dutch tolerance of diverse sexualities
is unusual even amongst Western societies; but this tolerance does not apply
to the same extent to racial, religious or linguistic diversity.
In attitudes towards social conformity and authority the Netherlands also
stands out, and here a plausible link to dislike of attitudes characteristic of so-
cial conservatism and authoritarianism may be made. As noted, the Dutch iden-
tify less than British or Americans with those for whom tradition is important
and have the least confidence in the churches; this also goes for government,
the armed forces and the police (WVS 2006 Wave). They also have the lowest pro-
portion prepared to fight for their country (the only one with less than 50 %; all
others were above 60 %), trust their family least (63.4 % trust them completely,
compared with 72.5 % for the US and 85.9 % for Britain) and are most likely to
give ‘protecting free speech’ as their first choice personal aim (43.4 %) (WVS
2006 Wave).
In this context Islam, with its social conservatism and family-oriented cul-
ture, is likely to be regarded skeptically. Van der Veer’s (2006) cultural analysis
of the significance of rapid and recent secularisation triangulates well with these
results; Eyerman’s (2010) cultural trauma thesis fits less so – for example, it is
dissonant with the low value placed on tradition and patriotism. We now turn
to consider the processes through which such attitudes have been produced,
and in particular the production of Dutch social knowledge of Islam and Mus-
lims.
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3 Media and the stigmatisation of Islam and
Muslims in the Netherlands
In 2008 the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) con-
cluded that Muslims in the Netherlands are:
[…] the subject of stereotyping, stigmatising and sometimes outright racist political dis-
course and of biased media portrayal, and have been disproportionately targeted by secur-
ity and other policies. They have also been the victims of racist violence and other racist
crimes and have experienced discrimination. (ECRI 2008: 36–7)
This section will consider more precisely the role of the mass media in the pro-
duction and circulation of ‘stigmatising’ and ‘biased’ representations of Muslims
and Islam. A range of mostly US-based research has pointed to the role of the
media in the production of ‘ethnicized ways of seeing’ (Entman and Rojecki
2001: 120), meaning stereotypical representations in which out-group members
are seen to ‘possess fundamentally different traits’, such that ‘it becomes diffi-
cult for in-groups to empathize with them’ (Entman and Rojecki 2001: 120).
In the Netherlands such a sense of fundamental difference is produced and
perpetuated by the media’s use of words such as tuig (literally ‘harness’ but
meaning ‘lesser breed’) and Islamieten (perjorative term; no English equivalent)
to describe Muslims (Cherribi 2010: 142, 148), by ‘the painful overexposure in the
Dutch media of Moroccan-Dutch individuals who break the law’, such that Mo-
roccans and criminality become reflexively linked in the public imagination
(Leurs et al. 2012: 165), and by a whole series of ways of representing minority
(especially Muslim) groups as a threat. For example, minority self-organisation
though social media is described as ‘ghettos on the web’ (Hulsman 2005: 33)
and is linked with radicalisation (Ostveen 2004: 38) and hate speech (Pietersen
2008). Moreover, ethnicisation arguably extends beyond the media to main-
stream political and official public discourse:
[T]he terminology of ‘autochthonous’ (read white) people versus ‘allochthonous’ (read
black, migrant, refugee) people, steadily maintained by Dutch politicians, government of-
ficials and mainstream news outlets, is fraught with meaning as an exclusionary practice.
[… T]he label ‘allochthonous’ allocates positions to groups of people considered non-Dutch
others, and, like a long tail that cannot be shed, the label is not only applied to first-gen-
eration migrants but also to the subsequent generations that are born in the Netherlands.
(Leurs et al. 2012: 156)
A detailed study of newspaper coverage of Geert Wilder’s video compilation,
Fitna, shows that coverage of Islam and Muslims tended to be negatively repre-
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sented by politicians, experts and citizens (Scholten et al. 2008: 4, Table 1). How-
ever, the same study also cautions against seeing the media as uncritically sup-
porting Islamophobic perspectives; Wilders and the video were often more neg-
atively portrayed than Islam and Muslims (Scholten et al. 2008: 4), and earlier
Fortuyn had also experienced a hostile press much of the time (Margry 2007:
111: Oosthoek 2005: 112– 114). Indeed, a perception that media characterisation
of Fortuyn as a far-right extremist had contributed to his death fuelled public
anger in its wake (Margry 2007: 111).
Media scholarship has long established that conflict makes stories more
newsworthy (Fiske 2006), but the Dutch case suggests that recent trends in
news production and public relations – especially ‘pro-active news-making’
and the mediatisation of politics – may further increase the conflictual framing
of news (Cherribi 2010: 139– 140), as the following examples will show.
3.1 Proactive newsmaking: The El-Moumni affair
Arguably a key event in the launch of Fortuyn’s political career was the El-
Moumni affair. On May 3 2001 the late-night current affairs programme Nova,
the flagship news discussion programme on public broadcasting channel Neder-
land 3, aired a much-trailed, pre-recorded interview with the Rotterdam-based
imam Khalil El-Moumni. The interview had been arranged on the topic of
crime involving Moroccan youth, but the interviewer gave additional questions:
‘What do Muslims think about homosexuality?’, to which El-Moumni replied, ‘It
is a sickness’, followed by a question on gay marriage, to which the imam re-
plied, ‘If men continue to marry men, and women marry women, then Dutch so-
ciety will disappear’ (cited in Cherribi 2010: 144). Over the following days a
‘snowball effect’ occurred, in which the stance of Muslims on homosexuality
was widely (and negatively) represented, from the liberal daily newspaper
NRC Handelsblad to the populist daily De Telegraaf, which opined that the
imam’s views could only be found in the ‘medieval deserts of North Africa’ (8
May 2001, in Mepschen 2010: 967).
Thus the episode came to be represented as an attack by a Muslim spokes-
man on gay rights, even by academics writing much later. For example, in a
widely cited article on the Dutch retreat from multiculturalism, Joppke wrote:
[…] only when provoked by a prominent Dutch-Moroccan Imam’s statement that homosex-
uality was a ‘disease’ did Fortuyn retaliate that Islam was a ‘backward’ culture (2004: 249,
emphasis added).
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Yet El-Moumi’s statements were a spontaneous response to unexpected ques-
tions in an interview ostensibly about something else. It is also decidedly odd
to depict Fortuyn as acting in self-defense, since in 1997 he had already publish-
ed a book entitled Against the Islamization of Our Society, in which he made clear
that he opposed the Muslim presence in Dutch society. It is also notable that El-
Moumni’s statements were also received quite differently to indigenous Dutch
criticism of gay lifestyles. For example, on the occasion of the Gay Games in Am-
sterdam in 1998 (Mephschen et al 2010: 968), such ‘provocations’ received nei-
ther the extent of coverage devoted to El-Moumni nor the generalisation to an
entire imagined community.
The incident represents a case of pro-active news-making; under pressure in
a ratings war, the Nova journalist opportunistically asked extra questions on a
controversial topic and circulated previews via social media so that the websites
of several gay organisations carried the story before the actual broadcast, appa-
rently deliberately to generate controversy and hence ratings (Cherribi 2010: 146).
It thus illustrates the powerful role that mass media, in this case amplified by
social media, can play in framing an event for public consumption, exerting a
decisive influence on subsequent discussion, while the media’s role in manufac-
turing the event is forgotten. In this case, it also coincided with another powerful
media-driven phenomenon, the personalisation of politics, because it helped set
the stage for the launch of Fortuyn’s political career (Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2002;
Cherribi 2010: 150).
3.2 Mediatised government
While some studies of media influence have tended to emphasise its effects on
the least politically engaged, most easily manipulated audience segments (Klein-
nijenhuis et al. 2002), Uitermark and Gielen’s study (2010) of the Amsterdam lo-
cality of De Baarsjes, following the murder of Dutch film maker Theo van Gogh
(2004), shows media influence on the most politically astute, e.g., those respon-
sible for local policies. De Baarsjes had been the site of previous disturbances
involving Moroccan youth – though, notably, there is no evidence of Islamic rad-
icalisation – so local policy makers were keen to avoid further incidents in the
wake of van Gogh’s death. They therefore initiated a ‘Contract with Society’
which local mosques would be invited to sign to show their support for integra-
tion and to generate publicity to show local Muslims’ support for this. In terms of
media exposure the strategy was a success, producing high local and national
visibility. But it proved less successful in building bridges with local Muslims;
while the offer of media appearances appealed to some of the mosque leader-
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ship, only one leadership team was able to convince its committee to sign up,
and even there tensions between the leadership and congregation were exacer-
bated. Most disturbingly, the whole strategy was formulated not in response to
conditions on the ground, but rather in response to the calculated media impact
on the majority of voters:
The government acted against radicalism not because it observed radicalism in the neigh-
bourhood, but because it sensed there was a demand amongst media audiences for images
and narratives of the struggle against radicalism. (Uitermark and Gielen 2010: 1340)
In this case then, local politics became ‘mediatised’ in the strong sense that pol-
icy makers felt the need to respond to media audiences’ demands, which over-
rode their assessment of local conditions, in particular in anticipation of impacts
on precisely the groups the measure was ostensibly designed to protect.
Thus we have seen that mass media contribute to the ‘othering’ of Dutch
Muslims in a range of ways.We have also seen social media playing an amplify-
ing role in the circulation of negative representations, for example of pre-broad-
cast publicity in the El-Moumni affair. In the next section, we scrutinise its role
more closely.
4 Social media, representation and resistance
Social media-based forms of activism may be grouped into three basic types.
First, ‘mass self-expression’, that is the expression of opinion on publicly acces-
sible social media sites, such as YouTube. Second, social media can function as
a forum for discussion. Third, social media networks can be used to organise col-
lective expressions of support or dissent, whether in the virtual or real world.
Research on Turkish and Moroccan minorities (two of the three largest Mus-
lim populations) in the Netherlands suggests that these groups have similar lev-
els of ICT skills and access as the majority but that there are some significant
differences in contexts of access (which are more likely to be collective for minor-
ities) and some ‘very marked differences’ in usage. Thus:
Young people use ICT for a great variety of reasons. Thus the ICT usage of Moroccan and
Turkish youths is more often well-targeted and aimed at information, for example, in active-
ly participating in news groups, seeking information on religion, art and culture and keep-
ing abreast of developments in their country of origin. Native youngsters look more often
for entertainment, emailing and downloading files. (D’Haenans 2007: 296)
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Further research has found that young Muslim women spend more time online
than their male peers, and on activities with a stronger social dimension
(Leurs et al. 2012: 160). Such evidence suggests that social media are likely to be-
come an important arena for expression of alternative views, especially among
groups (such as young Muslim women) whose voices have had limited represen-
tation in mainstream debate, and, as we shall see, some further evidence shows
that this is already happening.
4.1 ‘Voice’: social media as mass self-expression and sites for
building solidarity
Critics have dismissed one-way communication by the posting of text or video
online as ‘civic narcissism’ (Papacharissi 2009: 238), but others have argued
that self-expression through social media provides the opportunity for articula-
tion of identities by those marginalised in the mass media and is a legitimate
and democratically useful response to problems of inequality of access to main-
stream public spheres (Cottle 2006: 51). Further support comes from the concept
of the ‘public screen’. De Luca and Peeples (2002: 130) argue that thinking about
the public sphere has been dominated by the idea of the face-to-face conversa-
tion as the ideal model of human communication and the belief that the conduct
of politics should somehow approximate as closely as possible to it. Instead,
they argue that political communication needs to be thought of not just as con-
versation but as dissemination, which opens up conceptual space for apprecia-
tion of non-verbal communication such as symbolic protest, visual practices and
other performances as forms of cultural critique.
One example of self-expression as resistance might be the postings to You-
Tube of videos in response to Dutch MP Geert Wilders’ anti-Islam compilation
video, Fitna, in March 2008.Van Zoonen et al. (2011a) analysed 63 videos posted
by women. They found contrasting voices to mainstream media commentators
on Fitna in the Netherlands and the UK – mostly older, non-Muslim men (Schol-
ten et al. 2008; Knott et al. 2010):
[T]he YouTube videos give voice to women themselves who come from across the globe, are
relatively young and often active Muslims. Second, they express different viewpoints in ge-
nerically new ways, criticizing and ridiculing Wilders or producing serious and committed
explanations of their own understanding of Islam. Third, although relatively few women
appeared in the videos, those that did speak for themselves, not only take on Wilders,
but also claim their right to speak within Islam. We propose to understand these videos
as acts of citizenships through which women constitute themselves as global citizens.
(van Zoonen et al. 2011a: 125)
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Second, sites for minority ethnic groups provide ‘hush harbours’ (Leurs et
al. 2012: 162) for discussion of issues affecting minority groups and may provide
space for building solidarity and identity through sharing and debate. Research-
ers have found that on sites such as Marokko.nl, Maghreb.nl, Mahgrebonline.nl
and Chaima.nl, ‘a great deal of discussion on message boards is about the ster-
eotypes and counter-positioning of Moroccan-Dutch youth in the Netherlands’.
Their popularity suggests the importance of their social function: Marokko.nl
is estimated to reach 70–75 % of Moroccan Dutch aged 15–35 (Leurs et
al. 2012: 162).
4.2 Deliberation: social media as discussion forums
Van Zoonen et al. (2011b) also analysed viewer responses to the videos posted by
a larger sample of female and male posters (n = 776) in order to assess ‘how the
video responses to Fitna were seen, listened to and reacted upon [sic] by others’
(2011b: 1296). These responses provide an opportunity to assess the kind of de-
bate generated by social media in response to mainstream mass media opinion.
The videos attracted considerable attention, up to 3.6 million viewers, with an
average [presumed median] of 24,000 (2011b: 1289), and generated about a quar-
ter of a million comments. However, the interaction generated between them was
limited – ‘only some 13 % of posters engaged with each other through comments,
subscriptions or “friendships”’ ( 2011b: 1296) – and these connections were most-
ly ‘limited to people with similar viewpoints’ (2011b: 1290). Furthermore, where
exchanges between posters of differing standpoints occurred, they tended to
be antagonistic. The researchers therefore conclude that:
[V]ideo practices that emerged in reaction to Fitna can thus be characterized as a set of on-
line demonstrations against (and to a much lesser extent in favor of) Fitna that express
both antagonistic and agonistic passions and views, but that are not particularly conducive
to the emergence of dialogue or mutual understanding. (2011b: 1296–7)
Against this reading, it may be argued that, if viewed as a public screen for ex-
pression of dissent and solidarity, the number, viewing figures and volume of
comment generated by videos suggest a significant phenomenon, particularly
when the degree of co-ordination between some posts and concerted action or-
ganised through social media is considered, as below. Also, YouTube is not the
best social media site for generating deliberative debate, although some con-
structive debate did take place, most notably around two videos posted by a
group of Egyptian women activists (van Zoonen et al. 2011a: 123). Rather, re-
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searchers have argued that moderated forums provide better spaces for the de-
velopment of deliberation (Stromer-Galley 2007), and those linked to major
news sites in international languages, such the BBC World Service’s World
Have Your Say forums, may be best for generating participation from a broad
range of contributors with diverse opinions (Herbert and Black, forthcoming).
4.3 Social media as resistance
Dutch new media lab Mediamatic organised a video protest against Wilders’
video (van Zoonen et al. 2011: 1289). This encouraged participants to use the
Fitna tag to post short video clips apologising for Wilders’ video in an attempt
to ‘drown’ references to Wilder’s video in the sea of Internet information. As
an organiser explains:
Why? Well, we can’t stop Wilders. He has a right to freedom of expression…We can compete
for attention however. And we can produce disinformation. So we are going to make Movies
called ‘Fitna’ in which we apologize for Geert Wilders’ embarrassing behavior…So if you
want to join in; just make your own Fitna movie and put it on line…Call it Fitna by
Geert Wilders…If we work hard enough, no one will be able to find his crap among all
the noise we produce. (in van Zoonen et al. 2011: 1289)
More than 200 such clips were uploaded (van Zoonen et al. 2011: 1289). Tagging
has been condemned as anti-social online behaviour, causing ‘content pollution’
(Benevenuto et al. 2009); but as van Zoonen et al. argue, where one video and
point of view is getting so much exposure, there may be an argument for this
kind of tactic to demonstrate oppositional perspectives (van Zoonen et
al. 2011: 1289).
Social media also provided the location for acts of resistance against another
of Wilders’ initiatives, the ‘kopvoddentax’ (‘raghead’ tax), a proposal that women
wearing head coverings should pay an annual tax (policy announced 16th Sep-
tember 2009). For example, the Dutch social networking site Hyves hosted the
community ‘Wij Willen Geen Hoofddoek Verbod’ [‘We want no headscarf
ban’], which attracted more than 15,000 members (Leurs et al. 2012: 152). As
well as virtual solidarity being expressed, a series of local protests were organ-
ised (Leurs et al. 2012). Thus social media provided the space for the high levels
of participation by Moroccan and Turkish young women, triply excluded from so-
ciety by ascribed ethnicity, religion and gender roles, to translate into organiza-
tion and off-line activism.
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5 Conclusions
This account of the role of media factors in the spread of Islamophobia and at-
tacks on institutional multiculturalism in Dutch society began by arguing that
explanations which focus on multicultural policies themselves or the character-
istics of Dutch Muslims fail for the same reason – most indicators show that dif-
ferences, gaps and separation between the majority and Muslim minorities were
diminishing between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s. Yet public discourse implied
the opposite (Musterd and Ostendorf 2008: 89), already suggesting a significant
role for media factors.
It was then argued that mass media impacts on the construction of Islamo-
phobic attitudes amongst the Dutch public in a variety of ways. First, derogatory
terms for Muslims and immigrant groups are common in Dutch news discourse
and even in official discourse. Second, although Islamophobic politicians and
leaders are also criticised, because this criticism tends to be directed at the in-
tegrity and competence of these politicians rather than at their Islamophobia,
the effect is to feed narratives of victimisation by these politicians and their sup-
porters rather than countering Islamophobia. Third, the effects of these discours-
es can be inferred from their presence amongst groups with limited direct expe-
rience of minorities (such as the ‘critical liberals’ in Sniderman and
Hagendoorn’s 2007 study). Fourth, the competitive media environment leads
journalists to engage in practices such as ‘pro-active newsmaking’, in which
media do not merely report but actively generate conflict in the search for rat-
ings. Fifth, the trend towards the personalisation of politics and the culture of
media celebrity arguably enabled Fortuyn to have a significant impact on nation-
al politics, without the need to build a traditional party political base. Sixth, in
the mediatisation of politics, policy makers’ public relations orientation actually
led them to prioritise media audiences’ perceived demand over local issues.
However, while mass and social media are deeply implicated in the process
of ‘othering’ Dutch Muslims, the latter especially are also critical in the forma-
tion of minority voices and identities in response to and resistance of Islamopho-
bia. While social media also play a role in the articulation of post-liberal Islam-
ophobic voices – as Wilder’s launch of Fitna illustrates – so media should not be
dichotomised as mass media bad, social media good; social media’s low access
costs (in Europe) and horizontal communication properties provide opportuni-
ties for groups with limited social and political power to communicate and po-
tentially organise and resist, as both Mediamatic’s anti-Fitna and the anti-kop-
voddentax campaigns illustrate. Just as well, as another finding suggests that
such resistance may become increasingly necessary. The experience of rapid sec-
ularisation (van der Veer 2006) and the cluster of Dutch social attitudes associ-
Paradise Lost? 97
ated with individualism, hedonism and anti-authoritarianism found in the WVS
data, which apparently makes this audience particularly receptive to negative
representations of Islam as the archetypical collective, restrictive and authoritar-
ian religion, also characterises younger white cohorts in other European coun-
tries (Norris and Inglehart 2011: 153), suggesting that these post-liberal Dutch cul-
ture wars may foreshadow developments elsewhere.
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Modern-day Martyrs: Fans’ Online
Reconstruction of Celebrities as Divine
The infiltration of the celebrity phenomenon in contemporary popular culture is
glaringly apparent in the flashy headlines of magazines and tabloids and the
very existence of a 24-hour celebrity news cable channel, E!. Consumers’ obses-
sion with and supposed intimate connection to these distant yet famous strang-
ers has been researched from a psychological standpoint as the manifestation of
a pathological defect (Maltby et al 2004). However, a closer examination of indi-
viduals’ extreme reverence and high regard for the select celebrity elite provokes
further questions about the nature of so-called celebrity worship as just that –
the authentic practice of implicit religion. While a review of the media’s histor-
ical development reveals a definite connection between the creation of the celeb-
rity and the mass media’s promotion of select individuals, innovative online so-
cial media can be inferred to have further revolutionised fans’ roles in the
construction of celebrities and their unique public identities. Media professio-
nals have been stripped of their exclusive narrative power as a multiplicity of in-
dividual fans have emerged, wielding the unprecedented ability to publish their
own understandings of celebrities online through a wide variety of public ven-
ues, such as blogs, Facebook, Twitter and website forums. Deceased celebrities’
personalities become particularly malleable, as fans reflect on these celebrities’
public lives and resurrect such famed figures into martyr-like individuals, whose
tragic deaths inspire reverence and heightened devotion. Through communally
constructed narratives, fans can integrate a celebrity’s ‘martyrdom’ into the
greater context of a modern gospel, in which celebrities are viewed as higher be-
ings unjustly persecuted by an unforgiving mass media and general public.
This chapter explores how fans’ online actions can exhibit traits of implicit
religion in the way they frame celebrities as religious entities. First, a literature
review of the media’s role in the creation of celebrities and fans’ roles in the re-
construction of celebrities’ identities is presented in order to understand how ce-
lebrity worship takes place and can be seen as a valid form of implicit religion.
Next, a case study examination of Michael Jackson fans’ creation of individual-
ised online ‘tributes’ on memories.michaeljackson.com demonstrates the post-
humous reconstruction of deceased celebrities as divine figures. Michael Jackson
serves as a prime example of a celebrity who has been reconstructed by fans to
be a modern-day martyr, an individual who defied many cultural, racial and gen-
der expectations, but who ultimately is believed to serve as a sacrificial outcast.
Through their outpourings of praise, fans make sense of Jackson’s unexpected
death by framing it as a divinely ordained act for the greater good of humanity;
in short, fans see Jackson as publicly victimised and finally free in death to spi-
ritually watch over his family and devoted fandom. Finally, from these findings
the central question of this study is addressed: How do fans’ online actions re-
construct celebrities as religious figures, and how can these be interpreted as a
form of implicit religion?
1 Defining implicit religion
Before we explore how fans construct celebrities as divine, a foundational defi-
nition of implicit religion must be established. Lord defines implicit religion as
‘the mode of behaviour exhibited, rather than the goal towards which the behav-
iour is directed’ (2006: 206). From this perspective, a fresh understanding of re-
ligion shatters notions of a ‘sacred versus secular’ dichotomy, such that implicit
religion is not deemed authentic because of a link to the ‘recognisably holy’ but
is noted instead in the ‘observable actions carried out by a person, whether ran-
dom, habitual, impulsive or rational’ (2006: 206). Therefore, in relation to this
understanding, in order for celebrity worship to be considered implicit religion,
fans’ actions in veneration of celebrities must be analysed.
For this discussion, it is important to note that implicit religion must be rec-
ognised as religion that is deinstitutionalised yet demonstrates what Bailey
(cited in Lord 2006: 208) deemed ‘the secular quest for meaning’. More so
than simply meaningful behaviour, implicit religion has also been connected
to the creation of sacred symbols from the secular world; as Chidester’s study
of Americans’ reverence for Coca-Cola led him to conclude, ‘religion is about sa-
cred symbols and systems of sacred symbols that endow the world with meaning
and value’ (Chidester 2005: 214). In this sense, perhaps the public identity of an
individual celebrity could be seen as a sacred symbol, providing meaning to de-
voted fans. This is illustrated by Campbell and La Pastina’s study (2010) of the
narrative framework used to reconstruct the iPhone as divine, in that fans adopt-
ed religious symbolism in order to spiritualise a secular icon and imbue it with
seemingly miraculous capabilities, thus framing it as a form of implicit religion.
From these examples we see how implicit religion can be characterised as prac-
tices – including both meaningful actions and language choices – that allow fol-
lowers to make sense of the surrounding world by merging the secular with a
sacred understanding. Therefore we argue that, for celebrity worship to be re-
garded as implicit religion, there must be significant evidence that fans apply
their understanding of celebrities to their understandings of the greater world,
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and that their actions in reverence of celebrities create a religious experience,
whether through meaning-infused rituals or through religiously charged lan-
guage, thereby allowing fans to recast celebrities as new-age saints.
2 Understanding celebrity worship in relation to
popular culture and implicit religion
Based on this understanding of implicit religion, we see that fans’ use of online
mass media can be interpreted as a practice by which they construct celebrities
as divine figures to be worshipped, which exhibits an implicitly religious charac-
ter and process of meaning-making. In order to provide support for this thesis,
several issues must be explored. The first aspect we consider is how the mass
media have historically created the very concept of the celebrity by providing
constant public exposure to particular individuals, allowing them to accumulate
attention and become firmly lodged in the public realm, regardless of actual tal-
ent or accomplishments. Secondly, we address the role that fans – those outside
the official media profession – play in the reconstruction of celebrities’ particular
identities, especially with regard to the use of new social media. Lastly, we syn-
thesise previous research surrounding the argument that practitioners of celeb-
rity worship demonstrate the use of various characteristics indicative of an au-
thentic form of implicit religion.
The mass media has led to the very development of the celebrity by promot-
ing the constant public exposure of select individuals. For example, in Evans’
(2005) reflection on the history of the celebrity, she explains that while fame
is a value which has always had to be mediated, it was not until the 1920s
and the advent of the film star – a product of mass media – that celebrities’ pri-
vate lives became nearly inextricable from their on-screen, performed personas.
Boorstin (1961: xxviii) explains how the term ‘celebrity’ was coined to apply to a
‘largely synthetic product’, in constant need of public attention from the mass
media and journalism venues in order to make the general population even
aware of their continued existence and to draw veneration of their perceived at-
tributes. Hollander (2010: 151) echoes these claims, deeming attention given to
celebrities to be ‘largely artificial’, in that being a celebrity is not dependent
on genuine talents, attractiveness or even the accumulation of wealth but is in-
stead ‘generated’ by publicists, journalists and public relations firms. In this
vein, Rothenbuhler (2005: 94) argues that we see an emergence of the ‘Cult of
the Church of the Individual’, in which the individual emerges as a celebrated
deity, with established celebrities at the top of the ranks. Importantly, he notes
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that this new church eschews physical or material bodies and instead is struc-
tured around the communication surrounding the individuals and is therefore
ultimately dependent on discourse and text. Not only is mass communication
necessary for the mere existence of celebrities, it is also through the mass
media that public understandings of celebrities’ personalities are manufactured
and revered. For instance, Elvis is still loved because the version of him depicted
in his movies is seen as solid evidence of his honesty, simplicity and other es-
teemed values (Rothenbuhler 2005: 98). Not only can the media present a biased
interpretation of a celebrity in his or her contemporary life, it can also recreate
them and perpetuate their fame after their deaths. A look into coverage of Mi-
chael Jackson’s death by People magazine reveals an intentional avoidance of
the negative traits that had plagued his reputation while living – his supposed
paedophilia and his ambiguous sexual orientation, among others – ‘ultimately
purifying his private life after-the-fact’ (Hollander 2010: 147). This understanding
of the mass media’s part in creating celebrities and defining their public person-
alities readily lends itself to an investigation of how fans, in turn, gather this in-
formation and reinterpret it for themselves.
Primary to fans’ emotional investment and time commitments to the vener-
ation of celebrities is the formation of parasocial interactions with these famous
figures. Chia and Poo (2009: 25) described this process as being that through
which fans experience the ‘illusion’ of intimate relations to distant celebrities
through constant media exposure. Furthermore, as fans develop stronger paraso-
cial relationships with beloved celebrities, they also demonstrate a tendency to
emulate these celebrities, role-modelling select values they perceive the celebrity
to exhibit (Chia and Poo 2009: 26). Fraser and Brown (2005: 183–206), for exam-
ple, observed that Elvis fans developed an understanding of the deceased celeb-
rity through his music, posters and other media products, consequently empha-
sising such prosocial behaviours as his perceived generosity and politeness.
According to a constructionist view of the audience and celebrity, it is important
to disregard the assumption that celebrities have a definite effect on an impres-
sionable audience, but rather to acknowledge that the audience is varied in its
reactions and that audiences can take up a variety of complex and competing
discourses to reconstruct celebrities (Stevenson 2005: 160). In short, fans are
an undeniable force in the manufacturing process of celebrities, and concern
should not be about ‘what celebrities do to us, but what we do with celebrities’
(Stevenson 2005: 142, original emphasis).
Thus fans are involved in an active framing process by which they forge par-
asocial attachments to certain celebrity figures. In particular, fans tend to ‘proj-
ect onto the celebrity an interpersonal reality and a moral code, which they can
then proceed to emulate’ (Fraser and Brown 2005: 185). In this way, Fraser and
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Brown noted in their study that the Elvis fans drew attention to the kind way it
seems he treated his mother, for instance, while ignoring his drug abuse and
other rumoured self-destructive behaviours. Hollander theorised that fans’ atten-
tive study of celebrity is a by-product of modern society’s ‘attention deficit’,
meaning that individuals fear they are not getting enough of the attention to
which they feel inherently entitled, with celebrities epitomising individuals
who are excessively praised and spotlighted, despite a lack of notable accom-
plishment or talent (Hollander 2010: 151). Celebrities’ success is somewhat irra-
tionally attributed to perceived positive personality traits, which allows them to
emerge as role models with influence over fans’ actions, and fans benefit from
the ambiguous morality of distanced celebrities (Fraser and Brown 2005: 185).
Furthermore, due to innovative social media technologies, the positive recon-
struction of celebrities is no longer exclusively restricted to media professionals,
as fans can create an original communal narrative with other individuals who
share a parasocial attachment to the same celebrity figure (Sanderson and
Cheong 2010: 329).
One means by which fans establish a universal interpretation of such celeb-
rities is through application of explicitly religious metaphors. While journalists
have already deemed Elvis to be ‘“like” a saint’ (Porter 2009: 271) and trips to
Graceland to be ‘pilgrimage[s]’ (Fraser and Brown 2005: 195), Sanderson and
Cheong’s study asserts that fans themselves construct and negotiate celebrities’
identities using religiously charged language. In particular, religious discourse
online aids fans in understanding difficult events, such as the passing of a be-
loved celebrity. The Internet allows fans to present preferred memories of celeb-
rities and share these ‘tributes’ with others as a means to ‘ameliorate the grieving
process and [offer] a sympathetic domain wherein an individual’s feelings about
the deceased are both understood and valued’ (Sanderson and Cheong 2010:
328). In both Sanderson and Cheong’s work on Twitter use to express grief
over Michael Jackson’s death and Fraser and Brown’s on fans’ imitation of
Elvis Presley, fans could exercise selectivity regarding which values they per-
ceived to be exhibited in a celebrity’s life and incorporate those preferred values
into their own lives (Fraser and Brown 2005: 200). In this way, only positive as-
pects of Jackson’s character are mentioned on memorial websites, such that he is
‘transformed into a veritable saint and tragic figure’ (Hollander 2010: 147). More
so than the communal experience, these divine reconstructions of celebrities can
provide higher meaning for individuals and ‘“resurrect” media celebrities into
public consciousness’, as fans ‘mimicked behavior that one would expect from
a disciple of an actual religious figure’ (Sanderson and Cheong 2010: 328).
To summarise, online social media has furthered fans’ feelings of personal
connection to celebrities by dramatically increasing their sense of intimacy
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and allowing fans to personally construct the versions of celebrities they believe
to be worthy of veneration and ‘self-martyrdom’ (Sanderson and Cheong 2010:
338). Fans’ roles in reconstructing celebrities, particularly in reconstructing
them as religious figures, contribute to an understanding of celebrity worship
and fandom as implicit religion.
Overall, we argue that fans’ veneration of celebrities can be viewed as a ver-
sion of implicit religion. As Porter details, if an individual’s actions mirror those
of a traditionally religious person, it is unimportant that the framework for this
mode of being originates from popular culture (Porter 2009: 279); in short, the
authenticity of an implicit religion is not derived from its theological tenets –
or lack thereof – but from the actions and associated emotions of its adherents.
Porter draws support for her argument by providing a case study of Star Trek
fans who incorporate certain values from the television series storylines, includ-
ing multiculturalism, tolerance and free will, into their own lives. It is not reli-
gious for fans to simply collect celebrity-related items or to admire celebrities;
as Doss explains, these actions take on religious meaning only when they create
a transcendent reality with the potential to influence human affairs (Doss 2005:
69). In particular, she investigates how Elvis fans’ personal tributes and shrines
to the entertainer after the star’s death, such as those incorporating the famous
‘velvet Elvis’ image, can be interpreted as authentic devotional practices that
provide comfort to grieving fans (Doss 2005: 79). In this way, fandom can be ac-
cepted as a meaningful understanding of the surrounding world, as individuals
eschew conventional cultural standards of religion and negotiate new interpre-
tations derived from popular culture.
Finally, these forms of celebrity worship reveal much more than modernity’s
mundane need for constant entertainment, but are rather indicative of a much
greater human need that had been fulfilled in the past in other ways, hinting
at a shift in society’s constant pursuit of higher meaning (Hollander 2010:
150). Laderman similarly sees celebrity worship as implicitly religious, solidify-
ing this by a comparison of modern-day saints, such as Princess Diana and Rus-
sell Crowe, to their more traditionally sanctified counterparts (Laderman 2009:
63–84). He states that new mythologies, ritualistic practices, personal transfor-
mations and the establishment of values develop from the ‘spiritual-secular mix-
ture’ that is fans’ devotion to celebrities (Laderman 2009: 84). Laderman partic-
ularly examines the frenzy following Rudolph Valentino’s death in 1926 and how
the fans and media collectively honoured his ‘martyrdom’ and effectively perpe-
tuated his life through the creation of personal shrines to the deceased actor, fil-
led with memorabilia, together with the authorship of extensive biographies to
add to the Valentino mythology.
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Taken together, all these studies indicate that celebrity worship can be
viewed as a form of authentic implicit religion, where veneration of celebrities
includes a selectivity – with the good raised up – and can then be seen as a
source of higher meaning, whether this be guidance in life, the emergence of
commonly shared mythologies and symbols or the creation of a religious expe-
rience.
This overview of previous studies suggests a sequential process can occur,
by which arbitrary entertainers can be transformed into modern-day saints.
First, the mass media generates the existence of the celebrity by presenting a cer-
tain public understanding of that individual through various mass communica-
tion venues. Next, these celebrities can then be interpreted and framed by indi-
vidual fans in terms of particular perceived attributes, by which the fans form
parasocial relations with these famed figures and even seek to emulate their pro-
social traits. Then when fans’ sense of intimacy with celebrities and their conse-
quent acts of veneration for celebrities gain transcendent meaning, either
through the creation of divine symbols, mythologies or experiences, celebrity
worship becomes a form of implicit religion. These processes are more fully ex-
plored in the next section through a case study investigating fans’ selective per-
ceptions and religious language choices in relation to how Michael Jackson has
been posthumously reconstructed as a divine figure and, in some ways, a martyr
whose death is viewed by fans as preordained and motivated by undeserved per-
secution.
3 Case study: the construction of Michael Jackson
as divine martyr
A greater understanding of how the mass media perpetuate the existence of the
celebrity – even after death – and the part fans play in reconstructing that celeb-
rity’s identity, in alignment with the basic characteristics of implicit religion, can
be found by examining fan practices and discourse surrounding the website
memories.michaeljackson.com. This is an official site created by the Sony
Music Entertainment Company, which holds the copyrights to Jackson’s music.
However, fans from all over the world are encouraged to share their personal
‘tributes’ to Michael Jackson by posting individualised messages on the web-
page; fans are also able to promote the website via Twitter and Facebook.
Michael Jackson provides an interesting case study, not only because of his
wildly devoted fan base and popularity, but because his unique public persona
readily lends itself to an otherworldly interpretation, as he utilised his ‘freakish-
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ness’ – his childlike nature, seeming asexuality, ambiguous ethnicity, continual-
ly morphing facial appearance, etc. – to gain ‘access into social spaces and iden-
tities typically denied to black male entertainers while [sidestepping] the pitfalls
that tend to punish non-normative expressions of race and gender’ (Gates 2003:
3). The huge attention given by the mass media to his death, memorial service
and the posthumous release of the documentary This Is It led to an undeniable
mourning period for fans; as stated in People magazine on the day of his death,
‘the world seemed to pause together to measure this loss […] Jackson’s life, and
now his death, profoundly affected his millions of fans in a way that is rarely
seen’ (quoted in Hollander 2010: 147). New social media venues allow for fans
to ‘invoke religious discourse as a comforting mechanism [drawing] solace
from equating the celebrity with the divine’ (Hollander 2010: 147), as Sanderson
and Cheong (2010) also observed in their longitudinal study of fans’ grief proc-
esses on Twitter, Facebook and TMZ.com. Their research found that not only did
creating this communal narrative allow fans to find comfort in a ‘resurrection’ of
a beloved celebrity but also provided the comfort of predictable rituals, such as
‘Michael Mondays’ on Twitter, on which fans would post favourite memories of
Michael Jackson on a weekly basis. This provides a point of departure for exam-
ining memories.michaeljackson.com and the various means by which fans recre-
ate Jackson as divine through their tributes on the site.
While there are hundreds of thousands of messages that have been posted
on the site since its original launch, for this case study a strategic sampling of
posts was collected from the hours of 12 a.m. to 3 a.m. on 29 August 2010.
This date is significant in that it would have been Michael Jackson’s 52nd birthday
and is just 14 months after his death. This sample presented a total of 105 posts
for analysis, although approximately half-a-dozen were identical ‘repeat’ posts,
possibly caused by a technological error. Several of the posts were written in
Spanish, Portuguese, Chinese and Russian; all were translated into English for
this analysis using Google’s online translator service.
In order to scrutinise these posts for evidence of implicitly religious traits,
posts were read and flagged for certain explicitly religious terms, including
‘angel’, ‘heaven’ and ‘God’, as well as for other phrases that implied an under-
standing of the afterlife, such as ‘God-like inspiration’ or other less blatantly re-
ligious references. From these findings, it could be deduced that fans’ implicitly
religious responses to Michael Jackson’s death could be roughly categorised into
three slightly different understandings of Michael as a divine figure: Michael the
angel, depicted by fans as called by God to join him in the afterlife; Michael the
otherworldly messenger, believed by fans to have been sent to spread love and
hope to the world; and Michael the immortal spirit, depicted by fans as being
continually resurrected by their eternal adoration. Drawing from the research
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on the reconstruction of celebrities by fans and celebrity worship, as discussed
above, the construction of each of these interpretations of Jackson will be exam-
ined through observation of religious terminology use (and the surrounding con-
texts) as well as the means by which fans selectively perceive Michael’s person-
ality traits and express the intimate connection they feel they have to him.
One of the most common reconstructions of Michael as divine is a general
consensus that the entertainer is unquestionably in heaven now, as he is
meant to be. While there is no discussion of Michael as Christian or faithful to
any particular religion, fans reconstruct Jackson such that he seems to be re-
deemed by his own perceived goodness or preordained fate. Ten posts make ex-
plicit references to Jackson currently being an angel in heaven, if not considered
a sort of guardian angel for his children or fans left on earth. Several of these
posts directly connect the idea of Michael being an angel to the belief that
God specifically called Michael from earth to serve a higher purpose. For in-
stance, user ‘Jen’ (29 August 2010, 2:52 a.m.) comments, ‘Heaven must have really
needed an angel’, and ‘Talan’ (29 August 2010, 1:30 a.m.) states that ‘god was
looking for his Angel’ (sic). In both of these posts, Michael is directly referred
to as an otherworldly figure, connected to the idea of a divine mission, whether
on heaven or earth. One of the most vivid descriptions of Michael as an angel
was posted by ‘Lena’ (29 August 2010, 2:39 a.m.); she envisions Michael in heav-
en with ‘angelic wings, dancing, using the sky as [his] Stage and the Moonlight
as [his] Spot Light’ (sic). Like many of the other users who express belief in Mi-
chael’s transcendent, eternal existence as perpetuated by his ever-loving fans –
as will be discussed in depth later – ‘Lena’ expresses a personal belief that Jack-
son’s entertaining power will continue forever, not merely symbolically, but lit-
erally in his afterlife.
In other posts, Michael himself is not considered to be an angel but to be
among angels who either celebrate his greatness or provide comfort to him.
These posts differ from others in that they hint at a more traditional notion of
heaven as a place of refuge for the deceased. The aspect of divine experience
emerges from fans’ feelings of continued intimacy with Jackson – most strongly
evident in the fact that the overwhelming majority of posts are addressed directly
to the deceased Michael – and the sense of hope they derive from the belief that
the ‘King of Pop’ is watching over them. User ‘MJsprettybaby’ (29 August 2010,
1:39 a.m.) posted, ‘I hope that you are always smiling to us from heaven’, and
‘Nieves Lopez’ (29 August 2010, 1:41 a.m.) posted, ‘Someday we will see you in
the KINGDOM OF GOD!’ (sic). By creating a shared understanding of Michael
as in heaven, one who furthermore listens to fans’ online pleas and awaits a re-
union with his adoring audience, fans are able to make sense of Michael’s sud-
den death. They can attribute it to a higher, although not fully understood, pur-
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pose (e.g., ‘GOD doesn’t make mistakes, and that he needed you to come home’,
sic, as stated by ‘melliemel’ at 2:01 a.m.) and therefore create a saint-like figure to
whom they can feel justified in pouring forth praise.
The second reconstruction of Michael as divine is an interpretation of the ce-
lebrity as a supernatural messenger sent to unite people around the globe and
spread his perceived message of hope and love. This particular interpretation
of the celebrity stems from fans’ heavily selective perception of the type of per-
son Jackson is believed to have been. Despite the fury at antagonistic press cov-
erage of Jackson’s many puzzling antics – from his extensive rhinoplasty to his
insistence on his children wearing masks in public – not one of Jackson’s sup-
posed vices is mentioned on the site. Instead, he is recreated as a nearly divine
visionary, spreading goodness to all. While some fans are not specific in pin-
pointing Jackson’s perceived gifts, offering ample praise such as ‘You gave so
much to this world’ (‘MJsprettybaby’, 29 August 2010, 1:39 a.m.), others provide
detailed lists. ‘Bridget’ (29 August 2010, 12:58 a.m.) lists Michael’s ‘smile, pas-
sion, spirituality, humility, genius talent and innocence which suffused the
world with wonderment and joy, so much joy!’ One user explicitly labels Michael
to be ‘MY Idol’ (sic, ‘SANDRA’, 29 August 2010, 12:00 a.m.); two declare him to be
their ‘inspiration’, and a few draw even stronger parallels to religious devotion,
such as one stating avidly, ‘i do believe in you. i know you are the truth’ (sic,
‘Alice Neverland’, 29 August 2010, 12:00 a.m.).
Much more than simply describing Michael in highly praiseworthy terms,
fans imply that a universal community has been forged through mutual love
of Jackson. ‘Bridget’ (29 August 2010, 12:58 a.m.) says that ‘[Michael’s] music
harmonized the world with hope and communal reverence’, and ‘Lena’ (29 Au-
gust 2010, 2:39 a.m.) says, ‘[T]he power you evoke Michael, is almost God
Like, it’s Hypnotic, it draws people from world’s away to become one’ (sic). If
the sprinkling of different languages present in this small sample has any further
implications, Michael is a divine messenger who works to unify people, not only
through his widely distributed music but also through the communally shared
experience of his perceived love. A final Christ-like element of this reconstruction
of Michael concerns fans’ repeated assertions that he was falsely depicted or per-
secuted by the mass media, an active choice to ignore select aspects of the celeb-
rity’s life. ‘Talan’ (29 August 2010, 1:30 a.m.) bluntly states, ‘F*** the press, Mi-
chael your the best’ (sic), and ‘Jovi Ramirez’ (29 August 2010, 12:35 a.m.)
pledges to Jackson, ‘I love u with all my heart reguardless of wat people say’
(sic). There are two other references in the postings to the ‘lies’ and ‘doubts’ sur-
rounding what fans believe to be Michael’s true character. While this is not ex-
plicitly religious language, it does provide a stronger framework for the interpre-
tation of Michael as a persecuted martyr brought into the world with a higher
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purpose. Overall, Michael’s life is recreated as a sort of new ‘gospel’, one for
which fans confirm they will be faithful proselytisers, as ‘all that were touched
by [Jackson] continue to spread this wonderful message and live by it’ (‘Asha’, 29
August 2010, 2:04 a.m.).
Additionally, Michael is seen as divine in a third sense by those fans who
draw particular attention to his eternal nature, as perpetuated by belief in his
continued existence via the mass media and fans’ love. This is different from
the first reconstruction of Michael the angel in that it does not draw from conven-
tional faith in a heavenly afterlife, but rather provides fans with the hope that
they can play a personal part in assuring Jackson’s immortality. Sixteen posts
make an explicit claim that Michael still lives; these posts were different from
those stating that Michael had made a transition to a heavenly state, but rather
imply that he, like an ethereal spirit, is one with humanity on earth for eternity.
A few of these posts were straightforward acknowledgements of fans’ belief in
Michael’s immortality, such as ‘you will live forever’ (‘aditi varma’, 29 August
2010, 1:16 a.m.) and ‘R.I.P Michael Jackson [1958-INFINITE]’ (‘Eureka’, 29 August
2010, 12:56 a.m.). Two posts contributed to the well-known ‘Michael Jackson as
Peter Pan’ narrative by directly equating the star with the timeless, mythical
character. Two other posts explicitly attributed Michael’s perceived immortality
to the continual devotion of his fans and their commitment to various Jack-
son-related media.
Another user (‘susie oneal’, 29 August 2010, 12:51 a.m.) connected belief in
Jackson’s eternal nature to fans’ actions on the website by writing, ‘[Y]ou contin-
ue returning to life […] every time we write on pages [… B]ecause we write THESE
you will be more present than ever’. In two posts, fans expressed a ritualised as-
pect of their continued devotion to the King of Pop. The same user (‘susie oneal’,
29 August 2010, 12:51 a.m.) tells Michael, ‘I listen to your music everyday wishing
you could have been with us much longer’ (sic). Due to the fact that this sample
is limited, the degree to which belief in Michael as divine manifests itself in rit-
ualistic behaviours is impossible to pinpoint without explicit reference to these
practices by users, such as the aforementioned. However, the communicated be-
lief in Jackson as a forever-present spirit is also expressed as an implicitly reli-
gious mechanism by which fans are able to cope with their grief and put faith
in something greater than themselves. For example, ‘niki’ (29 August 2010,
2:50 a.m.) states, ‘You are still here and you always will’ (sic). In this reconstruc-
tion of Michael, fans’ adoration provides the basis for a divine experience, as
they are able to contribute to his God-like eternity and comfortingly believe in
his continuous spiritual companionship.
Michael’s death is also depicted as martyr-like by his fans, who piece togeth-
er an all-encompassing narrative that casts the pop singer as a saintly figure who
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was unjustly killed despite the creed of love he promoted. This reconstruction is
an accumulation of the previously described depictions of Michael as an angel,
otherworldly messenger and eternal spirit, in that Michael the martyr is depicted
by fans as chosen by God to fulfil a higher purpose – to spread his ‘gospel’ of
love on earth – and he was then taken from the world after he suffered persecu-
tion by the media. Several posts on the website mention Michael’s legacy of love
and even describe themselves as ‘witnesses’ to his message. For example,
‘Louise Costello’ (29 August 2010, 1:31 a.m.) states that Michael ‘Saved so
many Lives and never wanted anything back in return except L.O.V.E’ (sic), a de-
scription that parallels the stories of Christ. Similar to devotees of Christ or a
martyred saint reflecting on such sacrificial deaths, ‘Sayan Banerjee’ (29 August
2010, 2:50 a.m.) asserts, ‘The world stood perplexed for several minutes on hear-
ing his untimely expiration. All should be thankful to him for showing us the ray
of hope in this world of doom and despair’. ‘Bridget of New Zealand’ (29 August
2010, 12:58 a.m.) added that she felt ‘so privileged that I was of a generation
where I was able to witness it and be a part of it’. As a key element of a martyr
is enduring suffering for a greater good, a number of posts reference the pain
and prejudice inflicted upon Michael during his life, such as ‘THE WORLD
SHOULD OF APPRICIATED YOU MORE’ (sic, 29 August 2010, 1:13 a.m.) and
‘since you’ve passed away, your pain and suffering is no more’ (29 August
2010, 12:56 a.m.). Finally, after Michael’s believed ascension to heaven – ‘GOD
doesn’t make mistakes […] he needed you to come home’ (‘melliemel’, 29 August
2010, 2:01 a.m.) – Michael’s death continues to inspire his followers with his per-
ceived prime value, namely, love for all. For instance, ‘Asha’ (29 August 2010,
2:04 a.m.) states that ‘all that were touched by you continue to spread this won-
derful message and live by it. Your fans worldwide will continue keeping your
legacy alive no matter what’.While no individual post alone establishes a martyr
narrative about Michael, together the fans’ postings form a communal narrative
by which different elements of a martyr or Christ-like story are asserted.
Throughout the posts, there is the notion of a clear division between suppor-
tive fans and an antagonistic general public. Jackson’s talents are viewed as a
gift to a suffering world in need, and through sacrificial death and the committed
loyalty of his fans, Jackson’s legacy is framed as otherworldly and never-ending.
For example, ‘Nieves Lopez’ (29 August 2010, 1:41 a.m) dedicates his post to Mi-
chael for ‘all these years you gave us, all your effort and dedication, your suffer-
ing, what they expected and never came, the injustice and lies […]’. While Mi-
chael’s global impact is frequently linked directly to his art, often Jackson
himself is the sole object of reverence and a catalyst for change. For instance,
‘Asha’ (29 August 2010, 2:04 a.m.) affirms that ‘our lives were enriched by
your existence’. When compiled together, these different online voices tell the
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story of Michael the modern-day martyr, one who was willing to endure public
suffering and even death but who would relentlessly continue to promote a mes-
sage of overwhelming love.
In conclusion, a brief case study of fans’ actions online at memories.mi-
chaeljackson.com demonstrates that, through the creation of shared narratives
and symbols, a deceased celebrity can be collectively resurrected and recon-
structed into a divine figure, one who provides a framework of meaning for
fans struggling to accept Jackson’s unforeseen death and make sense of the
world. While the various words used to commemorate Jackson do not mean
that the online users are rejecting more traditional religious beliefs – in fact,
the described reconstructions of the celebrity draw heavily from Christian beliefs
in heaven, the revolutionary love of Christ and the infiltration of the Holy Spirit
(‘Proshant’, 29 August 2010, 2:24 a.m., writes ‘[W]e are not alone, he’s still here
with us’) – the fans’ created narrative does represent a merging of the sacred
with the secular. Because there is no interaction between users on the website,
all understandings of Jackson as divine must be drawn from individual fans’ in-
tentional language choices in their self-expression of who Michael was and still
is to them. It is clear that fans exhibit discretion regarding which aspects of Mi-
chael Jackson’s character they decide to focus on in the process of recreating
Jackson as a divine figure,whether as a heavenly angel, an otherworldly messen-
ger or an eternally present spirit. They choose to ignore any negative depictions
of his character, reflecting instead on the positive force of his music and charity
work. More so than mere symbols, these three different divine identities are in-
fused with greater meaning, providing hope to faithful fans and a point of refer-
ence for what is deemed to be good and worthy in the world.
To summarise, fans’ religiously-charged language and selective perceptions
of Michael’s identity readily mould the legendary and controversial entertainer
into a venerable, divine figure. Through their praise and expressed perceptions
of the meaning he infuses in their lives, Jackson is transformed into something
much greater than a mere popular cultural icon. The many negative rumours and
child molestation allegations that plagued his life are forgotten as fans draw at-
tention to and celebrate his life, his message, his virtues and his legacy, and
thence crown Jackson with saintly titles. Consequently, he emerges as a genuine
religious idol, a shining symbol of hope, love, guardianship, destiny and eternity
to those who perceive him as such.
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4 Reflections on celebrity, divinity and martyrdom
From the findings of this study, it can be concluded that fans can recreate celeb-
rities as religious figures through the online construction of communal narratives
and symbols that provide higher meaning to their lives. One significant aspect of
these narratives that appeared to be a common thread throughout each of the
examples was that, despite a loosely unified understanding of a celebrity as di-
vine, each individual fan played a personal role in the selective process that went
into recreating a celebrity’s perceived identity, resulting in fragmented interpre-
tations. This echoes Fraser and Brown’s (2005) study of Elvis fans and their imi-
tation of the icon, a practice that could be viewed as an implicitly religious ritual
or fan-generated posthumous ‘resurrection’ of the celebrity. They found that
while few survey participants had ever actually met Elvis or seen him perform
live, fans nevertheless readily formulated their own distinctive understandings
of Elvis through creating personalised interpretations of his mediated personal-
ity, such as those lived out through their unique impersonations (Fraser and
Brown 2005: 197). Similarly, Sanderson and Cheong’s (2010) study of grieving Mi-
chael Jackson fans found that religious discourse was used to interpret Jackson’s
death in a multiplicity of ways. These included not only a mode of veneration
and a coping mechanism for his passing but also condemnation of those who
scorned his purportedly sinful nature. Here, celebrity worship represents a
form of implicit religion, and thus multiple readings of a single celebrity’s iden-
tity can be regarded as equally authentic religious interpretations.
This tendency is also seen in the case study of memories.michaeljackson.-
com.While many fans utilised religious language, this was used to create starkly
different understandings of Michael. One example is the divergent groups who
presented Michael as an angel in heaven and conversely as an ever-present spirit
on earth. However, despite their differing manifestations, both of these interpre-
tations serve as a framework for coping with loss, much like traditional religious
beliefs. For instance, one user (‘Steph Newton’, 29 August 2010, 2:28 a.m.) recre-
ates Michael as an angel and thus finds comfort that he would still be able to
watch over his children, while another user (‘paulasue’, 29 August 2010, 12:00
a.m.) reconstructed Michael as more of a spiritual presence (‘forever in our
hearts’), but one who also provides comfort to his fans by manifesting himself
in his legacy and resonating love for the world. Although there are recurrences
of phrases and images used by fans to depict Michael as ‘divine’, it must be
noted that the sheer subjectivity of personal interpretation is a critical aspect
of celebrity worship as implicit religion, for it is not only in the fans’ veneration
of the individual but in the meaning to the fan that a religious experience is
forged.
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Predictably, fans take great liberties in terms of which aspects of a celebrity’s
perceived personality traits they choose to celebrate – or ignore – as well as the
traditional religious ideas from which they construct new mythologies in the
process of recreating celebrities as modern-day ‘saints’. From these varied inter-
pretations, a variety of religious metaphors and narratives inevitably emerge.
More than simply producing heterogeneous understandings of celebrities as
divine, another important conclusion is that this mode of implicit religion is also
highly dependent upon the existence of public discourse and communication.
This might seem to be an overly fundamental observation, but it is nonetheless
critical. It is through fans’ explicitly religious choice of words that they create a
communal narrative – however varied – that serves as a framework of implicitly
religious meaning and the foundation for the genesis of a religious experience.
As Rothenbuhler argues, culture has promoted ‘the self [as] the holy object of the
society carried by the medium of the individual’; as the self can only be fully ex-
pressed through communication, the Church of the Cult of the Individual ‘can
only exist in communicative interaction’ (Rothenbuhler 2005: 99). It therefore
seems no coincidence that celebrities,whose very public personas are dependent
upon their mediated personalities, would promote a sort of worship that is heav-
ily dependent upon a communicated religious experience or narrative.
Fraser and Brown (2005: 185) argue that celebrities’ ‘relation to reality and
morality is ambiguous’, for they are ultimately ‘images without bottoms’
(Ewen 1988: 13).With the blank slate for a public persona, fans are free to trans-
form a celebrity into a divine figure, but to do so fans must use religious dis-
course. As Sanderson and Cheong’s study (2010: 338) finds, ‘religious discourse
is a “common language” that [people] can use to communicate both their affec-
tion and contempt for celebrities’. Because of this flexibility and fluidity of im-
plicit religion, deliberate choices must be made by fans in invoking religious lan-
guage in a way that frames celebrities in a highly positive or reverential sense.
For example, in the case study, online users’ explicit use of religiously-charged
words, such as ‘angel’, ‘heaven’, ‘God’ and ‘blessing’, were necessary to convey
an understanding of Michael Jackson as divine. Fans’ word choices could even
transform Jackson’s commonly known nickname, ‘the King of Pop’, into a title
reminiscent of Christ as the ‘the King of Kings’, e.g., ‘the true King, the King
of human hearts’ (‘YuliyaVV’, 29 August 2010, 12:41 a.m.) and ‘Dear and beloved
King’ (‘Avik’, 29 August 2010, 12:41 a.m.). Thus, it is ultimately through fans’ de-
liberate word choices, words that evoke the idea of Michael as immortal and
praiseworthy, that the celebrity is created as divine.
This study also shows how deceased celebrities who are framed as divine
may also be seen as martyrs by their fans. Celebrities, especially popular musi-
cians, have often been framed in terms of martyrdom in order to justify their
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deaths or self-destruction as a sacrificial gift by the iconic identity they symbol-
ised to an undeserving world, e.g., discussion of the deaths of Kurt Cobain (Kahn
1999: 83–96) and Janis Joplin (Bradshaw 2008: 69–87), or to frame the sharing
of their music or talents in terms of self-sacrifice and martyrdom for their fans.
Hollander (2010) argues, for example, that Jackson (throughout his career)
framed himself and the loss of his childhood, due to his musical career, in
terms of self-martyrdom. Johnson (2009) likened Jackson to a martyr, similar
to Princess Diana, immediately following Michael’s death. In an op-ed article,
Johnson wrote that while Diana evoked ‘an astonishing response’ because she
spoke to women around the world, Jackson ‘spoke to the billions of people
the world over who feel that they do not conform in some way to the Hollywood
stereotype of good looks [… I]n a world dominated by a demoralising canon of
physical perfection, [Jackson] was the patron saint of dysmorphia’.
Throughout the posts on memories.michaeljackson.com, this concept of oth-
erness plays a key role, as fans assert that, while Jackson was undeniably differ-
ent, he was unique in a way that both made him somehow superior to the mass-
es and yet unquestionably accepting of all. Here the frame of celebrity
martyrdom presents the object of devotion in a spiritual light, highlighting char-
acteristics of selflessness and willingness to give up their lives for their fans –
together with the messages of love, peace, hope and justice that their music is
seen to represent. In this investigation, we see that Michael Jackson’s fans
view his death as martyrdom in that, collectively, they reframe his death as
the product of a hostile world unwilling to accept his legacy of the lyrical mes-
sages of acceptance and charity.
Beyond the mere creation of religious narratives about celebrities, fans’ di-
vine experiences are derived from the meaning these communal mythologies
provide to their lives. For ‘[i]t is in the impact of the text on its audiences that
the religious import is to be found’ (Porter 2009: 275) and it is through such
texts that celebrities fully shine in an unexpectedly ‘holy’ light. It is through
fans’ selective reconstructions of celebrities as divine, via their communicated re-
ligious narratives and fans’ consequent transcendent experiences, that celebrity
worship evades traditional notions of idolatry. Instead, it presents itself as a fully
valid form of implicit religion, with celebrities ‘mov[ing] people to action as well
as contemplation […], their personal stories becom[ing] public morality tales in-
structing larger communities about right and wrong, success and failure, fulfil-
ment and tragedy’ (Laderman 2009: 73). This chapter argues that the actions
of the fans are not so unlike certain aspects of traditional religions and shows
how popular culture and the social affordances of new media may function as
a form of implicit religion for many individuals.
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Arjen Nauta
Radical Islam, Globalisation and Social
Media: Martyrdom Videos on the Internet¹
What does a martyr do? His function is not confined to resisting the enemy and,
in the process, either giving him a blow or receiving a blow from him. Had that
been the case, we could say that when his blood is shed it goes [to] waste. But at
no time is a martyr’s blood wasted. It does not flow on the ground. Every drop of
it is turned into hundreds and thousands of drops, nay, into tons of blood and is
transfused into the body of his society […] Martyrdom means transfusion of
blood into a particular human society, especially a society suffering from anae-
mia, so to speak, of the true faith. It is the martyr who infuses such fresh blood
into the veins of such a society. (Ayatollah Murtaza Mutahhari 1980: 63)
1 Introduction
‘A martyr! How strangely that word has been distorted from its original sense of
a common witness’, Edward Gibbon remarks as he mentions that Sigismund of
Burgundy has become a saint and martyr (1963: 176). Gibbon seems somewhat
short-sighted in his assessment of the ancient Greek word ‘mártyras’ (μάρτυρας)’
however; witness or testimony is a very powerful form of advertisement because
it communicates personal experience and credibility with an event to an audi-
ence – also to the ancient Greeks. In human history, many religious movements
and organisations have taken this further and resorted to ‘witnesses’ for promo-
tional purposes. What could be a more powerful testimony than a person who
chooses suffering or death over life in order to testify to his or her absolute com-
mitment to a religious cause? Especially if a belief system is not in a culturally or
politically dominant situation, or under attack from an outsider, the sacrifice of
the martyr is very helpful in defining the value of the cause s/he dies for. Martyr-
dom serves (1) as a boundary marker in which the borders between religious sys-
tems are sharpened; (2) it furthermore creates an example, a standard of con-
duct, which should be followed by fellow members of the religious
community; and, (3) by creating boundaries and examples, the martyr provides
 I would like to thank David Herbert and Anita Greenhill for their valuable comments to
preliminary versions of this chapter. They corrected many flaws, for which I am very grateful.
a new sense of cohesion to a community, defining more sharply why a cause is
worth dying for (Cook 2007: 1–2).
The martyr also needs witnesses, however, the spectators who witness the
sacrifice to a certain cause and testify it to others so that it becomes part of
the collective memory. In ancient times, Christian martyrs were often executed
in public – quite regularly in the theatre. The Romans thus provided the neces-
sary stage for the martyr, enabling the audience to witness it (Potter 1993). This
might have been a deterrent to most spectators, as the Romans intended, but it
enabled other Christians to witness the martyr’s sacrifice as an example which
should be followed, or at least praised. It was only through these public demon-
strations and subsequently produced written records – which spread through the
Christian communities in the empire and were eventually collected by Eusebius
in the 4th century – that martyrs and martyrdom as such could gain a prominent
position in Catholic Christianity (Brown 1981).
This is as true nowadays as it was during ancient times, except that the de-
velopment of mass communications and media has conceptually extended the
theatre. The theatre where the martyrs perform their sacrifice, witnessed by
the audience, now extends to virtually anyone with access to the Internet. In
the contemporary world, radical Muslims make frequent use of the instrument
of martyrdom. Mass media and the Internet now serve as the means to spread
these martyrdom stories, often in the form of suicide attacks, in carefully crafted
hagiographies of martyrs, often produced on video. The current Eusebiuses are
the many radical Islamic sites featuring martyrologies, written as well as filmed.
This paper seeks to investigate these videos on the Internet: where they can be
found, who makes them, how they are spread, and what they actually consist of.
Most important, however, are the questions about how they function and for
what purposes they have been produced.
This investigation attempts to form a contribution to the current study of rad-
ical Islam and terrorism. Although many facets have been extensively studied,
the role of radical Islam on the Internet has so far had insufficient light shed
on it. This essay seeks to show that martyrdom videos form an important part
of radical Islamic propaganda and therefore need to be investigated more close-
ly. In order to further clearly demarcate the breadth of my field of investigation, I
will focus on martyrdom videos from suicide bombers. It is unnecessary to re-
mind the reader of the major role which the discourse of radical Islam plays
in contemporary Western societies. Within this discourse I include the many
(often overlapping) currents that are usually associated with radical Islam –
such as fundamentalism, Salafism, jihadism, and Islamism. Likewise, radical Is-
lamic organizations have been labelled (whether by others or themselves) funda-
mentalist, terrorist, Salafist, jihadist or have simply been subsumed under the
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name of al Qaeda.When I refer to the organisations behind the individual suicide
bombers in this essay, I will use the term ‘jihadist movement’. Although the dis-
cursive use of ‘jihad’ is contested in the Arab world itself, as well as in Western
academia, I regard jihad as the religiously-driven struggle for Islamic orthodoxy
and purity (in these cases turning violent). The jihadist movement is a loose col-
lective term for the plethora of Islamic movements that regard themselves as part
of that struggle (or war) and choose to engage in it. I am fully aware that this to a
certain extent involves certain generalisations and reifications, but this is not
detrimental for the purposes of this chapter.
2 Martyrdom videos on the Internet
Although the use of high-tech devices and instruments such as the Internet may
appear to contradict their often fundamentalist ideals, radical Islamic organisa-
tions have recognised the use of the Internet as a multipurpose tool and weapon.
Connections to the Internet have spread around the world in recent decades,
making it easily accessible for radical Muslims. Even in the most remote parts
of the Hindu Kush, the Internet is now readily available, and cybercafés have
sprung out of the ground like mushrooms. This offers another advantage for
the Muslim radical: the ability to remain anonymous (see Eickelman 1992; Sage-
man 2004; Linjakumpu 2008).² While with personal computers the danger re-
mains that intelligence services may track the IP address, the emergence of cy-
bercafés poses an excellent alternative in order to avoid tracing. Adding to the
accessibility of the Internet are the relatively low prices, not only for using it
but also for, e.g., creating a website, thus making it not just available for the
wealthier classes. Moreover, the Internet forms an excellent source for informa-
tion but, more importantly in this matter, also for sharing information (Anderson
2003a: 48–52 and 2003b: 887–897). The use of the Internet as a means for global
communication has been pivotal for the development and actions of radical Is-
lamic organisations (see Devji 2005).³
Some of the means for which radical Muslims have actually used the Inter-
net include the following: (1) They have used it as a vehicle for fundraising and
financial transactions between involved groups and persons. Although the latter
 Although academics have discussed the availability of the Internet to radical Muslims, I think
we should nowadays assume that Internet access will somehow be available – for the reasons
mentioned above.
 Osama bin Laden himself affirmed the pivotal role of mass media and the Internet in the
spread of Al Qaeda’s messages (Devji 2005).
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has declined in recent years, as increased monitoring has made it too risky, some
transactions still occur through new ‘pay-as-you-go’ credit cards (see especially
Atwan 2008). The use of the Internet as a vehicle for fundraising has become
more popular though, as have efforts to sell merchandise (see Nacos 2007). (2)
Radical Muslims have also used the Internet as a tool for the recruitment of
new members. Personal contacts have traditionally been the most important
means of winning new recruits, but with its global spread the Internet has
proved instrumental in this respect (see e.g., Sageman 2004; Husayn 2007).⁴ It
also served consequently (3) as a virtual classroom for training recruits in radical
Islamic thought and also in bomb and explosive making. The investigation of
computers left behind by Al Qaeda members in Afghanistan has also shown
that they were extensively used (4) for gathering information, such as maps
and news. More important is the outlining of the Internet (5) as a virtual battle-
field on which the enemy can be digitally attacked, e.g., by hacking into web-
sites, e-mail, etc. This is the so-called ‘Cyber Jihad’ (Atwan 2008) or ‘E-Jihad’(-
Bunt 2003). Equally important, however, is its use in (6) logistics, the
facilitating and planning of operations. The Hamburg-based perpetrators of
the 9/11 attacks, for example, Mohammed Atta, Ziad Jarrah, Ramzi bin al-
Shibh and Marwan al-Shehhi, communicated with Al Qaeda’s operational
boss, Khaled Sheikh Mohamed, via the Internet (Sageman 2004: 105–8).
Most important for the purpose of this chapter, however, is the use of the In-
ternet (7) as a means of propaganda, narrowly related to though not entirely
overlapping with the Internet as a tool for recruitment. One can find many
sites on the Internet which roughly fit within the discourse of radical Islam,
whether called Jihad, Salafist, Islamist or fundamentalist. The unprecedented
possibilities of the Internet for marketing have been fully appreciated by the
makers of many sites, seen in the plethora of interactive options, flashy banners
and the amount of audio-visual material used for their purposes. Many of these
sites are designed to rapidly disseminate their messages and often have graph-
ical interfaces as well as familiar logos and symbols. Religious messages often
contain Qur’anic quotes and are packed in attractive messages, coupled with ex-
tensive use of religious symbolism (Bunt 2009: 177–80). On these sites hagiogra-
phies for the martyrs – from here on referred to as martyrologies – can often be
found, either written in biographical form or in video clips.
 Sageman (2004) clearly states that integration in radical networks always happens through
personal contacts, not through ‘light communities’ such as the Internet. An excellent example
for this argument is given by Ed Husayn (2007). More recent investigations have demonstrated,
however, that through its rapid global spread, the Internet has become an instrument for re-
cruitment as well.
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Many academics have so far undertaken research on radical Islamic sites, al-
though the number and location of sites fluctuates considerably and thus only
allows a snapshot of the situation at the time of investigation.⁵ Government
agencies (such as intelligence services), Internet providers and private organisa-
tions⁶ regularly attack/hack these sites to get them offline, even though the serv-
ers often operate from countries such as China and Pakistan. The results of these
attempts vary because the webmasters of these sites are very resilient, as I will
show in the next section.
One of the first and most influential sites was azzam.com, named after Ab-
dullah Yusuf Azzam.⁷ It served during the 1990s as an influential source of infor-
mation on the activities of jihadists throughout the world (although especially in
Chechnya and Afghanistan). After its forced closure shortly after 9/11, IslamicA-
wakening.com continued to publish the Azzam news bulletins on its website. In
its forum, as well as in many other forums and chatboxes on radical Islamic
sites, one can find many hyperlinks connecting to martyrdom videos (Bunt
2009).⁸ IslamicAwakening is moreover active on social media sites.
A Facebook presence was only comparatively recently established (in Febru-
ary 2011) and therefore relatively few posts have been made so far. Most of these
are seemingly quite innocent and call for the release of prisoners or the ousting
of a London-based Imam who has not followed the Islamic creed strictly enough,
according to the appeal. One dates from March 31, 2011 and invites its users for a
‘question-and-answer’ session with a certain Tarek Mehanna on the forum Islam-
icAwakening.com (Facebook 2011). Although this seems harmless, Mehanna was
arrested in October 2009 by US authorities in Boston because he allegedly con-
spired to attack civilians at a shopping mall, American soldiers abroad and two
members of the executive branch of the federal government (New York Times
2009). Mehanna has not so far answered the many questions posted on Islami-
cAwakening.com – where most asked for his advice and spiritual guidance (is-
lamicawakening.com n.d.). An apparently innocent link to a QandA session on
Facebook is thus put in another light. On December 20, 2011 he was pronounced
 The University of Arizona has developed a highly specialized search tool for jihad-related
topics on the Internet, which enables them to carry out regular and more systematic research. An
extensive list of radical Islamic sites can be found in Bunt (2009: 223–226).
 Examples include Internet Haganah, run by computer programmer Aaron Weisburd, and the
online activist Jonathan R. Galt (a pseudonym), who is credited by Azzam.com as the individual
behind the removal of their website.
 Azzam was a theologian and key figure in militant radical Islam until his assassination in
Peshawar in 1989. He was the mentor of Osama bin Laden.
 See especially the forum on ‘Politics, Contemporary Issues and Jihad’, which received by far
the most hits and posts.
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guilty in the Boston US District Court, totalling seven convictions for counts of
conspiring to kill in a foreign country, providing material and logistical support
to terrorists and lying to authorities in a terrorism investigation (Valencia 2011).
He was subsequently sentenced on April 12, 2012 and faces over 17 years in pris-
on (Sweet 2012).
The contents on Twitter, which IslamicAwakening also only recently joined,
are roughly the same as on Facebook as of the date of investigation (Islamic
Awakening n.d.). Links to martyrdom videos cannot, however, be found on the
Facebook and Twitter pages of this organisation, although many can be found
in the forums of IslamicAwakening.com. This site forms an excellent example
of the increasing insight gained concerning the potential of the Internet and
the recent appearance of social media.
Another famous landmark in the world of social media is YouTube, where
users can upload and share their own videos. Many martyrdom videos can be
found on the website (as well as on a similar video-sharing website LiveLeak.-
com), mainly from Afghanistan, Iraq and Chechnya, the areas where most sui-
cide attacks have occurred.⁹ Simple search terms such as ‘jihad’, ‘al qaeda’
and ‘martyrdom’ lead to movies featuring the stories of suicide attacks. Appa-
rently these are not forbidden by the guidelines set forth by the site for the con-
tents of their videos; the YouTube guidelines state:
‒ Graphic or gratuitous violence is not allowed. If your video shows someone
getting hurt, attacked or humiliated, don’t post it.
‒ YouTube is not a shock site. Don’t post disgusting videos of accidents, dead
bodies and similar things.
‒ We encourage free speech and defend everyone’s right to express unpopular
points of view. But we do not permit hate speech (speech which attacks or
demeans a group based on race or ethnic origin, religion, disability, gender,
age, veteran status and sexual orientation/gender identity).¹⁰
Violent images are certainly present in martyrdom videos but are usually not
very explicit. The main aim of these videos is not violence in itself, and the im-
ages usually originate from wars or other armed conflicts. Although the victims
 In May 2008, US Senator Joe Lieberman, Al Gore’s running mate during the 2000 Presidential
Election, wrote to Google officials to urge them to remove videos on YouTube produced by Al
Qaeda and other groups considered terrorist. YouTube removed some videos but left others,
since they did not violate the guidelines of the website. See CNN (2008) ‘Lieberman to YouTube:
Remove al Qaeda videos’.
 I have only mentioned the relevant guidelines in this article; for a full survey see YouTube
(2010).
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are sometimes visible, the images are not more shocking than those regularly ap-
pearing on public television. People are not being tortured or executed in these
videos, which therefore more or less comply with the guidelines. The execution
video of Daniel Pearl, for example, cannot be found on YouTube (or LiveLeak)
but can be found on the Chinese video sharing website Wretch (n.d.). That the
guidelines are not always observed and might be considered hazy can be illus-
trated with a video called ‘a martyr or what????’, which shows uninterrupted im-
ages of a wounded man who is dying, apparently fighting for the Chechens and
wounded by the Russians (YouTube 2004). One hears Qur’anic recitations in the
background, while the supposed martyr is slowly passing away.
Martyrdom videos are widely present on the Internet, although it might
sometimes be hard to find them – if not on social media websites – as they
are mainly traceable through links posted in chatboxes and forums on sites
such as IslamicAwakening.com. These sites are often protected and one needs
to register as well as enter a password in order to access files. They play a pivotal
role in the distribution of the videos from the makers to the public. The next sec-
tion will focus on the question of who actually makes these videos, how they are
made and how they are spread over the Internet.
3 The production and spread of martyrdom videos
The extensive use of martyrdom videos started during the First Chechen War
(1994– 1996), in which especially Ibn al Khattab pioneered producing video foot-
age of operations.¹¹ During the Second Chechen War (1999–2009), this trend de-
veloped towards the production of videos of martyrs, killed either by Russian
forces or in suicide attacks. The radical Muslims who took many hostages in
the Dubrovka theatre in Moscow in 2002 had also made a video in advance,
which was broadcast inside the theatre during the crisis and in which they pro-
claimed themselves martyrs for Allah (Speckhard and Akhmedova 2006: 441).
They produced the videos themselves, but the production process has become
professionalised in recent years. Azzam Publications, a London-based produc-
tion house which was behind Azzam.com, launched the website Qoqaz.net. On
this Caucasus-focused radical Islamic site, they posted many high-quality mar-
tyrdom videos, most of them sophisticatedly produced by ‘Sawt al-Qawqaz’
(Voice of the Caucasus). A video of Ibn al Khattab himself – which can be
 For an historical overview of suicide bombing in general, see Reuter (2004), Kippenberg
(2008) and Pape (2010).
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found on YouTube – was made when he was killed, allegedly by a poisoned let-
ter sent to him by Russian Spetsnaz forces.¹²
Another important source of martyrdom videos was the Second Intifadah,
during which many radical Muslims committed suicide attacks against Israeli
targets. The videos were often made the night before the missions and are
often home-made and of crude quality. They can be found anywhere in the
Gaza strip and on the West Bank, where they are clandestinely circulated
through radical Palestinian circles as well as on the Internet (Oliver and Stein-
berg 2005).¹³ As these videos were readily available, Muslims in other places
were also moved by their humiliation (by Russian and Israeli forces respective-
ly), effectively lifting the impact of a local conflict to a grander scale (Khosrokha-
var 2004: 70, 109).
The Iraq War was also the cause of a considerable increase in the production
of martyrdom videos, although these were often of poor quality. Research has in-
dicated that many of these videos were home-made and moreover filmed from
cars (Hafez 2007). Other movies circulating around the Internet often featured
coalition soldiers caught in a trap or shot by insurgent snipers. In the years
after the invasion some media organisations were established, such as the
straightforwardly called ‘Jihad Media Battalion’, the offspring of ‘Dawlat al-
Iraq al-Islamiyyah’ (The Islamic State of Iraq), an umbrella organisation of rad-
ical Islamic insurgency groups in Iraq. Their videos often featured martyrs in ad-
dition to broadcasts from high-ranking officials but were often only of slightly
better quality than those produced at home. Other groups, such as the ‘Ansar
al-Sunna’ (Followers of the Sunna), also produced videos of suicide bombings
for which they were responsible. However, in another video they claimed to
have shot down a US spy plane near Latafiyah. The ‘spy plane’ actually tran-
spired to be a Taiwan-made model airplane. The plane was most probably
owned by an Iraqi child who was left wondering about the whereabouts of his
favourite toy (Shackleford n.d.).
Much more professional than these clips, however, are those produced by ‘Al
Sahab’ (The Clouds), Al Qaeda’s audiovisual production house. Al Sahab was
founded in 2001 under the leadership of Abdul Rahman al Maghrebi (Moghadam
2008: 204). Little is known about this secretive organisation. Some specialists
have contended that their main centre of operations is located somewhere in
 YouTube, “The Story of Commander Khattab” in 11 parts (accessed 10 March 2011). In
Russian, Spetsnaz means special purpose forces.
 Oliver and Steinberg have collected many of these Palestinian martyrdom videos in order to
investigate the phenomenon of suicide bombing and the place which these martyrs occupy in
the collective memory.
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the Pakistani hills or valleys near the Afghan border, which are out of govern-
ment control. The establishment of a secure base in this region, these specialists
argue, should be linked to an enormous increase in video productions (Whitlock
2007). In 2007 Al Sahab produced 97 videos, a six-fold increase compared to
2005. Thus a new propaganda video was launched every 3–4 days, featuring
one of Al Qaeda’s commanders (Moss and Mekhennet 2008). Even though the
producers of Al Sahab have to evade Pakistani as well as American forces,
they manage to produce high-quality videos. These are released as documenta-
ries, but also in formats suitable for iPods and cellphones.
According to US counterterrorism officials, when a high-ranking Al Qaeda of-
ficial wants to make a public statement, a trusted cameraman is summoned to a
safe house somewhere in Pakistan where he records the message. The video file
is then edited by Al Sahab members who are equipped with high-quality mate-
rial – such as ultra-light laptops and top-end video cameras – after which the file
is taken by courier to an Internet café where it is uploaded to a passport-protect-
ed website, only available to a small range of trusted Al Qaeda members.¹⁴ These
files are encrypted with very advanced software and are nearly impossible to
crack or even detect. Because of the secrecy and encryption with which the
video files are uploaded to a secure website, nothing can be said about the lo-
cation where the videos are produced. Although theoretically videos could ap-
pear on the Internet within a week of their recording, it usually takes longer be-
fore they are released. According to Diaa Rashwan, an analyst at Al Ahram
Centre for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo, ‘It is clear that [the producers
at AN] are under no real pressure. […] They take plenty of time to go to their film
archives and edit their productions’ (cited in Whitlock 2008). They work very
carefully and circumspectly in order to avoid exposure to the attention of their
enemies – so far with considerable success.¹⁵
For a few years the videos have been spread through a newly designed logis-
tical distribution network, Al Fajr Media Center, which links thousands of web-
masters throughout the world. The main method is probably the snowball-meth-
 These have not included such people as Osama bin Laden (died May 2, 2011)) and Ayman al
Zawahiri, as they stopped using electronic communicational devices altogether in order to avoid
tracking by hostile forces. All communications go through trusted couriers.
 Intelligence services have so far been unable to trace the videos to their origins, although
Abu Musab al Zarqawi was killed in a US airstrike only 2 months after he first appeared in a
video message. The interrelatedness of these events can, however, not be firmly established. In
recent years some Al Qaeda communication officials have been arrested, such as the London-
based Younis Tsouli, originating from Morocco. Investigation of his computer gave intelligence
services greater insight into al Qaeda’s online modes of operation.
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od, in which one webmaster distributes a production to several others in the
chain, who spread it again to others, etc. Little is actually known about Al Fajr
and its organisation, although it likely resembles Al Qaeda structures; the organ-
isation is heavily decentralised and different branches (or webmasters) are gen-
erally unaware of one another’s true identity. They often add subtitles to video
productions in order to make them more readily available for the non-Arabic
speaking public – and sometimes even dub them.¹⁶ According to US intelligence
analysts, Al Fajr has separate divisions devoted to cyber jihad, cyber security,
distribution and multimedia (Whitlock 2008). After a few intermediate branches,
announcements and videos are then posted on popular radical Islamic web fo-
rums such as AlFarouq.com,which are also often password-protected and highly
regulated (Bunt 2009). Often only a few moderators are allowed to post material,
thus ensuring that all material comes from an authentic source. Members are en-
couraged to download the video material and redistribute it on other sites – such
as the above-mentioned IslamicAwakening.com. Thus the videos ultimately end
up on the Web, available for all interested parties, after passing many intermedi-
ate stages for security reasons. The initial distribution takes place within a small
network of core members, who communicate with each other solely through
tightly secured websites.
4 The contents of martyrdom videos
Many videos released by Al Sahab are of excellent quality; not only have they
been filmed and edited professionally, they also feature flashy banners, Qur’an
recitations and 3D animations. Al Sahab has released dozens of martyrdom vid-
eos in recent years, often of considerable length (around 45 minutes) and featur-
ing suicide bombers from different regions and organizations. Some videos focus
on several martyrs at once, such as the ‘Winds of Paradise’series, which is cele-
brated as one of Al Sahab’s best productions so far in radical Islamic circles
(Nanninga: forthcoming). This section will focus on two paradigmatic martyr-
dom videos produced by Al Sahab, called ‘Jihad and Martyrdom’ (YouTube
n.d.), about the martyr Abu al Hassan, and ‘The word is the word of the
sword’, featuring Abu Ghareeb al-Makki (YouTube 2009). Further attention will
be paid to Iraqi martyrdom videos – mostly acquired from secondary sources.
 Some videos are, however, primarily recorded by fluent speakers of English or French, such
as American-born Adam Gadahn. The movie ‘Jihad and martyrdom’, for example, has been
dubbed into Urdu, while one can find ‘The word is the word of the sword’ with German subtitles.
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This section will present and enunciate the several stages and acts into which
these videos can generally be divided. The subsequent section is devoted to
the identification and analysis of the grand narratives in which the makers
seek to embed the martyrs’ sacrifice and how it is put to use.
The videos always open with the announcement of the contents, the name of
the martyrs and a flashy animation featuring the logo of the production compa-
ny,which often means the name of the production house written in complex Ara-
bic calligraphy. Al Sahab’s logo is quite similar to Al Jazeera’s, although there is
no connection whatsoever between the two (Al Jazeera used to broadcast Al
Qaeda video clips featuring Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al Zawahiri but has
not done so since 2005). These announcements usually take 10 to 20 seconds,
and one often hears Qur’anic recitations.
In the second part of the video, the introduction to the testament of the mar-
tyr, a narrator takes about two-and-a-half minutes to justify martyrdom by plac-
ing it into a larger context of the struggle between the so-called ‘Zio-Crusader
forces’ and the ‘treacherous rulers of the Arab world’ on the one side and the
‘Muslim Ummah and its Mujahid vanguard’ on the other. This is an unequal
fight, according to the narrator, ‘because the discrepancy in material strength be-
tween us and our enemy is so huge’ and leads many to despair over the useful-
ness of the confrontation. With video footage of air raids, falling bombs, de-
stroyed buildings and injured people, they illustrate the discrepancy in
strength. The ‘Zio-Crusader forces’ merely have to press a button to create
havoc and destruction, killing innocent civilians and destroying houses, hospi-
tals and mosques in the name of the ‘war on terror’, while their troops remain
safe and sound.
It is the job of the Mujahideen to demolish these ‘imagined fortresses’, ac-
cording to the narrator, in order for the enemy to become vulnerable to physical
attack in the field, in order to balance the scale on which this conflict is fought
and to repel the assault. The means of carrying out martyrdom operations/sui-
cide attacks (accompanied by video footage of the planes crashing into the
World Trade Center on 9/11) is given, and the narrator subsequently implies
that the martyr’s dedication to death in the ‘Path of Allah’ empowers the
Ummah (the imagined global community of all Muslims) and its militant van-
guard to secure victory and restore the Ummah’s dignity:
The Mujahid Muslim vanguard must lead its Ummah in the two most critical fronts threat-
ening its destiny: the front of the Jewish-Crusader assault and the front of the treasonous
rulers. The Mujahid Muslim vanguard must spread the call for the defeat of the Crusaders
and Jews and their expulsion from our countries and for the removal of the treasonous rul-
ers and setting up of the Mujahid Muslim government until this call becomes an all-perva-
sive spirit flowing through the Ummah. But it will only accomplish that by providing the
Radical Islam, Globalisation and Social Media: Martyrdom Videos on the Internet 131
role model and paying the price in terms of the noblest and dearest of blood until it breaks
the barrier of fear which stands between the Ummah and victory and establishment.
Thus the suicide bomber – who through his sacrifice is called a martyr – is por-
trayed as a soldier serving in the vanguard of the Islamic community, who strives
to restore lost dignity, defiled and tarnished by the Zio-Crusader forces (who
should be expelled from Muslim lands) and the treacherous Arab rulers.
This elaboration on the broader context of the martyrdom operation (or sui-
cide attack) is followed by a third part, which comprises a biography of the mar-
tyr of a lengthy 30 minutes, as described by the narrator, Abu al Hassan, and
several other Al Qaeda leaders. Pieter Nanninga lucidly shows how this part
of the video is used to convey the message of Al Qaeda; the life of the martyr
and the movement Al Qaeda take a remarkably parallel course in the video,
thus providing many opportunities to dwell on the organisation’s activities, mo-
tivations and ideologies. The editors, Nanninga (Forthcoming) reveals, have fully
grasped these opportunities; Al Qaeda’s history is sophisticatedly integrated
through the biography of the martyr.
The video ends with the animation of the attack and Abu al Hassan’s last
words, in which he smiles shyly, asks for forgiveness and prays to God to accept
him as a martyr. This last minute powerfully rounds off the narrative and seeks
to show the viewers that the martyr is just an ordinary Muslim, like most of
them. The difference from most Muslims, which the producers seek to empha-
sise, is that the martyr does not belong to the passive majority but to the
small vanguard willing to struggle for the cause of Islam. This theme – whether
implicitly or explicitly – recurs in every video, as exemplified by the next para-
digmatic production, called ‘The word is the word of the sword’.
This video was released by Al Sahab in 2008. The 50-minute documentary
features Abu Ghareeb al Makki, a muezzin (one who calls for prayer) who
blew himself up in his car in front of the Danish embassy in Islamabad in
2008. The reason for this attack was the publication of cartoons about the proph-
et Mohammed in the newspaper Jyllandsposten. The first 30 minutes of this docu-
mentary are dedicated to an extensive argument justifying the use of violence
against Denmark and others who defile Islam. The crisis is thereby placed in a
conflict of a much larger scale, in which the paradigmatic narrative of global
jihad is the underlying message. The then Danish PM Anders Fogh Rasmussen,
former British PM Tony Blair and King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia all feature in
this sophisticated and extensive presentation of arguments. The video does
not attempt to ridicule them but seeks to show the hypocrisy of Western involve-
ment and interference in Arab countries – aided by the ‘Zionists’ of Israel and
the Arab dictators who are financially backed by Western countries:
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As for the second aspect of these double standards, it is apparent in their accusing the Mu-
jahideen of targeting the innocents, although they are the ones who for decades haven’t
stopped targeting weak and defenceless women, children and elderly men. The latest of
their crimes was the recent campaign targeting defenceless civilians in Afghanistan, in
which they killed more than 50 women and children attending a wedding reception in
the province of Nangahar, in addition to dozens of others they killed in other provinces.
[…] Despite the ugliness of these atrocious crimes, they don’t hesitate to justify it, at
times claiming that the smart bombs missed their target and at other times claiming that
the target was valuable and hence what’s the problem if dozens of [the] defenceless and
weak are killed in order to get at this target.
These allegations are accompanied by video footage and pictures of bombings
and other atrocities claimed to have been committed by Western powers. The
makers subsequently feature a US Air Force colonel, who states that innocent
casualties are sometimes allowed in order to get to an important target, and
Mark Galasco, former chief of high-value targeting at the Pentagon. According
to Galasco, at the beginning of the Second Gulf War he was allowed to kill 30
civilians around each high-value target. If more lives were to be risked, either
the Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, or President Bush had to be consult-
ed.
Subsequently, several Al Qaeda-related persons – such as Abdul Rahman
Saleem (in the movie as Sheikh Abu Yahya) – severely criticize not only Western
misdeeds but also many fellow Arabs,who they consider as infidels because they
have neglected the obligation of their religious duty of jihad. It is then stated that
it is not only the ‘apostate rulers’ but also the passive majority that ‘prefer sub-
mission, cowardice and sitting behind in the name of the medial [moderate] na-
ture of Islam’. The martyr, however, Saleem asserts, belongs to the small van-
guard minority, after which they turn to Abu Ghareeb himself.
In the following scenes, the martyr reads his testament, alternating with rec-
itations of passages from the Qur’an and short messages from the narrator, who
places the individual martyrdom story into a global context. The last recording of
Abu Ghareeb is made while he stands behind the door of a white Toyota Corolla,
which he claims is filled with bombs. He chants a militant song, affirms his long-
ing for paradise by renouncing the value of life in this world and enters the car.
Then we see an animation of the suicide attack: a car approaches a building car-
rying the Danish flag and explodes just in front of the entrance. This part is re-
peated twice, accompanied by a jihadist song, after which Sheikh Mustafa Abu
Al Yazeed announces that more attacks against infidels will follow in the name
of the defence of the dignity of Islam. The film is concluded with the azan (call to
prayer) given by the martyr, with the Ka’bah in Mecca featuring in the back-
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ground and the narrator praising the ‘suicide bomber turned martyr’ and ex-
pressing his wish that he will receive Allah’s grace.
Iraqi martyrdom movies generally show the same pattern and recurring
themes, as Hafez (2007) expounds in his informative work Suicide Bombers in
Iraq. These movies often start with footage from the Iraqi invasion in 2003,
with horrifying pictures of dead and injured women and children, American sol-
diers desecrating a mosque and shooting people inside and soldiers storming
and vandalizing houses. Images from the notorious Abu Ghraib prison in Bagh-
dad also regularly feature. These pictures are then combined with footage from
other regions, such as Palestine. The tanks and other high-tech weapons are pre-
sented in sharp contrast with stone-throwing Palestinian kids or other seemingly
innocent and harmless civilians.World and regional leaders also feature in these
movies – the most commonly used image, however, is a handshake between
President Bush and former Israeli PM Ariel Sharon in the White House during
the Al Aqsa Intifada, suggesting US support for the harsh crackdown against Pal-
estinian insurgents. Then the remedy for national salvation is presented: martyr-
dom operations. Subsequently, the use of martyrdom is defended and legiti-
mised, and the suicide bomber testifies to the sincerity and conviction of his
faith. He reads his final will and seems eager to perform his ‘religious duty’.
The Iraqi martyrdom videos thus seem not particularly different from others, ex-
cept that their outlook seems to be more explicitly focused on the situation in
Iraq and less on the intrinsic global jihad, as portrayed in most Al Sahab produc-
tions.
Based on this investigation of different martyrdom movies, we can identify
certain patterns and themes recurring in the majority of martyrdom videos: (1)
Videos begin with an introduction in which a narrator describes how Muslims
are repressed and embattled everywhere. He postulates a narrative in which
the global Muslim Ummah is under attack by inimical forces searching to destroy
it – accompanied by gruesome pictures or video material. Another theme is (2) a
justification of martyrdom operations as the sole means to battle the forces of the
enemy, thereby presenting the suicide bomber as a soldier in the vanguard –
comprising the jihadist movement – of the Ummah. Sometimes the narrator pres-
ents this, but videos often feature radical sheiks who legitimate the use of mar-
tyrdom in the struggle and attest to the sincere religious motivations of the mar-
tyr. Then (3) the martyr reads his testament, interspersed with Qur’anic
recitations. The movie concludes with (4) an animated video of the execution
of the martyrdom operation and (5) some final remarks regarding the results
of the attack and a laudation of the martyr, concluded with a prayer.
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5 Analysing the narrative
These martyrdom videos are professionally structured and their messages so-
phisticatedly disguised in the choice of pictures and the narrative presented.
The increasing professionalisation of the production of these videos – as stated
above – is manifest in recent releases. After having described and analysed the
content of martyrdom videos, this section will now focus more specifically on the
implicit content and seek to interpret the aims of the videos.
According to Robert A. Pape (2005: 3–4), as a kind of warfare, suicide at-
tacks have been used to repel enemies from the soil that the suicide attackers
consider theirs. An excellent example of a successful operation is Al Qaeda’s Ma-
drid attack in 2004. The attacks influenced the parliamentary elections three
days later, which eventually resulted in a leftist coalition led by José Zapatero
(Chari 2008), who almost instantly decided to withdraw Spanish troops from
Iraq and Afghanistan.¹⁷ Moreover, the organisation is composed of national lib-
eration movements (see Roy 2004).¹⁸ The meaning of these attacks is not only
militarily strategic but also serves several other instrumental and expressive
functions, within and outside the jihadist movement (see also Bloom 2004;
Atwan 2008).
The introductions to these videos explicitly pose a global dichotomy be-
tween the Muslim Ummah and the ‘West’. The ‘West’ in these videos supports Is-
rael and the Arab dictators and attacks Muslim countries (such as Afghanistan
and Iraq). The Muslim Ummah is presented as an explicitly global community,
transcending ethnicity and national borders – a huge conceptual entity pre-
served by its members. Western or Israeli attacks on Arab soil are presented as
attacks on all Muslims in the world.¹⁹ Thus formulated, the makers of the
movie pull local conflicts out of their specific context to reinstate them into a
global narrative, seeking to affect and engage those Muslims who are susceptible
to it – whether living in Saudi Arabia, Malaysia or the UK (see Hoffman and Mc-
Cormick 2004).²⁰ Moreover, Al Qaeda itself has no permanently fixed base any-
 One week before the election, on March 8, 2004, Rajoy’s ruling People’s Party still enjoyed a
five-point lead over Zapatero’s SSWP (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party). On March 14, the SSWP
defeated the PP with almost a 5-point lead (Chari 2008).
 Roy (2004: 298–303). These include franchise movements such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), although the latter recently
merged with Al Qaeda. Other organisations are loosely affiliated with Al Qaeda, such as the
Southeast Asian Jema’ah Islamiyyah.
 For an analysis of this narrative, see Kippenberg (2010: 666–670) and Wright (2009: 17–26).
 They function as a ‘signalling game’ in which organisations convey their ideology, activities
and convictions to particular audiences (Hoffman and McCormick 2004: 245).
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more; after being based in Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Afghanistan, the organisa-
tion now temporarily settles in unregulated areas which are out of government
control, such as the Afghani-Pakistani border area, Somalia or the Yemeni
mountains.We can thus detect a development of globalisation and deterritorial-
isation, reflected through the videos in the methods, tools, audience, followers
and targets of the jihadist movement as well as in the movement itself (Roy
2004).
Despite this on-going globalisation, most targets of suicide bombers are still
in the Islamic world itself, often directed within the framework of the nation-
state. Many attacks seek to discredit and delegitimise secular national govern-
ments, which have often initiated crackdowns against radical Islamic move-
ments. The mostly secular and autocratic rulers are depicted in the videos as en-
emies fraternising with their Western allies. Severe criticism is especially directed
towards the Royal House of Saudi Arabia, which admitted armed foreigners in
the first Gulf War and is referred to as a defilement of the ‘land of the two cities’.
A certain ambiguity thus seems present in the elaboration of the goals of the ji-
hadist movement in these disseminated videos produced by the movement: on
the one hand, they attempt to lift jihad to a global level, employing a global dis-
course and attacking the forces of the enemy on their own soil (such as the at-
tacks in the US, Spain and the UK); on the other, their focus necessarily remains
framed within the boundaries of the nation-state, because the main power inter-
ests are concentrated on this level. Also, regarding sources of potential support-
ers, the jihadist movement is in certain ways restricted to certain territories with-
in the framework of global power interests (Bonnefoy 2009: 339). The makers of
the videos seldom use the names of Islamic nation-states but always refer to
them as one single entity – the global Muslim Ummah (see Al Rasheed 2009:
301–20; Roy 2004: 321).
Martyrdom is the only means to battle the forces of the enemy, many videos
contend, and the suicide bomber must be regarded as a soldier fighting in the
vanguard of the Ummah. Radical sheiks selectively use Qur’anic suras and the
writings of influential theorists to religiously legitimise the means of martyrdom
in the struggle. The same theorists repeatedly recur in this context, such as Ibn
Taymiyya (1263– 1328), Sayyid Qutb (1906– 1966) and Abu Alaa Al-Mawdudi
(1903–1979), who all professed a very strict – or radical – observance of religious
duty and whose writings are utterly applicable to the jihadist movement. Further-
more, sheiks frequently refer to the initial period of Islam. Reasoning by analogy,
they seek to legimitise martyrdom according to tradition, referring to comparable
events in the times of the Prophet Muhammad. Contrary to Shia Islam or Catholic
Christianity, however, martyrdom has never formed an important facet of reli-
gion in Sunni history (see Seidensticker 2004: 107– 16). This ‘tradition’ of martyr-
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dom which the radical sheiks seek to establish can therefore only be considered
an invented tradition, ‘a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly
accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seeks to inculcate cer-
tain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies
continuity with the past’ (Hobsbawm 1963: 1; see also Cook 2007: 144 and
164). But if conveyed repeatedly, over and over, one could embrace this invention
as a genuine tradition. As Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (1963) aptly show
in their volume, it would certainly not be the first successfully implemented in-
vented tradition.
6 Conclusion
Together with the subsequent parts – the reading of the martyr’s testament, the
animation recapitulating the suicide attack and the concluding remarks and
prayers praising the martyr – this narrative forms a powerful compilation, one
which seeks to psychologically and emotionally affect its viewers (Hafez 2007:
226). Thus, every section in the video is devoted to that purpose; an illustrative
example forms the Hollywood-like scene in which the martyr Abu Harith al Dos-
ari dramatically bids his wife farewell (Devji 2005: 95).
The producers have sophisticatedly construed and structured these movies
in order to convey their message to their followers all over the world. They not
only seek to capitalise on the religious convictions of the viewers but also on
their feelings of morality and justice – regarding the accompanying pictures in
the videos featuring wounded women and children and the attempts to show
the hypocrisy of Western leaders and their Arab counterparts. By means of
these videos, the jihadist movement seeks to disseminate a message to recontex-
tualise suicide attacks to empower the Muslim Ummah to stand up against their
infidel tyrants and the West, to establish an Islamic state and eventually to unite
the world under the banner of Islam.
The crux of the whole video is the sacrifice of the martyr and his clearly stat-
ed willingness to die for these abstract yet powerful imaginings. His sacrifice
might easily be the most powerful testimony for the intrinsic value of the mes-
sage the video seeks to convey (for such reasoning see Stark 1996:186–8;
Duby 1985: 151–2). Thus these videos sought to empower the members of the
Ummah, testifying to the intrinsic value of religion and appealing to their
sense of morality and justice, and they have succeeded in this – as we have
seen above on websites and social media – with at least one group of Muslims
(see Devji 2005: 95–6; and Nacos 2007: 132–4). The violence enacted by martyr-
dom operations can be experienced as dehumiliating and liberating and seeks to
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give the Ummah a sense of empowerment. These are acts of ‘performance vio-
lence’, since they are real as well as symbolic dramas designed to have an impact
on the several audiences that they target (see Juergensmeyer 2003).
The continual spread of mass communications throughout the world, as well
as the ever expanding availability of the Internet, form a crucial step in the abil-
ity to spread the deeds of suicide bombers in carefully constructed martyrdom
videos. While Marcus Aurelius still had Christian martyrs executed in theatres
throughout the Roman Empire, the theatre has now expanded globally through
the mass media. The audience which can be reached and affected has grown ex-
ponentially through these developments. Those witnessing the violence – in the
theatre in ancient times, but nowadays through mass media and the Internet as
well – are part of and affected by what occurs.
The Internet has revealed itself as an invaluable tool in spreading the jihad-
ists’ message, and therein the social media form an advantageous and increas-
ingly tapped tool, considering their longstanding utilisation of YouTube and
LiveLeak and recent engagements with Facebook and Twitter. Even more than
the rise of mass communications and media, the Internet has presented the ji-
hadist movement with an unprecedented toolkit, not only to spread their prop-
aganda uncensored but also as a means of targeted communication. Suicide op-
erations recorded and contextualised in martyrdom videos retain a shocking
effect; in that sense, martyrdom operations are still theatre (El Affendi 2009: 65).
In recent decades, a globalising and deterritorialising trend has been iden-
tified within radical Islamic movements, which is also visible in martyrdom vid-
eos. Together with an increasing professionalisation, the producers of these vid-
eos have increasingly sought to reconstruct their chosen events in a
decontextualised global narrative, complying with the goals and ideology of
the cause. The videos are immanently expressive in character, seeking to awe,
inspire and motivate the audience and to give them a sense of belonging to
the global Ummah (Atwan 2008: 140). Whether imagined and/or digital, these
videos empower the idea of the Ummah as a global community, within which
(disembedded) Muslims can regard themselves as members (Nacos 2007: 127;
Sageman 2004: 161). And although many instruments are carefully and aptly
used for that purpose, the message – as I have shown – remains highly ambig-
uous in certain ways.
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Grassroots Religion: Facebook and Offline
Post-Denominational Judaism
1 Introduction
Young peoples’ Judaism online is thriving, yet little is known of the contribution
that this makes to contemporary Jewish self-definition, practices, beliefs, values,
behaviours and rituals, particularly in a post-denominational environment.
Much scholarship so far regarding religion and the media tends to explore
media activity that is consciously driven by religious organisations (Meyer and
Moors 2006) rather than ‘bottom up’, self-generated activity by individuals.
This chapter therefore aims to contribute to current debates about the role of
new interactive electronic media in contemporary religious and spiritual life. It
will address this via an examination of how the construction of Jewish identity
is accomplished in one new media/online environment, Facebook, which has
played a key role in enabling users to explore and define notions of meaning
and being amongst young people in this area. It builds on the writing so far
on young people engaging with religion using interactive technology (Brasher
2001; Beckerlegge 2002; Dawson and Cowan 2004; Hojsgaard and Warburg
2005; Karaflogka 2006) to address the curious lack of writing on how young peo-
ple engage with Judaism online.
Social networking sites, such as Facebook, perhaps offer the ideal opportu-
nity in twenty-first century Jewish life to explore and experiment with religious
self-definition, meaning, congregation and even being itself, insofar as in Face-
book one’s being can be literally reinvented in ways without ‘stifling’ religiosity
by forcing it to conform. We propose to investigate how religiously identified
Jews are able to explore their Judaism in both the virtual and real worlds,
using electronic means, to contribute to debates regarding religious self-defini-
tion in the context of increasing post-denominationalism. In particular, we will
focus on the role of the Internet as a vehicle for helping to create and maintain
congregations who meet also in an offline setting. As well as their own websites,
many groups make use of third-party social networking facilities such as Face-
book. Facebook’s 150 million users indicate the substantial possibilities for glob-
al congregational formation. There are no precise figures for the number of Jew-
ish users, although this project will examine the extent and nature of their
participation.
By far the most research in the area of Judaism and the Internet, as Campbell
(2011) notes, has been conducted in terms of the Orthodox engagement with it.
This has overwhelmingly focussed on the Israeli and US contexts. As a conse-
quence, to date, the use of the Internet by non-Orthodox diasporas, beyond
these two poles of Jewry, has been largely ignored. This chapter hopes to rectify
this gap by examining one representative European case study, the United King-
dom.
There are many emerging research questions, such as how web-based facili-
ties and social networking contribute to the construction of post-denominational
identities among young Jews. To what extent is Facebook used to address feel-
ings of alienation or disenfranchisement amongst Jews who are dissatisfied
with the existing denominational infrastructure? How is offline Judaism con-
structed and practised as a result of the online world? While data here will be
exclusively drawn from the UK context, this chapter also aims to open up the
possibility of the mobility of Jewish self-definition across geographical bounda-
ries by virtue of utilisation of virtual networks. Participants are globally connect-
ed via the Internet and can be part of a global, post-national as well as post-de-
nominational Jewish congregation. It is hoped that the chapter will not only
interest students of Judaism, but will also provide a model for the study of
other transnational diasporic and religious media in a world that is increasingly
globalised and ethnically fragmented.
2 Research context
Existing scholarship on Judaism and the Internet has tended to focus on what
happens online, exploring such issues as Judaism and Second Life (Voloj
2008; Shandler 2009). Surprisingly, social networking sites such as Facebook
have not yet attracted significant academic attention in this area. The substan-
tial, still burgeoning body of research exploring social networking sites has
often focussed on students and reveals much interest in issues of trust, privacy,
disclosure and security. Comparative studies involving different social network-
ing sites have been conducted, but most research into social networks has con-
centrated specifically and particularly on Facebook.
There has been a substantial amount of work investigating the motivations
and reasons for using social networking sites and work exploring the psycholog-
ical parameters of the users of these sites. The effectiveness of using social net-
working sites for the purposes of formal education or educational purposes
(such as educating patients about management of medical conditions) has at-
tracted the interest of researchers. Other major interests for researchers of social
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networking sites have been identity construction, identity presentation and iden-
tity management of users, either as individuals or as members of wider cohorts,
and social capital possessed by users of social networks. Boyd and Ellison
(2008) provide an excellent overview of the definition, history and scholarship
of social network sites.
Although there is a social networking site specifically aimed at members of
Christian congregations (www.MyChurch.org), there is an evident dearth of re-
search into religion/spirituality on such sites (Nyland and Near 2007), and at
the time of writing we have found none at all specifically exploring Judaism
on Facebook. Studies have begun to explore ‘social networking’ sites such as
Facebook (Niezen 2005; Ellison, Steinfield and Lampe 2007) to show how
‘friending’ online differs from offline friendship (boyd 2006; Zhao, Grasmuch
and Martin 2008) and also is dependent on user anonymity, but how this func-
tions in a Judaic environment is less clear. While Young, Dutta and Dommety
(2009) explored whether users’ decisions to disclose their religious affiliation
on Facebook may suggest their desire for seeking romantic partners of the
same religious affiliation, their largely quantitative data was not limited to Jew-
ish users, the sample size of which was small, meaning it too is of only limited
use here. Boyd and Ellison (2008: 224) observe that ‘vast, unchartered waters still
remain to be explored’ and note the lack of experimental or longitudinal studies
as well as the limited understanding of the use of social network sites outside of
the United States. They also suggest that large-scale quantitative and qualitative
research would be fruitful and that ‘richer, ethnographic research on popula-
tions more difficult to access’ would further aid the understanding of the long-
term implications of social networking sites (boyd and Ellison 2008).
Despite a great deal of work on young people and their sense of identity,
there are significant gaps in our knowledge (Buckingham 2007). We still look
at this from the outside rather than using peoples’ own mechanisms for commu-
nication. In Jewish terms this is a new area. While research into online Judaism
has been growing, it is restricted both geographically and denominationally in
that it is largely confined to the United States and Israel and Orthodoxy, as sug-
gested above. While there have been fairly recent studies of Internet use within
Jewish religious communities in Israel, these are limited by their specific focus
on haredi¹ denominations (Livio and Tenenboim 2004; Barzilai and Barzilai-
 Haredi (plural: haredim) literally means ‘one who trembles’, derived from Isaiah 66:5, in
which the prophet admonishes his people to ‘Hear the word of the Lord, you who tremble
[haredim] at His word’. It is often confused with the much more common term (in American
English at least) Hasidic. Haredi is generally translated as ‘ultra-Orthodox’, a definition that
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Nahon 2005). Since haredim have a fraught relationship with new technologies
such as the Internet and mobile phones (Campbell 2010), their use in generalis-
ing overall patterns to fit non-haredi Jews’ relationship to such media is limited.
Furthermore, contributions such as Brasher (2001) and Voloj (2008) do not al-
ways benefit from a cross-disciplinary perspective. Where the latter solely con-
centrated on Second Life, the former argues that the Internet enables new
forms of traditional religious expression, highlighting such examples as a
cyber-Seder or virtual Passover as a way of helping people reconnect with
their Judaism. There is little cross-cultural comparative work and even less
work which examines and compares Jewish self-definition globally. The Europe-
an/UK environment is virtually ignored. Following the model provided by Bunt
(2009), which explored Islam, new media allows us to study the way in which
British Jewish participants interact globally to develop their sense of religious
self-identity in order to provide a non-haredi, non-US and non-Israeli case
study in this area.
This chapter addresses these concerns by investigating the way new media
and communication technologies are used in the construction of ethno-religious
identities, communities and outlooks. It will examine how construction of Jewish
identity is accomplished in one new media/online environment now widely used
by young people, namely the social networking site Facebook. In this way, it
hopes to build upon the recent move toward more theoretical work in studies
of Judaism and the Internet. Such work explores in greater detail ‘the offline im-
plications of online religious activities and how the Internet may serve as a mi-
crocosm for studying shifts of behaviour and belief in offline religious culture’
(Campbell 2011: 375). It seeks to address the challenge posed by Campbell that
‘future research should explore in more detail the relationship and effect of on-
line religious activities and groups on offline religious communities and institu-
tions’ (2011: 378). It takes as its starting point Campbell’s observation that ‘the
Internet becomes a portal for the initiation and enculturation of Jews into a larg-
er religious community and thus has interesting implications for the Jewish Di-
aspora’ (Campbell 2011: 375). To quote Campbell further, and at length:
New media raise age-old questions of how Jewish religious identity is constructed, what
constitutes the boundaries of community life, how the sacred should be mitigated and
lived out in contemporary society, and what constraints faith should place on engagement
outside the Jewish world. These issues underlie the question of what it means to be Jewish
in a new media world. (2011: 377)
does not do justice to an extensive and nuanced term,which covers a range of Jews who fall into
this category, not all of whom are ‘Orthodox’ in the strictest definition of that term.
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3 Defining Jewish identity
Definitions of Jewishness are complex and contested. They can be divided into
ethno-cultural-historical and religious categories. There are two ways of being
Jewish according to Halacha (Hebrew: Jewish law), that is, normative rabbinic Ju-
daism: being born to a Jewish mother or conversion by a recognised rabbinic au-
thority. Halachic (Hebrew: according to Jewish law) Judaism can further be sub-
divided into Masorti (Hebrew: traditional), modern Orthodox and haredi.
Normative rabbinic Judaism, however, is under challenge, as the primacy of ma-
trilineal descent is being undermined by the recognition of patrilineality by the
Reform, Liberal and Progressive movements within contemporary Judaism.
Cross-cutting these denominational divisions are those based on origin, includ-
ing Sephardi (North African, southern European, Asian subcontinent), Mizrahi
(Middle Eastern), Ashkenazi (eastern and central European) and Beta Israel
(Ethiopian) traditions. Furthermore, although one can become Jewish ‘by
choice’, i.e., through a process of rabbinic conversion, this is also subject to con-
testation by different groups within Judaism, which refuse to recognise and sanc-
tion certain conversions.² As a consequence, there is no single, common Europe-
an Jewish identity (Graham 2004). Indeed, it has been argued that the only
genuinely common Jewish characteristic is the propensity for a ‘Jewish’ person
to self-identify as such, that is, ‘what makes a person a Jew is saying they are
one’ (Konrád 1998). Following the model provided by the EC-funded DIALREL
project (http://www.dialrel.eu/), which interviewed ‘self declared Jewish partici-
pants’, as well as the ‘Identity à la carte’ project (JDC-ICCD 2011), whereby the
respondent and his/her relatives, grandparents, parents, partner and children
were identified to be Jewish if s/he her/himself did so, we define Jewishness
in the broadest possible fashion to include anyone who self-identifies as Jewish,
regardless of their halachic or legal status (Dencik 2011). No conditions are
placed on this criterion for classification. This challenges essentialist notions
of Jewishness and uses a processual notion of identity formation.
However, as contemporary theories of identity argue (Bourdieu 1991; Cal-
houn 1994; Modood and Werbner 1997; Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Jenkins
2008), identity is always a construct; its construction is largely determined by
situational, interactional, contextual and other changing factors. It may occur
that Jews who in certain contexts opt for a strong ‘Jewish’ identity, incline to de-
 Witness the recent controversy over the JFS School, a Jewish school in Brent, London, which
was subject to a court ruling that its admissions policy breached the UK’s Race Relations Act in
2009/10 (see UKSC 2009).
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fine themselves by other identity categories in other contexts, for example, as
members of a religious group, as citizens of the country where they live, as mem-
bers of a national minority or simply as Europeans.We understand identity nei-
ther as entirely fluid, fragmented and contingent nor as solid and given once-for-
all. It is rather an ongoing process of everyday, inter-subjective construction and
reconstruction. It is also a category of everyday experience and everyday practi-
ces used by individuals to make sense of themselves in relation to the world they
live in and in relation to others, who may be defined as ‘similar’ or ‘different’,
‘us’ or ‘them’. Identities also function as cognitive schemata – internally stored
information and meanings, which serve as frameworks for interpreting experien-
ces. Since identity for us is a process rather than having a defined end, we ask
not only what it is but also how it becomes, how it has been formed, maintained
and transformed in the course of various life experiences and what are the mech-
anisms crucial for identity development.
4 Post-denominationalism
Recent research in the United States has indicated a sense of alienation from
Jewish communal organizations and experiences among 20–30 year-olds who
perceive them to be boring and uninviting (Kelman and Schonberg 2008). The
result has been a general decline in synagogue membership and financial con-
tributions (Cohen and Kelman 2007b) as well as in denominational affiliation, as
greater numbers of younger Jews identify as ‘just Jewish’ rather than Reform,
Conservative or Reconstructionist than in the past (Cohen et al. 2007). Cohen
and Kelman (2007a) noted, ‘As institutions experiment with ways to understand
and engage the next generation, many younger American Jews have begun cre-
ating their own opportunities for Jewish engagement that are relatively inde-
pendent of existing communal organizations and institutions’. Many among
the Jewish-educated leaders of the next generation are choosing to pursue Jew-
ish life outside of institutional structures (Cohen and Kelman 2006; Cohen et
al. 2007; Bleyer 2007). ‘Rather than following their parents into the halls of syn-
agogues and federations, a significant segment of younger Jews are seeking to
create new avenues of, and opportunities for, Jewish involvement that do not
replicate older patterns of Jewish communal participation’ (Kelman and Schon-
berg 2008: 12).
Commentators have defined this experience as that of the ‘post-denomina-
tional Jew’. The post-denominational Jew ‘refuses to be labelled or categorized
in a religion that thrives on stereotypes. He [sic] has seen what the institutional
branches of Judaism have to offer and believes that a better Judaism can be cre-
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ated’ (Rosenthal 2006: 20). Rather than reject Judaism wholesale or ‘engage in
community structures they find alienating or bland’ (Kelman and Schonberg
2008: 12), post-denominational Jews use their creativity and commitment to or-
ganise independently, to build meaningful Jewish experiences and to create rit-
ual on their own terms outside of community institutions but within their own
organic community of friends and family. They resist labelling by existing reli-
gious institutions and reject existing branches of Judaism to create something
more fluid. These Jews tend to be, but are not exclusively, under thirty, and
they often feel excluded from religious life. As Lurie put it, ‘Justifiably so: the
suburban mausoleum that is the liberal synagogue was, at best, built for a socio-
logical reality decades out of date’ (2011: 25). This has become known as ‘Do-it-
Yourself (DIY)’ (Kelman and Schonberg 2008: 12) or ‘empowered’ Judaism (Kaun-
fer 2010).
Graham has drawn attention to ‘an ongoing process of identity development’
in Europe (2004: 22), what Webber has termed ‘a reconstruction of identity’, es-
pecially by the young (1994: 22). Dencik uses the term ‘ethno-cultural smorgas-
bord’ (2003a: 54). As early as 1977, Stein and Hill coined the term ‘dime store eth-
nicity’, in which individuals pick and choose from a variety of ethnic identities
(cited in Graham 2004: 22). Using these observations, Graham uses a more gen-
eralised term, namely ‘pick ‘n’ mix Judaism’, reflecting an environment in which
European Jewry now finds itself that is ‘open and welcoming and encourages
choice and personal preference above rules and dictates – Pick ‘n’ mix Judaism
is European Jewry’s adaptive response to this new environment’ (2004: 22).
5 Pick ‘n’ Mix DIY Judaism in the UK
The last few years in the UK have witnessed the growth of a number of grass-
roots, bottom-up, young-people-generated activity, reflecting the rejection of in-
stitutional structures and an expression of the values of diversity and inclusive-
ness already witnessed in the United States in an offline setting. The most
prominent of these are ‘Wandering Jews’, ‘Carlebach Minyan Belsize Park’, ‘Jew-
das’ and ‘MoHoLo’. Wandering Jews describes itself as:
[…] a self organising collective that has been celebrating Jewish stuff in London since 2005.
We meet once or twice a month in North, West, East and South London and occasionally
further afield to eat and pray and drink and be. We are hosted by a new person every
time and aim to ‘never go to the same house twice’. We also hold firm to the ideal, ‘your
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house, your rules’. A little bit Fight Club, a little bit minyan,³ almost 100 % good.We look
forward to welcoming you soon. You and your veggie food, your vegan liquor and your
beautiful neshamas.⁴(Wandering Jews. N.d.).
Wandering Jews meets regularly to daven (Yiddish: pray) and eat in different
homes. This arrangement is achieved through email and social networking
sites. Each host determines the minhag (Hebrew: tradition), doing it according
to their style of Judaism. No leaders control the agenda; instead ‘custodians’
care for the group’s continued existence as long as there is demand. It is open
to ‘all Jews and the people who love them’. And they are ‘post-philanthropic’, es-
chewing funding because ‘asking for funding is akin to asking for permission to
exist’ (Boyd 2009).
Carlebach Minyan Belsize Park (CMBP n.d.) operates in a similar fashion to
Wandering Jews. Carlebach Minyan runs Friday night services in members’
homes or in more exotic locations such as Whitstable Beach, a Suffolk vineyard
and even Tuscany. The services run in the style of the eponymous ‘singing Rabbi’
Shlomo Carlebach, and the emphasis is on song followed by a communal meal
to which everyone is asked to contribute. A ‘secret’ Facebook group, to which
new members can only be invited by existing ones, facilitates it. In this way it
theoretically maintains exclusivity, but in reality more people attend than are
members of the Facebook group.
Jewdas, on the other hand, does not provide religious or spiritual experien-
ces per se, although some of its events are modelled on points in the Jewish cal-
endar, such as East London Sukkah,⁵ Nitl Nakht,⁶ Rootless Cosmopolitan Yeshi-
va,⁷ Night of Ritual Slaughter, Treifspotting,⁸ Elephants of the Protocols of Zion
and Punkpurim. It is a self-styled subversive organisation, led by a group of in-
dividuals all calling themselves ‘Geoffrey Cohen’. Its tagline is ‘radical voices for
the alternative diaspora’.
 A Minyan is the minimum number of ten Jewish males over the age of thirteen required for a
Halachic communal religious service. Some non-Orthodox denominations include women in the
count.
 Hebrew: souls.
 A temporary booth, hut or shelter, erected during the Jewish festival of Sukkot (Tabernacles),
symbolising the wandering in the wilderness.
 Christmas Eve in Yiddish, when some Jews would take a break from studying the Torah and
enjoy themselves, though this is not for Orthodox Jews.
 An educational institution that focuses on the study of traditional religious texts, primarily
the Talmud and Torah.
 Treif is non-kosher food.
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Finally, MoHoLo is the shorter title for the Moishe House, London. Founded
in October 2007, it is a subsidised home for six young Jews who are also tasked
with holding a certain number of events in return for their subsidy, which means
that they pay much lower rent than the market rate. They describe themselves
thus:
From our own home, we bring [an] exciting, creative, non-denominational Jewish commun-
ity to London, also welcoming and supporting our local community. From Friday night din-
ners to film showings, impromptu concerts to study sessions, meditation to jam sessions to
social action events – the possibilities are endless. Much of our programming is based
around spirituality, the arts and social justice.We see ourselves as standing for experimen-
tal, creative and dynamic Judaism in the diaspora, and hope that our values will have a
ripple effect on the Jewish and wider community. (MoHoLo n.d.)
It also runs an open-profile Facebook group which, at the time of writing, has
935 members. MoHoLo, unlike the others, is generously funded. It is part of an
international organization, Moishe House (http://www.moishehouse.org/),
which funds 36 houses in 14 countries worldwide, aiming to provide ‘meaningful
Jewish experiences to young adults in their twenties’. As its website states, ‘Our
innovative model trains, supports and sponsors young Jewish leaders as they
create vibrant home-based communities for their peers’. Moishe House provides
a budget for programming, which the residents must facilitate, as well as open-
ing up the house to guests. It also receives sponsorship from the Pears Founda-
tion, a UK-based Jewish philanthropic body.
Taken together, these groups pride themselves on ‘creating gatherings which
are heartfelt, soul centered and intellectually inspiring’(CMBP n.d.). One partic-
ipant/observer described a common ‘vibrancy and vitality that I so often find
lacking in more traditional community events for Jews of my ilk’ (Russell
2009: 11). They are self-organising collectives characterised by their refusal to
be labelled by the existing denominational tags; for example, three individuals,
drawn from Reform, Liberal and Orthodoxy respectively, founded Wandering
Jews. The philosophy and principles of these collectives are to create very differ-
ent Jewish spaces from the synagogues and other communal organisations as
well as to be egalitarian, democratic, peer-led, informal and inclusive. They
are avowedly open, welcoming to non-Jews, organised and led by volunteers,
have no paid clergy or denominational affiliation, meet at least once a month
and are not linked directly with any of the mainstream communal organisations
in the UK. In all of these ways, they perceive themselves to be different from the
existing communal infrastructure. These groupings are, in some ways, descend-
ants or heirs of the ‘havurot’ (Hebrew: fellowships), participatory communities
that sprang up in the 1960s and 1970s in the United States and were marked
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by a ‘countercultural, anti-institutional, Do-It-Yourself aesthetic’ (Lurie 2011: 25).
What is different, however, is that each of these offline activities has been facili-
tated through extensive Facebook networking. Indeed, as mentioned above, Car-
lebach Minyan is an invite-only ‘secret’ group. Jonathan Boyd, one of the few
thus far to pay serious attention to this development, has argued:
These members of the ‘Net Generation’ who have grown up with the Internet, differ signifi-
cantly from their forebears in Jewish outlook, expectations and notions of community. They
have little faith in the ‘authoritative’ or ‘authentic’ view – they scrutinize information on-
line, and decide what makes sense to them. They refuse to be passive consumers – they
satisfy their desire for choice, convenience, customization and control by designing their
own products. And they don’t retreat into a lonely world behind their computers, they col-
laborate and network in the vast array of communities online. (Boyd 2009)
It should also be added here that they collaborate and network in the vast array
of communities offline.
6 Grassroots Jews
Building upon these networks, in September 2009, individuals connected with
these groups met to create, for the first time, independent High Holyday, namely
Rosh Hashana (Jewish New Year) and Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement) services in
North West London. This was not done within an existing synagogue, nor in part-
nership with one, but entirely autonomously. At no point was communal appro-
val requested or sought. They described themselves thus: ‘We are a group of
friends with many different Jewish backgrounds and perspectives’. A website
(grassrootsjews.org), a blog, (http://grassrootsjewishnewyearproject.wordpress.-
com/2010/09/03/ellul-boot-camp/) and a Facebook group (http://www.
facebook.com/groups/97599398526) were set up, a downloadable video (http://
vimeo.com/5667190) was produced, promising ‘the most exciting autonomous
and non-hierarchical Judaism ever to surface’, and a series of invitations were
sent out via Facebook. A flat fee of £45 for the services was requested; however,
the inability to pay was taken into consideration, and others paid what they
could afford. As Schalit (2009: 1 Sept) observed in a blog post, Grassroots Jews
are ‘largely unwilling to buy into a model of community that implicitly, if not ex-
plicitly, demands that they sign-up for the whole synagogue package at consid-
erable expense’. A second promotional video (http://vimeo.com/14154519) clearly
symbolizes how Grassroots Jews feel about the existing options. Opening with
shots of a traditional Reform service, after 44 seconds it cuts to a black screen
emblazoned with the large white letters ‘Bored of shul [Yiddish: synagogue]?’
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as a reggae soundtrack blares over a montage sequence of traditional Jewish
iconography, including haredim dancing the hora, synagogue interiors, the
Torah, Hebrew lettering, praying and so on. Such imagery is then intercut with
a series of statements: ‘Looking for something new and fresh?’, ‘A new form
of community’ and ‘Where do you belong?’. Thus, the group clearly positions it-
self as one which would appeal to those who are seeking both novelty and a
sense of belonging (grassrootsjews.org n.d.).
The Grassroots Jews services took place along Halachic, that is, normative
rabbinic lines, but with some distinct and non-traditional differences. Atypically,
three discrete areas of seating were provided. There was a traditional segregated
section in which men and women were divided by a mechitza (partition). There
was also a mixed section along Reform/Liberal/Progressive/Masorti lines. Final-
ly, there was an unallocated area, described as a ‘free wheeling, open, free to
come and go, chill out spaces, cushions, tents, friendly, space for mothers and
babies’ and ‘space for breastfeeding’. Grassroots Jews presupposes some of
‘the permanence of innovations made by Reform and Conservative movements
in having women lead all parts of the services, men and women [can] sit togeth-
er, and both [can] count in the prayer quorum’ (Lurie 2011: 25), but at the same
time, as the above arrangements demonstrate, they are flexible enough on these
issues in order to accommodate those who are more to the right on the religious
spectrum. At the same time, Grassroots Jews is united in its desire to provide an
egalitarian experience, ‘usually with the full liturgy, but with feeling’ (Lurie 2011:
25). Thus, Grassroots Jews’ innovations rely on older, canonical and traditional
religious practices.
The aim was to be as avowedly religiously inclusive and non-hierarchical as
possible: ‘We want to be PARTICIPATORY AND FRIENDLY’ (sic), and ‘We want to
be the kind of place where people say hello to people they don’t know’ (Grass-
roots Jews Community, n.d.). Women were called up to the Torah in accordance
with Halacha, led the davening (Yiddish: praying) and sang the haftorah (He-
brew: a short reading from the Prophets following the reading of the Torah in
synagogue). There were no age restrictions: ‘This is for people of all ages[,]
from children to grandparents’. A guest cantor and a teacher from Israel – a mu-
sician and a professor of medieval Jewish history at the University of Haifa –
were flown in (Grassroots Jews Community, n.d.). The initial venues were a mar-
quee in the back garden of a private home and a classical music concert hall,
both in Hampstead. In their second year of operation, they relocated to the prem-
ises of the Moishe House in London.
Grassroots Jews attempts to blend the traditional with the innovative. Its
preference for Hebrew prayer and traditional liturgy is one indicator, but this
also most likely stems from the upbringing of a sizeable number of attendees
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from the United Synagogue – the British variant of mainstream Orthodoxy. Draw-
ing upon the Jewish exegetical tradition, they state, ‘exploring, questioning and
challenging is important’. At the same time, however, they investigated alterna-
tives to tradition not typically found in mainstream religious infrastructures in
the United Kingdom, such as ‘parallel sessions with less structure and more
spontaneity’, including ‘experimental approaches to prayer, meditation and
yoga’. In this way, they ‘intend to bring this spirit of joy and Jewish exploration
to our services’ (Grassroots Jews Community, n.d.) .
It is clear then that Grassroots Jews feel that inclusiveness, experimentation,
exploration and a spirit of joy are missing from the typical UK fare and that such
fare is the antithesis of ‘heartfelt, soul centred and intellectually inspiring’, in
comparison to what one blogger described as ‘the Judaism they find elsewhere
in the community [that] is rather dull, meaningless and stuffy’ (Schalit 2009: 1
Sept). Have ‘you ever sat in Shul and thought “there must be more to it than
this?”’, they ask. Thus, if mainstream Jewish religious organisations are not will-
ing or are not able to provide this outlet, Grassroots Jews will; not by challenging
the mainstream organisations to change from within, but by providing their own
alternatives. Reflecting the US experience, as Lurie has commented:
Without a doubt, core minyan-goers have a more serious commitment to community and to
prayer than does the average synagogue member, who can rely on institutional staff to look
after logistics and lead prayers. There are, however, ragged edges to these commitments.
Most minyanim (plural of minyan) that stress prayer over other forms of Jewish communal
life do not meet weekly. (2011: 27)
This group feels their agency is denied within mainstream British Judaism, that
their voices are not heard. But, rather than get angry with the old denomina-
tions, they are just saying no to them, and ‘we can find what we like or create
what we like’. Consequently, using the Internet in general and Facebook in par-
ticular, this group set about producing its own alternative in which, as Schalit
(2009: 1 Sept) pointed out, ‘most of all, they want to do it their way, on their
terms, and with their people’. The group’s very name encapsulates their aspira-
tions: to build something completely new and from the bottom up, not to rely on
existing alternatives. Significantly, the organisers and participants are not mar-
ginalised Jews. They are what Cohen described as ‘groomed, not bloomed
Jews’ (Neroulias 2008). What this means is that ‘[t]heir renegade independence
from the denominational label has been made possible by years of communal
education, involvement, and training in denominational institutions’, training
for which the established movements have reaped little reward (Lurie 2011:
28). Most of them are in the late-twenties to early-forties age band, are well
known for their communal activism and are individuals who cut their teeth in
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such mainstream organisations as the Union of Jewish Students, Bnei Akiva,⁹
Noam,¹⁰ RSY-Netzer¹¹ and Limmud¹² as well as the new initiatives mentioned
above. Some of them are even the children of well-known rabbis. In short, as
one commentator pointed out, they are ‘people you would think the community
would be bending over backwards to include within existing frameworks’ (Scha-
lit 2009: 1 Sept).
To take one example, in an interview in the Jewish Chronicle, thirty-year-old
Zoe Jankel, a member of the Grassroots Jews organising committee, explained
the motivations for her involvement (Kasriel 2009: 62). She initially described
herself as ‘barely religious and rarely interested in matters of the spirit’. Her
non-Jewish friends identify her as a ‘cultural Jew’, and she ‘mainly avoids syna-
gogue’, but on the ‘rare occasions’ she attends, she will sit, hiding her paperback
inside a prayer book, ‘studiously ignoring the prayers’ around her and hence ‘not
an obvious contender for involvement in something such as Grassroots Jews’. At
the same time, however, for the past ten years or so she has participated
both actively and passively in a number of informal Jewish organisations, most of which
concentrate on the evolution of Judaism into a practice relevant to our lives today. For
me this is not just a cultural affiliation – it is definitely a connection to the religious prac-
tice – one that is not synagogue-based but is fluid and changing and more in line with the
world outside the walls of prayer (Kasriel 2009: 62).
Like many young Jews, Zoe enjoys the experience of Rosh Hashanah and Yom
Kippur with her family but is turned off by the synagogue service, which she
finds very passive (‘It used to be quite a lot of looking at my watch […] quite
dry and boring’) and which denies her agency (‘Last year I was a little bit an-
noyed with myself because I thought I could have just stayed at home’). That
is one of the key reasons she became involved with Grassroots Jews, as it allowed
her a sense of ownership and action in constructing the sort of services she
would like to attend (‘We’re all involved in creating this for the first time’), but
at the same time, as many of her friends were involved, an important social as-
pect was also provided. Clearly she was dissatisfied with the existing religious
infrastructure: ‘I think Grassroots Jews is a commentary on today’s synagogues.
It’s a way to move forward and to engage in what is going on in the Jewish com-
munity’. Informally she admitted that, without Facebook, Grassroots Jews would
not have happened (Kasriel 2009: 62).
 The UK’s largest Orthodox Jewish youth movement.
 Zionist youth movement of the Assembly of Masorti (traditional) Synagogues.
 Zionist youth movement for Reform Judaism.
 A cross-communal Jewish learning organisation.
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Feedback from participants posted on the Facebook site between 20 Septem-
ber 2009 and 14 October 2010 was overwhelmingly positive. ‘It’s mid-October,
and I’m still feeling the effects of the incredible High Holy Days experience. I re-
solved to be more grateful this year, so Thank You to everyone who made it so
special, and continue to grow our lovely community’; ‘thank you so much for
an amazing rosh hashana and yom kipur. I’ll never forget the magic neilah
with everyone coming together’; ‘THANK YOU ALL FOR THE WONDERFUL CEL-
EBRATIONS!’ (sic); ‘Thankyou GRJ, AMAZINGGGGGG. sending out love and
thanks to everyone who made it happen. It was a spiritual sensation. Still can
not believe how you all made it happen. U r all stars. Put me down for next
year!!! love you all’ (sic); and ‘Thank you so much to the whole team who
have organised GRJ. it has been a truly amazing and special experience thus
far […]’ (sic). Clearly, Grassroots Jews fulfilled a need that was missing for
some. However, given that the number of posters is tiny in terms of the number
of attendees, it is difficult to ascertain just how representative this is without fur-
ther in-depth research.
7 Future work: biographical narrative analysis
The information above was primarily drawn from online and printed sources,
blended with ethnographic research.¹³ Further clarity about the role of online re-
sources in the lives of the new post-denominational Jewish communities would
be enabled through more intensive biographic examination of a small number of
individuals currently resident in the UK who maintain a strong presence in Jew-
ish congregations on Facebook. Interviewees could also be identified according
to their degree of ‘presence’, with preference given to people who contribute a
great deal to online and offline Jewish congregations in terms of participation
and leadership. Peer nomination could also identify key individuals. A biograph-
ical narrative method would illuminate the points during an interviewee’s life
trajectory as well as the processes by which the interviewees became involved
with online fora and the reasons why. With such a biographically oriented ap-
proach, it would be possible to explore when and how these people met others
with different perspectives, where they found places in which they could not say
hello to people that they did not know and how they went off to find something
more palatable to them.
 This took place over two years from 2008–2010, including attendance at many of these
groups’ events as well as the Grassroots Jews services.
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Biographical approaches of this kind were developed originally at Otto Van
Guericke University in Magdeburg by Fritz Schütze (2008). They focus on two as-
pects of the life story: its actual biographical content and its specific chronolog-
ical and spatial structure. The narrator’s free choice to tell his or her life story in
a specific way and the form in which the story is told provides valuable insights
into biographical processes. This kind of reflexivity emerges at a point in life at
which the individual faces real-life dilemmas, when s/he is expected to make
her/his own decisions and deal with the consequences. These two elements –
the scope of experiences and the ability to reflexively assess them – would en-
able future researchers to reconnoitre the history of participants’ involvement
with online worlds, the pleasures, satisfactions and frustrations of doing so,
the relationship of their online involvement to their faith and self-definition in
corporeal life and the differences between online and virtual experiences. Partic-
ipants’ views of their online communities could also be examined, particularly
in terms of their understanding of why people engage in this kind of activity
and what are the gains and the gratifications.
Biographical analysis will reveal the events in people’s lives, their back-
grounds in terms of family experiences, societal position and religious involve-
ment as well as their educational backgrounds and career aspirations, and so
on, that led them to their involvement in on- and off-line religious communities.
The information gleaned so far provides a clear indication of how these people
feel and what they are trying to achieve – but biographical analyses will reveal
the unfolding of their lives and which life experiences may have led them to feel-
ing and doing the things that they are now feeling and doing. In addition, there
is a strong case for a longitudinal element to the kind of study we are advocat-
ing. Further biographical narrative analysis carried out in a few years hence will
also allow us to reveal what occurred over the passage of time. As the nucleus of
these Jewish users is predominantly single, unmarried or recently-married young
adults in their twenties and thirties, if not exclusively so, it will be poignant to
chart what happens once they settle down and start families, require a Hebrew
school and bar/bat mitzvah training, and whether they continue with such Inter-
net-provided activities or integrate into more mainstream communities.Will they
be happy to continue with these more ad hoc (although becoming increasingly
regularised and familiar) activities, or will they eventually succumb to what
Schalit (2009: 1 Sept) calls ‘the more concrete and stable versions of community
that one typically finds within an existing synagogue framework’? Will collec-
tives such as Grassroots Jews enable what has been variously labelled in the
United States as ‘the long-extended enabled adolescence’, ‘post-college, pre-
whatever’ (Kaunfer quoted in Shapiro 2010), ‘emerging adulthood’ (Arnett
Grassroots Religion: Facebook and Offline Post-Denominational Judaism 157
2004) or ‘the odyssey years’ (Brooks 2007)? According to Lurie, in the US (and
therefore using it as a model for the UK),
[o]n the ground, what this looks like is upper middle class Americans spending the ten to
fifteen years after college messing around and ‘figuring out their lives’ while postponing
marriage, children, and responsibilities. One way or another, the bill for this eclectic adven-
turousness is footed by parents, or, for the best and brightest, by various institutions and
sinecures. Certainly, in opting out of synagogue life, most young Jews become unaccus-
tomed to supporting Jewish institutions financially. We can feel connected to a particular
religious community without attending, paying money, or even living in the city where
the community is located (2011: 26).
Indeed, Kaunfer (2010) found that such Jews reported an average of five different
community affiliations. Certainly, it has been suggested that such groups do not
require the hard work, commitment, loyalty or steadfastness of a traditional con-
gregation, i.e., an ‘if I don’t like it, I’ll leave it and find something better’ atti-
tude. At the same time, Kaunfer discovered in the United States that independent
minyanim do not age per se, as a revolving-door effect means that as those who
are past their mid-thirties leave the community, they are simply replaced by a
new crop of university graduates who move in. The institution becomes quite sta-
ble because it caters to a demographic that is constantly replenishing itself. It
will also be interesting to see what type of internal dynamic these communi-
ties/congregations develop.
Furthermore, future biographical narrative analysis will also test the views
of some within the communal mainstream who tend to adopt a rather laissez
faire attitude to these and other similar endeavours, arguing that, as these
young people settle down and start families, their passion for Judaism will al-
most inevitably ensure that they slot back into the existing infrastructure and
the structure and stability it offers. Boyd (2009), for example, observed, ‘These
behaviours are not a passing fad; even if this generation later gravitates to estab-
lished frameworks, it will do so with a set of assumptions that will necessitate
significant communal change’. Perhaps initiatives like Grassroots Jews will slot
into, or even become, the mainstream. At the same time, it will be interesting
to watch the response of the communal and denominational leadership to the
rise of these new initiatives.Will they adapt or sit back and watch complacently?
Will Grassroots Jews impact on traditional religious authority in the UK? Boyd
(2009) has suggested, ‘Grassroots Jews is a fringe endeavour that, in 2009, barely
registers on the communal Richter scale. But the principles and behaviours that
underpin it may herald a raft of changes to Jewish life in the future. Grassroots
Americans recently elected the first Afro-American president; who knows what
Grassroots Jews might achieve?’ Furthermore, as Campbell put it, ‘It will be im-
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portant to consider the relationship between religious new media users and in-
novators and the offline religious communities they identify with’ (2010: 192).
Overall, then, this will be an excellent case study by which, a few years into
the future, it may be possible to assess more fully the impact of Facebook in a
post-denominational offline setting.
8 Conclusion
New forms of social software such as Facebook are providing an ‘architecture of
participation’, fostering collaboration and creativity by facilitating communica-
tion and the adapting of the technologies themselves, thus giving rise to new so-
cial practices, rituals, congregations and even beliefs across the Jewish spec-
trum. Social networking sites, here Facebook, have created discursive spaces
where choices that were once private have become increasingly public and visi-
ble and where small, emergent and labile offline congregations can form. Face-
book is clearly helping to address increasing feelings of alienation or disenfran-
chisement amongst post-denominational Jews who are dissatisfied with the
existing communal and congregational infrastructure, providing greater oppor-
tunities for religious self-definition as well as a qualitatively different encounter
with Judaism. It is seemingly allowing a new form of Judaism to emerge, un-
shackled from the constraints of denominational control, or at the very least re-
inventing and reviving earlier forms.
Yet there are many further questions still to be asked. Does Facebook really
meet the needs for congregation formation at a time when increasing numbers of
Jews are isolated and feeling disenfranchised or do not want to be affiliated?
Since all of the groups explored above are based in London, providing for met-
ropolitan Jews,what about the non-urban or non-London populations in the UK?
Can religious questions be raised on Facebook that may not be asked in real life
because it does not involve face-to-face conversation, thus providing a more wel-
coming encounter with religion? Does the Internet provide a greater access to
core Judaic sacred texts and/or does it renegotiate the user’s relationship with
such texts? Are the Judaic meanings and beliefs derived from them qualitatively
different from those that already exist? Is a new form of online/electronic Juda-
ism emerging which may lead to the need to re-evaluate Judaism in the real
world? What does it mean to be an online Jew? What can new electronic Judaism
tell us about the Jewish religion today? What is the nature of the virtual-real re-
lationship in Judaism? Is there any connection? How do electronic Judaic iden-
tities relate to questions of national context? And how have the institutional
branches of Judaism reacted in terms of utilising Facebook? How does electronic
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culture address the nature of contemporary Judaism? How does it attempt to ex-
press Judaic positions within religious frameworks that are identified with the
non-Jewish majority? Does it furnish an independent self-definition of Judaism,
and how does this relate to wider and fluctuating notions of other identities? It is
hoped that future research will answer some or all of these questions.
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Stephen Pihlaja
Truck Stops and Fashion Shows: A Case
Study of the Discursive Performance of
Evangelical Christian Group Affiliation on
YouTube
In the last five years, use of the popular video-sharing site YouTube has grown
enormously. On YouTube, Evangelical Christian video bloggers (vloggers) fre-
quently discuss topics of religion amongst themselves and with other users
from different religious backgrounds, but given the diverse viewpoints from
which users come, developing clear distinctions between oneself and others
who call themselves ‘Christians’, but with whom one may not particularly
agree on controversial theological questions, is a difficult issue. As YouTube
does not feature any ‘group’ function, as on other social networking sites,
users must associate or disassociate with one another only through their talk.
My previous research has investigated similar issues using longitudinal observa-
tion linked with metaphor-led discourse analysis (Cameron and Maslen 2010) to
show how misunderstanding between atheists and Christians emerges (Pihlaja
2010: 2011a). This chapter will extend analysis of YouTube discourse by investi-
gating the emergence of categories of Evangelical Christian users on YouTube in
one video. Drawing on a longitudinal observation of a group of users over two
years, analysis will focus on one video in which a user (Yokeup) aligns with
and distances himself from other users and how users react in the video com-
ments section to the categories Yokeup employs. Analysis will show that Yokeup
employs traditional denominations as well as metaphorical categorisations to
position himself and others, often drawing on a biblical text and his own exege-
sis of the text to accomplish this.
Since its founding in 2005, YouTube has become an important site of social
interaction and media production. During 2006,YouTube quickly became the key
site for video content on the web, allowing users to post content with only a lim-
itation placed on how long a video could be. Coupled with the growth of person-
al blog publishing and the affordance of cheap video recording devices, the new
technology allowed users to logically extend the conversational nature of the
blog genre by posting videos of themselves talking directly to the YouTube audi-
ence. ‘Video blogs’ or ‘vlogs’ became the video equivalent of diary style blogs,
with thoughts spoken directly to the camera rather than written down. Although
the bounds on what is and is not a vlog are not always clear, Burgess and Green
have suggested the very simple description of ‘a talking head, a camera, and
some editing’ (2008: 6) and free expression of one’s own opinions and experien-
ces in an online, public space. YouTubers (YouTube users) can align or associate
with other users through ‘subscribing’ to channels, but the real work of aligning
with or distancing from other users occurs in discourse activity, both in videos
and in text comments. In this chapter, I will analyse a single video, entitled ‘I
doubt JesusFreek is saved’, in which the user Yokeup discusses whom he believes
to be truly ‘saved’ and whom he believes is merely ‘religious’. Using close textual
analysis of the video and comments, I will seek to answer two questions: first,
what are the criteria Yokeup employs to identify Christians he sees as ‘saved’
from those who are ‘religious’; and second, were these criteria recognised and
accepted by others in response, or were other criteria applied by different users?
1 Background and methods: YouTube in context
Since 2005, research into YouTube has also grown substantially and in diversity,
with researchers having investigated copyright issues on YouTube (O’Brien and
Fitzgerald 2006; Hilderbrand 2007), the prevalence of YouTube in the life of
youth (Madden 2007), YouTube as a social-networking site (Lange 2007), the ed-
ucational potential of YouTube (Snelson 2008), the effect of YouTube on the US
political process (Burgess and Green 2009; Duman and Locher 2008), responses
to anti-Muslim media (van Zoonen,Vis and Mihelj 2010) and antagonism in You-
Tube comments (Garcés-Conejos Blitvich 2010; Lorenzo-Dus, Garcés-Conejos Blit-
vich and Bou-Franch 2011). Maia, Almeida and Almeida (2008) have done quan-
titative analysis of YouTube networks to identify user behaviour, similar to the
work of Benevenuto et al. (2008), who have also used statistical analysis to de-
scribe interactions on YouTube. O’Donnell et al. (2008) have used questionnaire
data to investigate how the YouTube community is constructed and how reac-
tions to videos differ based on the user group viewing the video. O’Donnell et
al.’s research was particularly oriented towards use of language and how text
comments related to videos, but videos analysed were not user-generated and
analysis did not include video interactions between users.
Anthropologist Patricia Lange’s studies of YouTube interaction and user ex-
perience (2007a, 2007b, 2007c) have perhaps been the most rigorous, in-depth
analyses of the YouTube social experience to date. Adopting an ethnographic
perspective, Lange has investigated user interpretations of YouTube interactions
and limits on participation in the YouTube ‘community’ as well as the antagonis-
tic nature of YouTube interaction. In particular, a unique form of antagonistic be-
haviour has developed on the site, referred to by YouTubers as ‘drama’, a phe-
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nomenon ‘that emerge[s] when a flurry of video posts clusters around an internal
“controversy” or antagonistic debate between one or more YouTubers’ (Burgess
and Green 2009: 98). Studies of YouTube antagonism and drama have been, un-
fortunately, incomplete in taking into account all elements of the video page as
well as the dynamic nature of interactions on the site. Although the studies
above have attempted to understand antagonism and drama, research into an-
tagonistic YouTube discourse activity has continued to rely on analysis of com-
ments and user reports of experience online rather than close analysis of videos.
Lack of close discourse analysis tends to move research away from the actual
YouTube video page and interactions between users and towards quantitative
analysis of YouTube activity or reports of experiences on the site. In contrast,
my analysis of YouTube video pages focuses on the dynamic interaction between
users on the site, using only the discourse data.
The development of treatment of online communication not as a static, tex-
tual artefact to be extracted and analysed but rather as a dynamic system of in-
teraction, using discourse analytic tools created and adapted from analysis of
offline communication, has shown promise. In an attempt to bridge discourse
analysis and online ethnography, Androutsopoulos has developed a discourse-
centred online ethnography (DCOE) to describe and analyse online texts (An-
droutsopoulos 2008), treating online discourse as emergent rather than fossil-
ised artefacts to be extracted and analysed. DCOE is influenced heavily by lin-
guistic ethnography (LE), which seeks to contextualise language by integrating
an applied linguistic perspective of language with ethnographic theories and
methods. Ethnography investigates connections between individual communica-
tion instances and context, drawing in all relevant contextual elements to bear
on analysis, with a particular emphasis on taking an emic rather than etic per-
spective. Inherently interdisciplinary, LE draws on linguistics, social theory
and ethnographic methodology (Tusting and Maybin 2007). From this perspec-
tive, all tools available to situate the text should be employed in analysis of dis-
course (Wetherell 2007) as language data is one component embedded in a com-
plex system full of components influencing any given talk or text.
In proposing DCOE, Androutsopoulos (2010) argues that researchers must
engage online texts and environments as dynamic, using discourse analysis in
longitudinal studies focused on discourse practices online. Androutsopoulos fur-
ther proposes systematic observation and direct contact with participants, cou-
pled with discourse analysis of user text, to provide the best perspective on on-
line data. With longitudinal user observation, user accounts of their own action
and discourse analysis, data can be compared and contrasted and analysts can
move between local and global phenomena. Although the LE goal to ‘get famil-
iar’ with speaker experience (Rampton et al. 2004: 12) through holistic descrip-
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tions of contextualised talk differs from my goal to explain category emergence
in YouTube discourse, using LE methods to situate user talk is likely to help ex-
plain group emergence. Androutsopoulos (2010) then suggests that, within the
observation of and contact with users, the analyst investigates user talk, employ-
ing an analytic framework for the talk contained on a given site. The form of dis-
course analysis can develop in a recursive process of observation and refining of
research questions, leading the analyst to the most useful discourse analytic
tools for a particular online environment. In an attempt to trace the dynamics
of user talk about categorisation in the dataset (necessary to fully answer the re-
search question), my analysis of the video page interaction will employ two
forms of discourse analysis: membership categorisation analysis and dis-
course-led metaphor analysis.
Built on the early lectures of conversational analyst Harvey Sacks’ analysis
of calls made to suicide prevention lines in the 1960s (Sacks 1995), membership
categorisation analysis (MCA) describes the ‘procedures people employ to make
sense of other people and their activities’ (Leudar, Marsland and Nekvapil 2004:
244) and describes the process by which people use everyday knowledge to cat-
egorise the world around them (Sacks 1995; Lepper 2000). Sacks used an exam-
ple taken from a child’s story (‘The baby cried, the mommy picked it up’) to show
how listeners were able to infer the relationship between the mother and child
using rules of membership in categories and membership categorisation devices
(MCDs) or ‘collection[s of categories] plus rules of application […]’ (Lepper 2000:
17). Categories can be any way of grouping together people, actions or locations
(Schegloff 2007) and can be grouped together into collections of categories. In
the above example, Sacks argued the hearer understands the two categories
(mommy and baby) in terms of the collection of ‘family’ and the category-
bound activity of ‘picking up’. MCDs provide the guide for placing members
into categories and provide an accounting for the resources or common sense
people take for granted when categorising others (Eglin and Hester 2003). Cate-
gories can be explicitly stated in talk or inferred from the context.
Although categorisation is a clear theme in the dataset, longitudinal obser-
vation and initial analysis of categorisation led me to include analysis of meta-
phor in the dataset as well. Drawing on previous work (Pihlaja 2010, 2011a,
2011b), dynamics of metaphor use (Cameron 2003, 2007; Cameron et al. 2009;
Zanotto, Cameron and Cavalcanti 2008; Cameron and Maslen 2010) will also
be employed to analyse metaphor use, complementing categorisation analysis.
A discourse dynamics approach to metaphor studies begins with the notions
of complex systems theory, in which metaphor is not ‘a static, fixed mapping,
but a temporary stability emerging from the activity of interconnecting systems
of socially-situated language use and cognitive activity’ (Cameron et al. 2009:
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64). This approach is particularly appropriate for researchers interested in how
language is organised in discourse, not in conscious, prescribed ways but as nat-
urally occurring from the interactions of the speakers. In the context of asyn-
chronous Internet text where videos exist in a dynamic environment with re-
sponses and comments being produced by different users, mapping the
dynamic interactions particularly around categorisation is likely to show how
metaphorical language emerges from use. Although the definition of metaphor
has been debated, I understand metaphor in terms of transfer of meaning; met-
aphor is ‘seeing something in terms of something else’ (Burke 1945: 503). Meta-
phor begins with a ‘focus term or vehicle’ in the text, which is incongruous with
the surrounding text and context and in which the incongruity can be under-
stood by some ‘transfer of meaning’ between the vehicle and the topic (Cameron
2003: 60).
Based on these tools, I will now introduce the particular video analysed in
this chapter by providing the necessary background and presenting the drama
episode from which it came.
2 ‘I doubt Jezuzfreek is saved’
In contrast to the previous research, I am less interested in describing the typical
YouTuber, but rather more interested in describing a particular subset of YouTub-
ers: Evangelical Christians. Although categorisation of Christians is at the heart
of this chapter, given the diverse meanings of ‘Christian’, it is necessary to de-
scribe in analytic terms the users in the dataset. Although the term ‘Evangelical
Christian’ is not employed by the users, it provides a useful starting point to en-
compass a majority of users observed. Bebbington (1989: 19) describes an ‘Evan-
gelical Christian’ as strongly agreeing that ‘through the life, death and resurrec-
tion of Jesus, God provided a way for the forgiveness of my sins’ (crucicentrism);
strongly agreeing that ‘the Bible is the inspired word of God’ or agreeing to what-
ever degree that ‘the Bible is God’s word, and is to be taken literally, word for
word’ (biblicism); strongly agreeing that ‘I have committed my life to Christ
and consider myself to be a converted Christian’ (conversionism); and agreeing
or agreeing strongly that ‘it is important to encourage non-Christians to become
Christians’ (activism). Although the Evangelical YouTubers in my dataset do not
ever explicitly attest to a certain set of religious beliefs, it does seem that Beb-
bington’s four descriptions apply generally to the group.
Observation of the Evangelical YouTubers in the dataset began in 2007, start-
ing with observation of one atheist YouTuber who broadly criticised religion and
religious users on the site. This is done through following connections to this
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user by observing who made video responses to his videos, who he discussed in
his videos and commenters. Following this pattern of identifying potential con-
nections, I was able to build a group of between 15–20 Christian and atheist
users who frequently interacted with one another. The number of users fluctuat-
ed during the observation period, as certain YouTubers joined and left the site. In
the course of the observation period I also began to identify potential ‘drama ep-
isodes’ for analysis, particularly episodes in which users took positions that
aligned with or distanced themselves from other users. Inclusion of atheists in
the dataset was necessary, as users frequently interacted with one another,
and it would be impossible (as I will show in the data) to understand the inter-
action of the Evangelical Christians on the site without also considering their in-
teraction with atheists, as this interaction is, especially in this dataset, a key
source of disagreement. Although linguistic ethnography (LE) takes an explicitly
emic perspective (often informed by user interviews and participant observa-
tion), attempts were made to contact users but this largely failed, and I was un-
able to elicit reports from users about their perceptions of interaction; therefore I
relied only on reports from videos.
In early 2009, an episode of drama began when the Evangelical Christian
YouTuber Yokeup used the term ‘human garbage’ in a subsequently removed
video. In the video, Yokeup calls an atheist user crosisborg (CB) ‘human garbage’
in response to insulting comments CB had made in an earlier (also subsequently
removed) video about Yokeup’s wife. In this video and others Yokeup produced
during January 2009, Yokeup makes the claim that calling someone ‘human gar-
bage’ is based on the biblical parable of the vinedresser and the branches (John
15: 1–24). The initial exchange between CB and Yokeup is marked by insults and
strong disagreement and results in a long-term argument among Yokeup, atheists
and other Christians over whether or not Yokeup should use this term. I attempt-
ed to identify videos which were both related to the drama episode and still post-
ed on the site. Starting with a search of the term ‘human garbage’, potential vid-
eos related to the dramatic episode were identified as appearing in the search
and/or from examining responses to these videos and/or videos made around
the time the controversy was responded to by key users, but which did not ap-
pear in the search as the text ‘human garbage’ was not attached to the video.
After 40 videos were identified as having some relation to the dramatic episode,
I determined that there were 24 videos which related directly to this episode and
were posted either near the time of the drama or re-posted later, but in obvious
reference to the episode.
YouTube provides users two options when they post a video: they can keep
the video private and only viewable to friends, or they can publish the video
openly on the site, allowing for access by anyone at any time. Although the dis-
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tinction between private and public space in social networks has been problema-
tised, most notably by Lange (2007) in discussing how users present themselves
in YouTube videos, in terms of the technical function of the site, YouTube is clear
about the implications of posting videos publicly. Its user policy states explicitly:
‘Any videos that you submit to the YouTube Sites may be redistributed through
the Internet and other media channels, and may be viewed by the general pub-
lic’ (YouTube 2010). Because of this, informed consent to use the videos was not
obtained.
Videos were transcribed and entered into the qualitative analysis software
Atlas.TI, where I coded all categories and metaphors. I identified a category as
any word or phrase used to describe a group of people (e.g., Christians, atheists,
the religious) and metaphors using Cameron’s vehicle identification procedure
(Cameron 2003). Although the videos included responses from both atheists
and Christians, this chapter will focus primarily on the response of Christians
to the use of the term, particularly in one video in which Yokeup makes explicit
issue of Evangelical Christian categorisation,wondering whether one user in par-
ticular, jezuzfreek777, is ‘saved’ or whether he is simply ‘religious’. The video was
made in April 2009, well into the drama episode, and addresses Yokeup’s sense
that other Christian users have joined with atheists in denouncing his use of
‘human garbage’ in insulting crosisborg.
Figure 1 shows the key information about the video.
Figure 1: Video information: ‘I doubt JezuzFreek is saved …’
Description
‘…but my opinion doesn’t matter … think about it, think about what Jesus Christ taught us, and




Time : (mins:secs) Date  April 




Category People and Blogs
The description box text and tags were written by the user, Yokeup, and the
number of views and comments were taken at the time of transcription on 18
May 2010. As the video is not still online, the number of views and comments
may have continued to increase before its withdrawal, but, as with most videos
on YouTube, there is generally a period of high traffic when the video is first
Truck Stops and Fashion Shows 171
posted, which can be assumed to have passed for this video. As new videos are
made, both the number of comments and views tend to stabilise, as users watch
and comment on new videos.
In another article (Pihlaja 2011b) I present a more in-depth textual analysis
of the video, identifying all categories and their interaction with metaphorical
language, but for this chapter I focus only on the development of two categories,
‘saved’ and ‘religious’, in both the video and the text comments.
3 Video analysis
The video (YokedtoJesus 2009) is recorded early in the morning and starts with a
video bumper¹ that Yokeup has used on many of his videos, and this includes the
man counting down from 5 and loud music playing. The image consists of Yoke-
up, a middle-aged American man, standing in front of what appears to be his
house as the sun is coming up behind him. Yokeup is wearing a t-shirt with
cut-off sleeves, and the tattoos on both of his arms are clearly visible. As in
many of his videos, Yokeup makes the video after returning from working out
and is sweaty and energetic in his presentation. There are small edits made
throughout the video, but Yokeup does not appear to have prepared the actual
content of the video, although as a frequent vlogger his delivery is clear and re-
laxed throughout. At the beginning of the video, he greets the viewer loudly over
the sound of the edited-in music, shouting ‘Good morning!’ while the music
fades. He stops and listens quietly to the sound of birds singing in the back-
ground and says to the camera, ‘Listen to that’ and returns to listening to the
birds. After several seconds, he comments, ‘We serve an awesome God’ and re-
minds the viewer that God has created all the animals before repeating, ‘We
serve an awesome God’.
After the opening of the video, Yokeup begins to address the main topic con-
tained in the title ‘I doubt JezuzFreek is saved’. Speaking directly to the camera,
Yokeup says the following:
But one interesting thing that that I’ve been thinking about: I wonder if jezuzfreek is saved.
I wonder if he’s had a salvation moment. I wonder if Paula’s saved, if she’s had a salvation
moment. And you know, I, I [sic] wonder about a lot of people. A lot of people that claim to
be Christians, and it seems to be a theme in the Baptist community, you know, are they re-
 An element that acts as a transition, e.g., to or from commercial breaks, or, as in this case, at
the start or end of a video clip (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_broadcasting_terms,
accessed 27.6.13).
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ligious or are they saved? I mean, is the holy spirit, have they, have they [sic] had that mo-
ment when the holy spirit comes into their heart, and uh, the reason, uh, and you know,
and in [the Christian user] hislivingsacrifice’s, Paula’s video, you know, she talked about
church in one of her videos; she talked about church. And um, and she said, ‘You know,
it’s more like a fashion show’. And, and it’s kind of struck me, are you going to church
to be seen? Are you going to church to hear the word of God? You know, we preach
down at the truck stop every Sunday. Ain’t no fashion show. It’s people hungry to hear
the word of God, and I, uh, and I thank God for that church. I thank God for, for putting
us in the ministry of preaching at a truck stop, um, because when people show up, they’re
hungry for God. And I don’t care if there’s two in there or ten in there. I don’t care, you
know? I’d rather be talking to those folks who are hungry to hear the word of God, rather
than to be seen and, you know, have it be a fashion show. (YokedtoJesus 2009).
In this extract, Yokeup employs two common descriptions of Christians: ‘saved’
and ‘religious’, but goes on to develop how other YouTubers can be placed into
these two categories. First, Yokeup identifies two users for potential inclusion in
the ‘religious’ category: Paula and jezuzfreek777. Jezuzfreek777, who the title of
the video identifies as someone that Yokeup doubts is saved, is identified as po-
tentially religious rather than saved because Yokeup wonders if he has had a ‘sal-
vation moment’, suggesting that one key difference between the religious and
the saved is ‘a moment when the holy spirit comes into [one’s] heart’. Although
the term ‘salvation moment’ appears elsewhere in Yokeup’s discourse, here there
is little description of what this moment might entail and how one might know if
another has had one. Paula, another Evangelical Christian YouTuber who subse-
quently closed her account after the drama episode, is also singled out for ‘reli-
gious’ categorisation. Yokeup positions Paula and jezuzfreek777 both as also not
having had a salvation moment, but he presents Paula as engaging in an addi-
tional category-bound activity similar to that of jezuzfreek777: she is overly con-
cerned with appearances rather than with ‘hearing the word of God’.
Categorised with Paula and jezuzfreek777 are several other groups that are
also suspected of being ‘religious’ rather than ‘saved’. First, Yokeup suggests
that ‘a lot of people’ fall into the ‘religious’ category. Moreover, not only Paula
but Paula’s church, and not only her church but the ‘Baptist community’, are in-
cluded in the potentially ‘religious’ category. Paula’s church is included in this
category based on Yokeup’s reporting of Paula’s speech that the church treats
meetings as ‘fashion shows’ rather than instances to ‘hear the word of God’.
Throughout the video, although Yokeup repeatedly talks about other groups of
users, ‘Baptist’ is the only denomination of Evangelical Christian mentioned. Yo-
keup makes it clear in his description of the users that their actions are evidence
of their placement in the ‘religious’ category, not their denominational affilia-
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tion.What they have or have not done is explicitly the issue for Yokeup, not what
they believe or which church they attend.
The category of ‘saved’ by contrast appears implicitly in the section, namely
as the inverse of the category-bound activities of the religious. The contrast, how-
ever, does not occur between Yokeup and Paula or jezuzfreek777, but rather be-
tween the institutions they are associated with. Yokeup doesn’t present himself
in contrast to Paula and her church; rather he says of the truck stop church,
‘It ain’t no fashion show’. Instead, he says, ‘It’s people hungry to hear the
word of God’. Although Yokeup and his wife Caroline are put ‘in the ministry’
of the truck stop church, the description of the people attending is not a descrip-
tion of Yokeup per se, but of the other attendees of the church. In addition to not
being a fashion show and being populated by people hungry to hear the word of
God, Yokeup states that he doesn’t care how many people attend, another state-
ment that contrasts with jezuzfreek777 who, as Yokeup goes on to describe him, is
overly concerned with the number of people hearing his message, a ‘subwhore’²
who is more concerned about the popularity of his message than the content.
As the video progresses, Yokeup includes discussion of another set of users,
including several atheists and Christians who Yokeup doesn’t regard as ‘saved’,
further expounding the difference between the ‘saved’ and the ‘religious’ Chris-
tians on YouTube. In particular, Yokeup criticises jezuzfreek for ‘considering as a
friend’ and ‘hanging out with’ an atheist YouTuber, tommyfromthebronx, with
whom Yokeup also occasionally had an adversarial relationship. In this instance,
Yokeup contrasts jezuzfreek’s actions with those of Jesus, whom he describes as
not caring about numbers and reaching out to the ‘lost’, but being ‘adamant’
about not being friends or buddies with those to whom he was reaching out.
Instead, Yokeup presents Jesus as preaching what he considers a ‘hard’ mes-
sage to his disciples, saying, ‘Look, this road’s getting awfully hard, man. You
know, if you ain’t willin to sell everything and, and uh, you know, come and fol-
low me, and give it all up, you know’.
In this presentation of Jesus’s message (apparently a re-voicing of Luke
18:22), Yokeup presents the message of Jesus as aggressive and difficult, not in-
tended to gain great numbers of followers and causing many people to leave
him. Although Yokeup seems to accept that Jesus was at times popular, he
casts Jesus as rejecting a popular message in favour of a hard message that
drove people away from him.
 Subscriber whore: apparently someone who is willing to do anything to increase the number
of people subscribed to their channel.
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In this extract, jezuzfreek777 is cast in opposition not to other religious peo-
ple but against Jesus, who is presented as the ideal. Again, Yokeup does not ex-
plicitly align himself with Jesus (Yokeup is also critical of jezuzfreek777’s appa-
rent lack of humility), the re-voicing of scripture in the extract above appears
to match the voice of Yokeup, in particular his marked use of the word ‘ain’t’,
which Yokeup doesn’t consistently use. Although Yokeup doesn’t describe him-
self as saved, by setting up the categories at the beginning of the video and fol-
lowing through a description of jezuzfreek777 in opposition not only to Christians
he sees as saved but to the ideal person, Jesus himself, Yokeup is able to implic-
itly align himself with Jesus and jezuzfreek777 with the ‘absolute evil’ users on
YouTube.
I will now turn to the text comments posted on the video to investigate how
other users interact not only with Yokeup’s description of jezuzfreek777 but also
with the categories of ‘religious’ and ‘saved’, and to what extent categorisations
are accepted by commenters.
3 Text comments
Before beginning analysis of the text comments, it is important to keep in mind
that the video producer (in this case, the user Yokeup on the yokedtojesus chan-
nel) retains control of who may or may not comment on his or her video. In the
case of Yokeup, his channel page features very clear rules for commenters, stat-
ing that he will delete comments that he feels to be inappropriate. To what extent
comments are deleted is only known by the channel owner, but it does appear
that Yokeup frequently deletes comments and blocks users. The absence, for ex-
ample, of atheist commenters and antagonistic comments seems to be a function
of Yokeup’s censorship of his channel, and the analyst must be aware, in looking
at the comments, that all have been approved by Yokeup, with the strong possi-
bility that others who may have hoped to comment were unable to. Moreover,
users whom Yokeup had blocked in the past would also be unable to comment
on the videos, which may explain why there are no comments from either jezuz-
freek777 or hislivingsacrifice, to whom the video is ostensibly addressed. At the
time the data was accessed, 18 months after the video had been posted, there
were 93 comments on the video and 2,426 views.
In the comments section, Yokeup’s ‘saved’ and ‘religious’ categories are both
recognised and engaged by other users, particularly by those who appear to be
Evangelical Christian users, but categorisation appears to be explicitly at issue.
Ele12957 writes:
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Jeff,³ saved people can become religious and religious people can get saved. I don’t doubt
Jesusfreek is truly saved, I may not agree with him on everything he says but I have listened
to him enough to know he has a relationship with God and have heard him talk about his
born again experience.⁴
In this comment, the question does not appear to concern whether or not the de-
scription of someone as ‘religious’ or ‘saved’ is in any way inappropriate, but
that Yokeup has mislabelled jezuzfreek777 as not being ‘truly’ saved (an addition
to the category that is not present in Yokeup’s talk) because he appears to have a
‘relationship with God’. Rather than describe the same category-bound activity
that Yokeup has described, namely having a ‘salvation moment’, ele12957 under-
stands his perception of jezuzfreek777’s ‘relationship with God’ as being a sign of
true salvation.
Yokeup engages with the commenter, stressing a new category-bound activ-
ity of the saved, namely that saved people, like Jesus, do not ‘condone’ sin or
‘compromise with sinners’. Yokeup writes, ‘[A]bsolutely, and YOU NEVER com-
promise Christ for sin … [Y]ou never take the side of sin against Christ[.] JF
sides with the sinners, encourages their arguments, joins in on them, partakes
with them, doesn’t stand outside of the sin’, adding, ‘[T]he lost need to know
that many “posers” claiming to have Christ are flat out liars and deceivers,
they need to know that the standards of Christ are not to be negotiated, or com-
promised … EVER!’ Here, the religious category is conflated with a new category,
‘posers’, which is extended to include ‘liars’ and ‘deceivers’. The conflation of the
categories implicates jezuzfreek777 in much more serious negative behaviour,
i.e., lying and deceiving, without making a clear statement about jezuzfreek777
in particular. Rather than stating, ‘jezuzfreek777 is a liar’, Yokeup is able to
imply that jezuzfreek777 lies through a series of equivalency statements about
categories and the category-bound activities members engage in.
Metaphor also plays a role in categorisation, as in the video Yokeup claims
that jezuzfreek’s decision to ‘hang out with’ the atheists was also wrong, as Jesus
never ‘hung out’ with sinners. Attempting to clarify this activity, MrTh1rteen
writes, ‘He did continue to “hang out” (Don’t think that’s an accurate phrase,
sry 4 using it) while they were in sin because they were Always in sin. He
never once condoned any of their sins. The fact is Jesus preached to ALL, he
didn’t keep himself away from people who were demonic’. MrTh1rteen recognises
the difficulty of employing a description of a user’s actions as ‘hanging out’, be-
 Yokeup’s real name.
 Text comments often contain typographical errors. All comments in this chapter have been
reproduced as they are found on the video page.
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cause what does or does not constitute ‘hanging out’ is ultimately ambiguous.
Although the metaphor is identified at this point, Yokeup and MrTh1rteen contin-
ue to employ it in their exchange, with Yokeup responding, ‘Amen, and what did
Jesus do when He hung out with them? care to share those details… did Jesus
condone their sins, continue to hang out with them for years while they lived
in sin? well, did HE?’, and MrTh1rteen responding, ‘Jesus hung out with tax col-
lectors, who at that time were not highly thought of. When questioned he re-
sponded, “it’s not the healthy that need a doctor He didn’t hang out with the
pharasis (sp?) in fact he criticized the “men of god” at the time’. Although the
metaphor has been flagged by MrTh1rteen as being potentially too ambiguous
to be useful, both continue to employ it, negotiating some shared, pragmatically
applicable definition that appears to be mutually acceptable.
The text comments show that debate between users that Yokeup is happy to
include on his page (rather than delete) includes categories from the video which
users seem happy to accept, but that users are unhappy with Yokeup’s decision
to categorise jezuzfreek777 as religious rather than saved. To contest this rather
than reject the categories, the users reject elements of Yokeup’s categorisation,
often made possible by the ambiguity of the language that Yokeup has initially
employed. Yokeup, in response, posits new categories and new categorisations,
expanding on what is said in the video in some cases but also appealing to new
ways of describing jezuzfreek777’s actions in others. In doing so, he is able to
continue to hold his position that jezuzfreek777’s behaviour is unacceptable, re-
gardless of the categorical label applied to it.
4 Discussion
Based on the analysis of the video and comments, I would like to draw together
three main points of discussion to consider what Yokeup’s categorisation of jez-
uzfreek777 might tell about how affiliation and opposition are performed on You-
Tube.
1) Unlike traditional church denominations, the categories and categorisa-
tions in the video and video comments were user-dependent.
Rather than employing categories that might be easily discussed in terms of
what a user may or may not believe, in this video, Yokeup uses the categories
‘saved’ and ‘religious’ only in relation to how he perceives certain users behaving
on the site rather than the particular beliefs they hold. In the dataset, users did
not, in most cases, present their denominational affiliations. Although I have
employed the term ‘Evangelical’, it is an analyst’s term, as no user in this
video, the video comments or the whole of the 24-video dataset uses the term
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‘Evangelical’. Rather, there seems to be a particular aversion to denominational
labels for most of the Evangelicals, and when a denominational label does ap-
pear in this video (in Yokeup’s reference to the ‘Baptist’ community), it is used
in a negative way. Although there is an aversion to using denominational labels,
the term ‘Christian’ does not appear to be sufficient for the users on the site, re-
quiring users like Yokeup to appeal to different descriptions of Christians that are
not based on the particular beliefs that another user holds (especially when
other users whom one perceives as different from oneself claim to hold identical
beliefs), but rather on how Yokeup perceives their actions on the site aligning
with his own.
Although one might expect users from different denominations to argue
about doctrinal issues, this drama episode is less about issues of faith and
more about the behaviours of individuals on the site. Yokeup’s argument against
jezuzfreek777 and Paula is ultimately a behavioural one, questioning whether or
not they have become too close to atheists on the site and whether or not they
are as eager as Yokeup to aggressively speak what Yokeup believes to be the
truth to others on YouTube. Although Yokeup does not explicitly cast himself
as the model Christian, his positioning in contrast to the religious suggests
that he views not only his beliefs about God to be the best, but, perhaps more
importantly, he views his behaviour to be appropriate and the ideal expression
of Christianity, fighting evil and proclaiming the truth. His denominational affili-
ation is inconsequential in relation to this.
2) Categories seemed to be rooted in standardised Christian discourse, but
the categorisations of users were dynamic and contextually dependent.
The notion of ‘religious’ and ‘saved’ Christians is not absent in offline Evan-
gelical Christian discourse, and it seems, as evidenced in the comments on the
video, that both categories are accepted by the viewers. In Evangelical discourse,
‘saved’ and ‘religious’ categorisation can be seen in discourse surrounding the
notions of religious works rather than salvation by grace. From this Evangelical
belief, as seen in Bebbington’s definition given earlier, the only way one can be
‘saved’ is by believing ‘through the life, death and resurrection of Jesus, God pro-
vided a way for the forgiveness of my sins’. The religious, on the other hand, are
shown as believing that one must also do some amount of ‘good works’ to be
saved. Evangelicals root this teaching in Jesus Christ’s own teaching against
the Pharisees throughout the New Testament and can be particularly critical
of forms of Christianity (particularly Catholicism) which include some notion
of ‘good works’ in addition to salvation by grace.
In the video, however, although Yokeup draws on this standard narrative in
Evangelical Christianity, the two users he singles out are both also Evangelical
Christians who appear to hold the same belief as Yokeup in regard to salvation
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by grace alone. The categories that he uses, ‘religious’ and ‘saved’, then carry
with them not only the negative value he ascribes to them in his talk through
the descriptions of the negative category-bound activities attributed to the cate-
gory ‘religious’, but also fixed notions of ‘religious’ Christians that users may al-
ready have. By employing the category as well as his own description of catego-
ry-bound activities, Yokeup is able to link what appears to already be a
stabilised, negative evaluation of certain kinds of Christians by Evangelicals
with his own mobilisation of the term, built on categorisations that are emergent
in his talk. The result is a negative evaluation through a category that is both sta-
bilised and remade in the context.
3) Metaphor provided the affordance of ambiguity, creating more flexible cat-
egorisation that did not include empirically verifiable descriptions.
What is particularly interesting about Yokeup’s use of the ‘fashion show’
metaphor in describing Paula and Paula’s church is the inability to precisely
identify when a church would be behaving in this way. Unlike statements of be-
lief in which clear, canonised disagreements might be identified (particularly be-
tween denominations), it’s unclear what empirical criteria might be applied to
distinguish ‘religious’ churches and people from ‘saved’ people. The ‘fashion
show’ church is contrasted with the ‘truck stop’ church. Although the church
does meet in a truck stop, the description of it as a ‘truck stop’ church suggests
a different environment than a fashion show, with different members from differ-
ent class backgrounds. The difference between the two is both readily accessible
in the metaphors used, provided the viewer has a basic knowledge of both the
fashion show and the truck stop concepts, and fundamentally obscured, even
as Yokeup goes on to describe the members of his own church. Yokeup says
that attendees of his own church are ‘hungry for the word of God’, another met-
aphorical description that is also not explicitly described. Rather, the categorisa-
tions seem to be built on his impressions of both churches and groups of believ-
ers rather than observed doctrinal differences.
The difference, however, is performed by Yokeup as he stands in his front
yard in a sleeveless t-shirt, having just returned from working out and with
his heavily tattooed arms clearly displayed. By tying himself to the truck stop
church and presenting himself as not caring about outward appearances, Yokeup
is able to distance himself from the ‘religious’, both in his description of his own
church and his appearance. In performing authenticity in this way and describ-
ing his religious experience in terms of ‘listening to the word of God’, he suggests
that his interpretation of God’s word is more accurate because it is more authen-
tic, particularly as he hasn’t done anything to present it or himself in a false way.
He, in contrast to jezuzfreek777 and in the same manner as Jesus, doesn’t care
about the perception of others, only about listening to the word of God. Yokeup
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performs his affiliation with Jesus further by embodying the voice of Jesus in his
own voice and colloquial expressions, presenting himself as not only aligned
with the teachings of Jesus but speaking in the same aggressive, simple way.
Conversely, when speaking in the voice of jezuzfreek777, Yokeup presents an in-
dividual focused on popularity and numbers of viewers, a clear contrast to
Jesus and Yokeup.
5 Conclusion
Membership categorisation and metaphor analysis reveal that Yokeup mobilised
two recognised categories in Evangelical Christian discourse, ‘saved’ and ‘reli-
gious’, to position himself and other Christians in the drama episode, but that
the criteria he employed to make these categorisations were dynamic and de-
pendent on descriptions of other users rather than fixed descriptions of denomi-
nations or articles of belief. The subsequent comments revealed that Yokeup’s
categories were recognised and accepted by others in response, but that there
was disagreement over how Yokeup had categorised others. The analysis also
showed that metaphor use in categorisation created ambiguity about precisely
what activity was acceptable or not and allowed Yokeup to present the behaviour
of others as inappropriate for ‘saved’ Christians without clear, specific bounda-
ries for appropriate or inappropriate actions. The analysis suggests that, rather
than belief or conventional denominational affiliations or particular theological
positions, the extent to which Yokeup recognised the actions of others as similar
to his own descriptions of proper behaviour dictated his categorisation of and,
consequently, his affiliation with or opposition to other users.
Given the relatively small amount of data included in this analysis, precau-
tions must be taken to applying any findings on a larger scale. Indeed, although
the dramatic episode was part of a longitudinal observation period, the extent to
which the findings apply to this group of users alone is unknown. More work is
needed to investigate the extent to which dynamic categorisation plays a role in
YouTube discourse more generally or whether other groups of users engage more
readily with traditional denominational categories. Still, the findings seem to
suggest that particular YouTube contexts provide challenges to traditional
means of thinking about religious or denominational affiliation. If users in the
dataset were less concerned with established means of identifying belief and
more with descriptions of actions on the site, it seems that, at least in this
small dataset, which belief statement one claims to adhere to is ultimately less
important than how others perceive one’s online activity. If this is indeed the
case in a broader context, it requires a rethinking of the role of denominational
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affiliation online and new theories for describing how users of faith identify and
affiliate with like-minded users in online fora like YouTube.
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Heidi A. Campbell and Drake Fulton
Bounded Religious Communities’
Management of the Challenge of New
Media: Baha’í Negotiation with the Internet
The negotiation of new forms of media by religious groups is a dynamic and
complex process that involves decision-making engaging the history, tradition
and beliefs of the community. This negotiation process is especially complex
for bounded religious communities, which establish rigid social and value-
laden boundaries allowing them to create and maintain a unique and separate
cultural system. Observing how members of bounded religious communities in-
teract with the Internet enables us to consider how some groups resist the fluid-
ity of networked relations and instead use technology to maintain closed social
structures and solidify their unique identities. This is clearly seen in the case of
the Bahá’í faith, especially in the patterns of use and limits American Bahá’ís
have developed to engage with the Internet. By using the Religious Social Shap-
ing of Technology approach, developed by Campbell (2010), as a lens to explore
the challenges and choices made by the Bahá’ís, this process of technological ne-
gotiation is unpacked.
1 Bounded religious community and new media
Bounded community is a term used to describe groups who live within a fixed
geographic region and/or possess strict ideological boundaries limiting their en-
gagement with outside groups. It has also been used to as a way to discuss ten-
sions that arise between groups attempting to maintain tight identity structures
in light of the increasingly permeable social boundaries of a networked society.
Describing a group as a bounded community can be challenging. In one sense
all communities are bounded, in that all communities possess certain bounda-
ries related to their quintessential characteristics, such as membership, identity
or locality. In the 1980s, identifying a group as a bounded community within the
sociology of community studies became a way to distinguish traditional com-
munities constrained by geography and familial small-scale relations with
more contemporary notions of community as a network of social relations
where boundaries are permeable (Wellman 1979; 1988). It also draws on the no-
tion that all communities are symbolically constructed, and their identity forma-
tion and presentation is based on varying degrees of boundary maintenance in
order to maintain the desired continuity of community (Cohen 1965). Bounded
communities thus become a way to talk about certain normative inclinations
of groups, such as constraints forming the basis for identity construction, organ-
ization and control of people, materials and territories (Linklater 1988: 133).
The notion of a bounded community is important when considering certain
forms of religious community. It is useful as it denotes those religious groups
which seek to live within a constrained social and cultural system that seeks
to resist the forces and patterns of life within modern networked society. In
this chapter the concept of the bounded community draws attention to the
fact that some religious groups actively seek to mark out and protect their iden-
tities in a cultural milieu that encourages fluidity of identity and relations over
static and controlled ones.
Researchers have found that the ambiguity and fluidity of postmodern cul-
ture encourages the creation of hybrid or blended cultural spaces among
many groups that were traditionally tightly-knit groups, such as ethnic minori-
ties (e.g.,Waldinger 2007). This ambiguity is accentuated by the social affordan-
ces of digital technology that can make it difficult to retain a cohesive identity
structure. Increasingly, religious community leaders struggle to monitor the prac-
tices and interactions of their members with external sources, as the Internet can
make it easier for members to bypass traditional gatekeepers and channels of
control (Livio and Teneboim 2007). This struggle raises provocative questions
about how new media technologies such as the Internet are impacting commun-
ity authority and power relations, especially conservative and fundamentalist
groups’ negotiation with the Internet (Howard 2000; Shandler 2009). In order
to carefully consider how bounded communities negotiate new media usage
we turn to the social shaping of technology, which we argue provides a clear
frame for studying this phenomenon.
2 The social shaping of technology as a frame for
understanding media appropriation
One way to approach how bounded communities negotiate their use of new
media technologies is through the lens of the social shaping of technology.
This approach frames technology as a product of the interplay between different
technical and social factors in both design and use (MacKenzie and Wajcman
2001). Technology use and creation is seen as a social process. Social groups
shape technologies towards their own ends rather than the character of a tech-
nology determining its use and outcomes. Scholars taking this approach exam-
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ine how social processes within a particular group influence user negotiations
with different technologies. It acknowledges that groups employ a given technol-
ogy in distinctive ways, so a group’s technology use is unique, and their appro-
priation reinforces valued patterns of community life or practice.
In order to understand how religious communities and individuals negotiate
their choices related to new forms of media technology, it is necessary to study
these groups’ choices in relation to religious norms and social factors which
guide their technological decision-making. This is referred to as the religious-so-
cial shaping of technology approach, which attempts to give an account of the
specific conditions influencing a community of users’ negotiations with a tech-
nology that can lead to changes in use or belief within a given social context.
It also attempts to explain responses to new technology in socio-technological
terms. In other words, the success, failure or redesign of a given technology
by a specific group of users is based not simply on the innate qualities of the
technology but on the ability of users to socially construct the technology in
line with the moral economy of the user community or context. It recognises
that individuals and groups of actors within particular social situations see
their choices and options constrained by broader structural elements of their
worldview and belief system.
3 The religious-social shaping of technology
approach to media
Based on extensive online and offline ethnographic research regarding how var-
ious religious user communities engage media technology, it has been observed
that religious communities typically do not reject new forms of technology out-
right, even if the communities they come from are highly bounded or controlled
groupings. Rather, they undergo a sophisticated negotiation process to deter-
mine what effect technology may have on their community. If a religious com-
munity sees a new technology as valuable but notes its use may promote beliefs
or behaviours that run counter to their community’s values, the group must care-
fully consider what aspects of that technology must be resisted. This resistance
often leads to the reconstruction of the technology regarding either how it is
used or discussed within the community. It may even lead to innovation,
where technical aspects or structures are modified so that they are more in
line with the community’s social and religious life. The religious-social shaping
of technology approach is offered as a way to investigate and analyse the prac-
tical and ideological negotiation process these communities undergo. This ap-
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proach is outlined in detail in the textWhen Religion Meets New Media (Campbell
2010) and involves scholars employing four levels of examination in relation to
the specific group being studied: (1) the history and tradition of the community,
(2) its core beliefs and patterns related to media, (3) the specific negotiation proc-
esses it undergoes with a new technology, and finally (4) the communal framing
and discourses created by them, which are used to define and justify the extent
of their technology use and the way they will or will not engage certain media.
Together, these form the basis of the religious-social shaping of technology the-
oretical approach to the study of religious communities’ use of media, which is
described below.
As suggested, taking a religious-social shaping of technology approach be-
gins with studying the history and tradition of a given religious community in re-
lation to their media use. Here, researchers start by carefully considering the his-
torical context of the specific religious community under study to see how a
religious community’s positions toward and use of different media have emerged
over time and what decisions or events in the community history might have
shaped these decisions. It is important to note that decisions made regarding
texts, one of the earliest forms of media, often serve as a template for future ne-
gotiation with other media. In this phase of study, researchers should pay atten-
tion to how history and tradition form standards and a trajectory for future
media negotiations.
This leads to investigating religious communities’ core beliefs and patterns,
where attention is paid to how these specific communities live out their core so-
cial values. It is important to note that while beliefs are often derived from a his-
torically grounded tradition, they must always be contextualised and applied
anew to the social, cultural and historic context in which a given community
finds itself. Researchers should identify how a community’s dominant social
and religious values are integrated into patterns of contemporary life and how
these might influence their interactions with contemporary technologies. In an
age of digital technologies, close attention must be paid to how core beliefs
guide communal decision-making processes related to media use and what pat-
terns of use this encourages and discourages.
These two areas set the stage for the study of the negotiation process that re-
ligious communities undergo when faced with a new form of media. Religious
communities must consider in what respect the new form of media mirrors
past technologies so that old rules can be applied. If qualities, outcomes or so-
cial conditions created by the technology are problematic in any way for the
group, the community must enter into a rigorous negotiation process to see
what aspects of the technology can be accepted and which ones might need
to be rejected or reconstructed.
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Innovation takes place if a technology is viewed as valuable but possesses
problematic qualities requiring it to be altered in order to be more in line with
community beliefs and practices. Researchers consider how the previous phases
inform a community’s choices and responses to the new technology when con-
sidering the ways in which a new technology is accepted, rejected and/or recon-
structed. Key to this stage is the community’s positions towards authority roles
and structures, which can indicate who has the right to govern media decision-
making processes and involvement in innovation.
Finally, attention must be paid to communal framing and discourse resulting
from the adoption of the new media form. This is a stage often overlooked in
studies of the social-shaping of technology, yet it plays an important role for re-
ligious communities in their internal justification for their approach to new
media. Researchers should consider how new technologies may require amend-
ments to previous language about media or how official policies regarding tech-
nology are constructed and publicized. The negotiation and adoption of new
technologies requires the religious group to create public and private discourses
that validate their technology choices in light of established community bounda-
ries, values and identities. The communal discourse can also serve as tool for re-
affirming traditions and past standards as well as for setting a new trajectory for
the future use or negotiation of technology. Thus, it is important for researchers
to pay attention to the language used by a religious community to frame technol-
ogy and prescribe communal use. Together, these four levels of inquiry make up
the religious-social shaping of technology approach to show how multiple social
and structural processes influence religious groups’ responses to new media.
4 Negotiation between the Baha’i faith and the
Internet
Investigating the American Bahá’í community shows the complex process reli-
gious groups undergo in their negotiations with new forms of media. This exami-
nation of their history, tradition, core beliefs and reactions to older forms of
media provides a clear basis for understanding this religious group’s current re-
sponse to the Internet.
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4.1 History and tradition
The negotiation of new forms of media by religious groups is a dynamic and
complex process that begins with reflection on the religious history, tradition
and beliefs of the group. In the case of the Bahá’í faith, it is important to consid-
er how this history has directly affected the negotiation process that practicing
Bahá’ís in America have with the Internet. The Bábí movement began in 1844
in the city of Shiraz, located in south-western Iran. In this year, Sayyid ‘Ali Mu-
hammad declared having had ‘some sort of extraordinary relationship with the
Hidden Imam’ (Cole 1990: 3). The Hidden Imam, or Mahdi, is believed to be the
redeemer or messiah by Shi’a Muslims and is believed to help restore order and
peace to the world. Sayyid ’Ali Muhammad, also known as the Báb, was seen as
a divine messenger (similar to Moses, Muhammad, Jesus, etc.) by his followers
and remains the central figure of the Bahá’í faith. According to Cole, members
of the Bábí movement believed the Báb was ‘the return of the Imam Mahdi him-
self, and he asserted that divine inspiration led him to reveal a new holy book
abrogating the Quran’ (1990: 3). The belief that the Báb was the manifestation
of the Hidden Imam to return and their ‘abrogation’ of the Qur’an were problem-
atic to many practising Muslims and led to the persecution of the individuals as-
sociated with the Bábí movement in the nineteenth century. According Adam
Berry (2004: 1), the Bábí movement was met with much resistance, as shown
by the execution of the Báb in1850. Further proof of persecution can be seen
by the number of followers killed between 1849 and the mid-1850s. Around
5,000 followers were killed during that period, in which the adherents to the
movement numbered 100,000 (Cole 1990: 3). After the death of the Báb, Mirza
Husayn ‘Ali, the successor of the Báb, adopted the Bahá’í name in an attempt
unify the members and survive persecution in Iran. Not only would this history
of persecution affect the way Bahá’ís view media, it would also help shape the
faith’s core beliefs and where these beliefs would be practised.
In an attempt to escape the persecution prevalent in Iran, many Bahá’ís
moved to new areas in an attempt to practise their religion peacefully. With
the idea of the Bahá’í faith symbolising ‘threatening aspects of modernity’ in
Iran, Bahá’ís looked to the western world for new opportunities (Cole 1990: 7).
From the 1970s to the mid-1980s, around 12,000 Iranian Bahá’ís emigrated to
the US to escape persecution, taking advantage of the religious freedom in Amer-
ica. With this migration of Iranian Bahá’ís, the US Bahá’í community grew from
10,000 to about 48,000 individuals with confirmed addresses, or ‘sure members’
(Cole 1998: 238). According to Juan Cole, this growth can be explained by ‘the
impact of the civil rights movements, the Vietnam War, the youth counterculture’
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(Cole 1998: 236). Currently, there are around 60,000 practising Bahá’ís in the US,¹
and many rely on the Internet to stay connected to the faith. This idea will be ex-
plored in depth in the media use negotiation section.
It is also important to note that, as the Baha’i faith emerged out of Shi’a
Islam in Iran, these roots and connections in some respects have informed the
faith. Scholars have noted a connection between the Baha’i and the Shiite move-
ments, in that both draw from esoteric and charismatic roots, have a defined hi-
erarchical structure of gatekeepers and represent conservative traditions with a
certain degree of secrecy in relation to religious knowledge (Warburg 1999).
These tendencies can also be seen in their dealings with the spread of informa-
tion, both inside and outside the community, and their position toward media,
as discussed in the following sections. Before moving on to how members of
the Bahá’í faith currently negotiate their relationship with the media, it is vital
to address the core beliefs and the religion’s relationship to authority. According
to the official Bahá’í Website of the United States, the purpose of life is to ‘wor-
ship God, to acquire virtues, and to promote the oneness of humankind’ (2010).
These beliefs directly influence the Bahá’ís’ relationship with other religions
which strive for religious universalism. Furthermore, Bahá’ís advocate for service
to humanity while maintaining a peaceful and pacifist nature. In relation to so-
cial principles, Bahá’ís desire the equality of men and women, universal educa-
tion and the abandonment of all forms of prejudice. The final factor that directs
how the media is treated by practising Bahá’ís is seen in the administrative order
of the Bahá’ís community. The formation of an individual order of adherence to a
hierarchy occurred in 1921 after the death of Abbás Effendi, who was the son of
the first successor to the Báb (Cole 1990: 3). Examples of how these structure the
hierarchy of the Bahá’ís community and inform their view of media are explored
in greater detail in the next section.
4.2 Media values and policies
Along with the history and tradition of the Bahá’í faith, the core values directly
lead to more unified policies towards the uses of media. In order to achieve such
beliefs as religious universalism and universal education, Bahá’ís thought it
would be important to make the transition from an individual order to an admin-
 According to the American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS 2004), there were an esti-
mated 84,000 adult Bahá’í members. The difference between these figures may be accounted for
in the word ‘practising’ as opposed to membership.
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istrative order. An example of an administrative body in the Bahá’í faith is the
Universal House of Justice. Established in 1963, the Universal House of Justice
has guided and directed the activities of the global Bahá’í community for over
40 years. By educating followers on how to practise and live their faith, the Uni-
versal House of Justice determines which activities are permitted based on the
laws of Mirza Husayn ’Ali (the first successor of the Báb and founder of the
Bahá’í faith).
Even though the core values, beliefs and admiration of the Bahá’í faith are
related to the creation of the Universal House of Justice, the preceding history
and tradition of the Bahá’í faith have contributed to a strict media trajectory.
As mentioned above, many practicing Bahá’ís in Iran experienced heavy perse-
cution for their beliefs. Many viewed the western world as an opportunity to
practice their religion in peace and to educate others about the Bahá’í faith.
However, along with more rights and freedoms has come criticism of Bahá’í pol-
icies by Bahá’í followers in the western world. To counter these criticisms, the
Universal House of Justice has increased restrictions of certain types of media
usage. For example, through the use of National Spiritual Assemblies, which
are located throughout the Bahá’í world, the Universal House of Justice has cen-
sored or restricted material published by Bahá’ís. Cole states that the ‘National
Spiritual Assembly claims the prerogative of telling private Bahá’í publishers
what Bahá’í-related books they may or may not publish’. This shows the impor-
tance of the core Bahá’í belief of having ‘conformity of views and behavior’ and
how it has been directly challenged by the freedoms shared in the western world
(Cole 1998: 244).
In relation to this, the Universal House of Justice has not only produced strict
policies on media content but also on individuals who produce media content
that challenges existing Bahá’í policies. One of the mechanisms used by the Uni-
versal House of Justice to achieve unification and conformity is the threat of la-
belling someone a ‘covenant-breaker’. Basically, a person accused of covenant-
breaking has committed a form of heresy and is shunned by the practising com-
munity. One who even associates with a covenant-breaker can possibly be shun-
ned and not recognised by the community. This has led to Bahá’ís ‘informing’ the
House of Justice of individuals who undermine its policies. ‘The House of Justice
encourages Bahá’ís who hear something they think out of the ordinary to chal-
lenge the speaker to justify his or her statement with regard to the covenant’
(cited in Cole 1998: 244). This directly affects what kind of content can be pro-
duced and expressed through the media because of the fear of being labelled
a covenant-breaker.
The actions and policies created by the House of Justice reveal how the
Bahá’í faith negotiates and teaches the Bahá’í how to use media. Due to the
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availability of freedoms in the western world, the House of Justice took strong
stances against criticizing opinions expressed in the media. One mechanism ad-
dressed above was the use of labelling someone a covenant-breaker and how
this has led to an ‘informing’ culture by practicing Bahá’ís. ‘Although Baha’u’llah
(or Mirza Husayn ’Ali) himself attempted to abolish the practices of shunning’,
the House of Justice enforces these policies to achieve the core belief of unifica-
tion (Cole 1998: 243). The work of the House of Justice also sets standards for
media engagement, which guide Bahá’ís’ views about and uses of the Internet.
This media negotiation is explored in more detail in the third area of investiga-
tion.
4.3 Media use negotiation
In order to understand how the history, tradition and core beliefs affect the
media use negotiation by the Bahá’í faith, it is important to focus in on a specific
community and media. Examining the Bahá’í faith community in America re-
veals how this specific branch of the Baha’i community negotiates its Internet
usage and how this has been informed by the Universal House of Justice. In
order to fully understand how the American Community of Bahá’ís use the Inter-
net, it is imperative to examine the Bahá’í Internet Agency. This agency was es-
tablished in 2004 by the Universal House of Justice, the legislative institution
and the highest governing body of the Bahá’í faith, and is under the auspices
of its International Teaching Centre. The Bahá’í Internet Agency (BIA) seeks to
advise and direct members of the Bahá’í faith on how to properly use the Internet
as well as offer assistance to the global community through technical support for
Bahá’í institutions and to support community-related online initiatives. The BIA
has also written a number of documents that provide members with specific
guidance about appropriate Internet use, such as blogging, podcasting and so-
cial networking (see BIA n.d.).
Bahá’ís in the United States currently have ‘official’ pages on Facebook, Twit-
ter, Beliefnet and PeaceNext where they post Bahá’í news as well as links to
blogs from various bloggers who discuss Bahá’í themes. The US Bahá’í Office
of Communications advocates the use of the Internet, yet this use is encouraged
or framed within certain constraints. One key emphasis of this office is to encour-
age community members to engage with the Internet in ways that affirm the be-
liefs and structures of the movement. They strongly advocate that members seek
information from web sites which are published and maintained by the official
organization and engage in dialogue in these contexts:
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Baha’is are encouraged to participate in a wide range of Internet initiatives carried out in
light of Bahá’í principles such as moderation, courtesy, probity, fairness, dignity, accuracy
and wisdom. Promoting mutual understanding, fellowship and a spirit of cooperation
among diverse individuals and groups is an essential characteristic of all Bahá’í activity.
(US Bahá’í Office of Communications 2010)
A further examination of this agency reveals the restrictions Bahá’í faith mem-
bers in the US face while using the Internet. The Internet is an essential part of
any organisation in America due to the high number of users in this country. As
of December 2011, according to the Internet World Statistics (2011), the United
States has over 245,000,000 users (with a population penetration of 78.6 %), nu-
merically second only to China (penetration of 38.4 %), with over half-a-billion
users.
In order to understand how the Bahá’í Internet Agency has reconfigured the
usage of the Internet, it is important to examine which aspects of the Internet are
beneficial and which are problematic. One activity that seems to be deemed both
beneficial and problematic by the Bahá’í community in the US is the use of blog-
ging. According to the Bahá’í Internet Agency’s white paper on ‘Blogging and the
Bahá’í faith: suggestions and possible approaches’ (2006), blogging ‘offers op-
portunities to explore Bahá’í teachings’ and ‘opens new avenues for sharing
the message’ of the Bahá’í faith. Furthermore, the Agency advocates that ‘indi-
vidual blogging’ allows for a ‘community of interest to the Revelation and to
Bahá’í community activity’.
However, there are some aspects that the American Bahá’ís must reject with
regard to blogging, as outlined by the Bahá’í Internet Agency. One of the aspects
discouraged for practising Bahá’ís is the use of confrontational and negative dis-
cussion threads on the Internet. This includes any blog post that is seen to un-
dermine or challenge Bahá’í policies or beliefs, which is to be ignored/deleted. If
the blogger who makes negative claims happens to be a practising Bahá’í, he/she
can be labelled as a covenant-breaker and shunned by the community. Cole ex-
plains that ‘threats to use shunning’ have increased with ‘the rise of cyberspace’
(1998: 243). The Internet allows some members to post confidentially so other
practising Bahá’ís will not know who they are. In response to this, the Universal
House of Justice has encourage Bahá’ís to ‘inform’ them of members partaking in
these restricted actions. Such moves show how the Universal House of Justice
has reconfigured the Internet and encouraged certain actions to achieve the
core belief of unification and adherence to the given structure.
Another problematic aspect for followers of the Bahá’í faith that has
emerged on the Internet is the use of social networking sites in the US. Although
many social networking sites, such as Facebook, attempt to connect people from
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around the world, there have been many concerns about the association of Ba-
há’ís with covenant-breakers. One specific example of this problematic activity is
outlined on truebahai.com (Weinberg 2008). According to the website, the Bahá’í
Internet Agency sent an e-mail out on 28 February 2008 to alert members to the
current activities of a specific covenant-breaker who ran an unauthorized ‘Ortho-
dox Bahá’í page on Facebook’, which was perceived to be threatening to the ‘spi-
ritual well-being’ of practising Bahá’í youth members (Weinburg 2008). What is
interesting is that simply accepting a friend request from this individual is seen
as a community violation, as being in association with a covenant-breaker (see
BIA n.d.). Through the Bahá’í Internet Agency, the meaning of a (cyber) friend-
ship on Facebook is redefined to be equivalent to a personal, face-to-face friend-
ship. This demonstrates how the Bahá’í must negotiate with online culture and
bring online communication in line with traditional religious practice and ex-
pectations of behaviour in order for the technology to fit comfortably within ac-
cepted community values.
4.4 Communal discourse
Finally, religious communities often develop policies or guidelines that present
their official view or perceptions of the Internet and advocate particular uses.
The aim of this communal discourse regarding the Internet is not merely instruc-
tive for community members; it also serves as an identity narrative – to affirm
the values and boundaries of the community. In the case of the Bahá’í commun-
ity, the Universal House of Justice serves an important role in policing and offer-
ing prescriptive guidelines for media activity and has attempted to encourage
certain forms of Internet engagement so that members’ use will not undermine
Bahá’í policies and beliefs. A notable discourse has been produced through the
work of the Bahá’í Internet Agency, who provide information on how to use the
Internet through issuing a number of white papers on a variety of issues related
to online communication, as noted above.
A key role of the Bahá’í Internet Agency is to circulate official statements
about Internet communication issued by the Universal House of Justice. These
documents advocate a particular relationship between the Bahá’í community
and electronic, digital communication technologies, one which supports core
communal values, such as unity in diversity and service to humanity. The Inter-
net is framed as offering the community new opportunities and challenges, such
that the published and thus accepted wisdom of their religious leaders should be
consulted when making decisions regarding the Internet. As stated in the docu-
ment ‘Guidelines for Internet Communication’:
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The opportunity which electronic communication technology provides is for more speedy
and thorough consultation among friends, and is highly significant. Without doubt, it rep-
resents another manifestation of a development eagerly anticipated by the Guardian when
he foresaw the creation of ‘a mechanism of world intercommunication […] embracing the
whole planet, freed from national hindrances and restrictions, and functioning with mar-
vellous swiftness and perfect regularity’. (BIA n.d.)
Official white papers also provide guidance to individual community members
seeking to use the Internet to represent their beliefs and the community online.
‘Members are to be mindful of how their online activities bear witness to the
Bahá’í faith’, according to the document ‘Individual initiative on the Internet’
(2007). It continues:
Internet initiatives should of course be carried out in light of Bahá’í principles such as mod-
eration, courtesy, probity, fairness, dignity, accuracy and wisdom [… T]he Internet is yet one
more domain in which Bahá’ís should demonstrate etiquette of expression worthy of the
approaching maturity of the human race – a maturity founded on the oneness and whole-
ness of human relationships. (BIA 2007)
Thus, members are exhorted to reflect the community in a positive light through
mirroring core values. These white papers often emphasise core Bahá’í beliefs
and teachings of religious figures as a basis for online decision making. By re-
leasing statements such as the ones above, the Universal House of Justice at-
tempts to define how the Internet should be used by all practicing Bahá’ís (Uni-
versal House of Justice 1995). Such statements not only provide Bahá’ís with
guidelines for behaviour within specific online contexts but also affirm core val-
ues regarding how individuals should present their community identity in public
contexts. For example, individual Bahá’ís are not forbidden to be involved in un-
official forums, but these performances should reflect the character of the com-
munity.
In general, the House of Justice has no objection to Bahá’ís participating in
public, unmoderated discussions about the faith, whether those discussions take
place in person or through some form of electronic communication. The wisdom
of participating in particular discussions must, of necessity, depend upon cir-
cumstances prevailing at the time. When, through such discussions, the faith
is attacked or erroneous information about it is disseminated, it may become
necessary for individual Bahá’ís to actively defend it (BIA n.d.).
This is affirmed in a 2009 statement issued by the Bahá’í Internet Agency,
‘Responding to Criticism and Opposition on the Internet’, which states that
Bahá’í use of the Internet should reflect the teachings of Bahá’u’lláh:
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Internet initiatives by Bahá’ís should therefore aim to broaden vision concerning challeng-
ing spiritual and social questions, shape discourse in a unifying way, and emphasize the
potentialities and promise of the present moment in human affairs. When harnessed in
this way, the Internet can become a vehicle for promoting mutual understanding and learn-
ing, serving others, instilling hope about the human condition, and demonstrating recti-
tude of conduct. (BIA 2009)
The U.S. Bahá’í Office of Communications also plays a role in framing the Inter-
net as an important sphere in which Bahá’ís are welcome to engage and offers
suggestions regarding how this should be done:
The increasingly participatory nature of Internet activity is providing novel and creative
ways of exploring the compelling message of spiritual and social transformation as taught
by Bahá’u’lláh, the Founder of the Bahá’í Faith. Bahá’ís around the globe are using the In-
ternet to give expression to the many facets of their belief in an open and imaginative man-
ner, including on blogs and social networking sites. (US Bahá’í Office of Communications
2010)
However, this is a contextualised engagement, as evidenced by the documents
provided by the Universal House of Justice that give prescriptive instructions
on such topics as how Internet discussion related to issues of Bahá’í faith should
be maintained and moderated online as well as how Bahá’í members should be-
have online as representatives of the community in the online world. Thus, offi-
cial discourse regarding use of and engagement with the Internet serves as a
space to reiterate and strengthen the religious identity of the Bahá’í community.
Therefore community documents and policy statements such as those highlight-
ed here help reaffirm community distinctiveness and contribute to the construc-
tion or maintenance of a desired public image within the age of the Internet.
5 Reflections on a bounded community’s
management of new media
Undertaking these four levels of inquiry demonstrates that American Bahá’ís
have a distinctive negotiation with the Internet, which is guided by their core be-
liefs and the particular value of unity and which official sources seek to exem-
plify through their use of the Internet and how they encourage their members
to represent themselves online. Their strict adherence to a certain structure
and hierarchy within the offline structure of the community is in many respects
simply replicated and encouraged online. As has been shown in this brief explo-
ration, the Bahá’í community’s Universal House of Justice has attempted to re-
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configure the usage and negotiation of the Internet in an effort to achieve ideo-
logical unification of motivations and practices in a context which blends the on-
line and offline contexts. Examples of this reconfiguration are evident in the cre-
ation of the Bahá’í Internet Agency, which seeks to direct practicing Bahá’ís on
how to properly use the Internet in relation to Bahá’í beliefs. Their white papers
not only provide guidelines for Internet use but also lead community members
back to the teachings of the Báb and therefore reaffirm core community beliefs
and frameworks. As the Bahá’í Internet Agency states, ‘The principles of our
Faith offer valuable guideposts in making use of the Internet. […] Bahá’ís need
to learn as much as possible about these new modes of interaction and deter-
mine how the principles of the Faith apply to their use’ (BIA 2006b).
This chapter also shows how a bounded religious community often seeks to
replicate traditional or accepted boundaries and practises of the larger commun-
ity online in order to solidify their established social patterns and behavioural
expectations. It is tradition and established understandings of the identity of a
community and authority structures which guide such groups’ engagement
with technology. The Internet can introduce new challenges for bounded com-
munities, in that it allows community members to interact outside official fo-
rums or systems that enhance individual choice over community accountability
or control. Therefore negotiation processes and discourse frameworks surround-
ing new media become important spaces for religious groups to consciously re-
establish the boundaries of the community and culture or resist and thence en-
counter problematic affordances of the technology. Religious groups desiring to
maintain a bounded social and moral system must carefully consider the extent
to which certain aspects of network culture may run counter to their desired pat-
tern of religious life. Bounded religious communities thus constrain members’
use so that it is both in line with community values and enhances desired struc-
tures or community identity markers. The religious-social shaping of technology
provides a valuable format to study and interrogate these processes of technolog-
ical negotiation and reveals the distinctiveness of a given religious community
that seeks to represent or promote itself in a modern, networked society.
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Anita Greenhill and Gordon Fletcher
Life, Death and Everyday Experience of
Social Media
1 Introduction
Much attention has been given to the development of social media and its rela-
tionship to ‘our’ everyday experiences (e.g., Galloway 2004). The application of
the traditional notion of a face-to-face ‘friend’ is regularly questioned in critical
literature discussing social media use and social networking (Ellison et al. 2007;
Tong et al. 2008), and studies have also indicated that at least younger genera-
tions have the ability to work with multiple media simultaneously, which makes
social media an increasingly central aspect of their daily experience (Thomas
2007; Ware 2008).
The complexities and intricacies of social networking are exemplified and
emphasised by those social networks that have explicitly formed around mourn-
ing, the remembrance of life and unfortunate death. However, while these spe-
cial interest social networks are the most visible and easiest to observe in the
context of cultural rituals concerning death, all of the most popular social net-
works (including, for example, Facebook and Bebo) have been used as sites
for the conduct of these rituals (Carroll and Landry 2010; McCrudy 2010; Fearon
2011). This chapter is an interpretative and observational examination of gone-
toosoon.org – a website that encourages family and friends, as well as complete
strangers, to create memorials, befriend others who have created memorials and
to leave digital tributes. We have utilised gonetoosoon.org as the basis for anal-
ysis as a representative harbinger of digitally based activities for contemporary
mourning rituals. Reimers (1999: 147) emphasises that an ‘aspect of rituals,
and especially of rites de passage, is that they unite participants […] with each
other’. This observation is made in the context of death and mourning, but it
could equally define the pivotal purpose of social networks more generally
and is a preliminary rationale for the close association of specific actions,
such as social network participation, with cultural practices, including mourn-
ing. Myerhoff foreshadows the advent of digitally based mourning by arguing
that the unifying aspects of ritual also create an association ‘with situations
and collectives beyond themselves, such as relatives at other places, ancestors,
and rising generations’ (Myerhoff 1984: 306). Taken together, Reimer’s and
Myerhoff ’s two statements effectively define the raison d’etre for gonetoosoo-
n.org.
In this chapter, we introduce the concept of ‘thananetworking’. This term is
consciously applied in order to dually recognise that the practices being descri-
bed are a subset of social networking more generally as well as that these prac-
tices have a relation with dark tourism or thanatourism (Seaton 1996; Slade
2003; Stone 2005). By exploring thanatourism and thananetworking practices,
we see the persistence of an ongoing human desire to understand and rational-
ise death. Thanatourism most commonly cites Jim Morrison’s graveyard in Paris
and Elvis Presley’s Graceland as two examples of tourist activity that has been
built around the early, untimely deaths of these performers (Ryan and Kohil
2006; Stone and Sharpley 2008). The human (living) ordering and respect for
death provided by graveyards constructs a defined venue for entertainment
(Rugg 2000: 264). The activities and actions associated with visiting these venues
form the basis for thanatourism – shifting and expanding the concept of pilgrim-
age to a form of entertainment, a cultural practice that extends beyond religious
observance and an action that assists in defining a place. Thananetworking has
evolved from the opposite direction – to a similar observable outcome – adapt-
ing the ostensibly entertainment-focussed medium of social networking to the
purpose of pilgrimage and, significantly, taking the ordering principle of memo-
rialising conventionally found in graveyards into a different domain. Looking at
thananetworking is an examination of mourning practices found within digital
environments. These are observable in all social media networks as well as in
specialised sites, including the site of our focus, gonetoosoon.org.
2 Belief and ritual
Story-telling interlocks with other practices as a mechanism for the reinforce-
ment of prevalent and dominant cultural understandings. Stories provide refer-
ence to a plethora of common contemporary operations and experiences that en-
sure an integrated belief system. The belief in immortality amongst most
widespread mainstream religions is equated with the survival and perpetuation
of a conscious soul after death (Levene 2009). GoneTooSoon and other online
memorials are not challenging the nuclear core of traditional beliefs, but rather
are appending and expanding on ancillary beliefs; this is simplistically evi-
denced, for example, by the extended use of ‘angelic’ imagery and ASCII art
on GoneTooSoon. For the majority of memorials on GoneTooSoon, the relation-
ship is to a ‘core’ set of Christian beliefs that are clearly evident and shaped
by the technical capabilities of the site itself, which would make the construction
of any ‘non-Christian’ memorial potentially problematic.
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GoonTooSoon also presents an ‘alternative’ perspective to the mainstream re-
porting of death and murder that similarly brings an ancillary representation to
the core and mainstream of media reporting. The shifting and diminishing power
of traditional media in relation to everyday practice is equally important in un-
derstanding how mourning practices have come to be associated with new ac-
tions and spaces of experience. Many of GoneTooSoon’s memorials capture
and record (through a form of unintentional serialising) recent British social his-
tory, including knife crime in London, gun crime in Manchester, various hate
crimes, the abduction and subsequent murder of teenage girls across England
and the murder of prostitutes by men seeking fame as ‘modern day’ Jack the Rip-
pers. The sensational deaths heavily reported by mainstream media overshadow
memories of individual lives and threaten personal memorials of life with recol-
lections of death and violence. These forms of memorialising create a form of so-
cial memory that potentially brings the fame originally sought by the perpetra-
tors of the murders. Doss (2002: 69) recognises the importance of this
interrelationship of media and mourning in relation to ‘terrorist’ attacks on US
territory: ‘The images, artefacts and rituals of these visibly public death-shrines
in Oklahoma City and Littleton framed issues of memory, tribute and collectivity
in contemporary America; their visual and performative dimensions clearly em-
bodied a vast collaboration of mourners and media’. Rituals of memorialising
and mourning within ostensibly Christian societies have become more and
more spectacular as the actions associated with them have shifted beyond the
boundaries of the formal graveyard, private household or wake to occupy
more public spaces, including road-sides and social networks. The potential out-
come for the association of mourning with the constant cultural desire for par-
ticipation in and observation of spectacle is an obsession that approaches the
teleological fatalism well-evidenced historically in a range of cultures, but
most famously in Pharaonic Egypt (Meskell 2001). The contemporary need for
all life experiences to be articulated in the form of (social) media spectacle
that was predicted by Debord (1995) also influences the ways in which death
is mourned – and particularly deaths that fall outside the ‘norm’ of old age.
The GoneTooSoon memorial website – as well as many of the memorials
found on other popular networking sites such as Facebook and Bebo – articu-
lates the interrelationship of grieving practices, expressed through actions
such as social networking, with the imperatives of fame-oriented culture as
well as the fundamental duality of life and death. Similarly the increasingly
wide boundaries of acceptability and decency within contemporary culture
(Thompson 2011), itself influenced by cultural obsessions with fame and exacer-
bated by the ready availability of network technologies, mean that many memo-
rials are detailed and graphic in focusing on the details of the person’s death
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rather than those of life. This has been aggravated on GoneTooSoon with the ad-
dition of memorials focused on some of the media’s most highlighted murders in
recent UK history by the site’s ‘Admin’, which has no direct family or friendship
connection with the individuals recognised by the memorial.
By utilising the methods of ethnographic observation and examining the
combined evidence offered through document analysis and direct presence in
the spaces that evidence thananetworking cultural practices, this chapter ex-
plores the complexities and intricacies of social networking around mourning,
the remembrance of life and of sensational death. While recognising that there
is a shift in specific cultural actions (moving from the use of a gravestone to
forms of digital momento mori), there remains a continuity of cultural practices
at a number of levels (including recording vital details and the relationships of
the person remembered). This chapter extends the theoretical proposals of boyd
and Potter (2003), where the ‘real and virtual’ spaces of social networking are
separated, arguing that cultural practices shape and mediate cultural experien-
ces, irrespective of the place in which they are undertaken. Culture and the prac-
tices through which it is expressed continue to change and evolve, irrespective of
the mediating presence of wires and networks. The differences – if differences
are to be sought – between traditional and contemporary practice of mourning
are found in the speed, frequency and accessibility of specific actions. This dif-
ference has provided immediate higher visibility for social campaigns founded
as a memorial to a deceased family member, such as S.O.P.H.I.E (www.sophie-
lancasterfoundation.com) – a modern version of the traditional miracle – a
form of bringing back from the dead a loved one, in name at least. An equally
significant question raised by the popularity of gonetoosoon.org is how digital
spaces offer wider potential for the construction of associations through simple
linkages and mutual mourning. When the relatives of murdered teenagers –
whose deaths become well documented through mass and social media – asso-
ciate themselves through tributes with the deaths of celebrities, the meaning of
this association and the role it performs in the individual personal grieving proc-
ess becomes problematised. This observation echoes Doss (2002: 64), who
claims:
Contemporary debate surrounding abortion, AIDS, euthanasia and gun control, however,
as well as increased popular interest in ‘good death’, the afterlife and bereavement therapy,
suggest the questioning and perhaps the lifting of certain death-related taboos. By exten-
sion, visibly public material culture rituals pertaining to death and grief suggest broad
and diverse interests in ‘reclaiming’ death, in making death meaningful on personal, indi-
vidual levels.
Riches and Dawson (1998: 144–5) claim:
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The portrayal of death in modem society serves a cultural and symbolic purpose. Individ-
uals whose lives have been unremarkable may gain fame if their death is extraordinary.
Newsworthiness lies in the ‘sensational’ nature of the death and in [audiences’] identifica-
tion with the ‘ordinary’ lives it has devastated. These stories contain messages about how
individuals grieve, offering the public examples of socially appropriate reactions (Walter,
1996) whose lives have been unremarkable.
These processes and approaches to death have evolved to become increasingly
clearly articulated within the GoneTooSoon environment and are the underpin-
ning basis for thananetworking.
3 Contemporary culture and death
Discussions of the rituals and practices associated with death and dying are
well-rehearsed and remain a source of continued interest for a broad range of
social science researchers (Hart et al. 1998; Gibson 2004; Gibson 2007). As
more time is spent in the digital domain and a variety of intimate and public cul-
tural displays are extended into these spaces, it is increasingly appropriate to
critically examine what links to traditional rituals and practices are being dis-
played in the virtual domain. This examination necessarily includes considera-
tion of the mechanisms by which mythological belief systems are constructed,
reconstructed and perpetuated. We take up this examination by exploring the
problematisation of ritualised actions and cultural meanings being presented
online that have been reconstructed from conventional and traditional rituals as-
sociated with death. In particular, within thananetworking practice there is an
identifiable blurring of the meanings of fame and infamy and of the boundaries
between public and private forms of grieving and emotional displays. Thananet-
working, along with roadside memorials and other memorialising of death, also
moves the conduct of mourning rituals beyond clearly defined domestic or ‘sa-
cred’ places. Doss (2002: 80) sees this as a cultural shift: ‘The visual and material
culture of grief in contemporary America seems to suggest heightened popular
commitment to shift the discourse on death from medicine to culture, and dis-
tinctive efforts to make death meaningful – memorable – on personal and public
levels’.
Reimers (1999: 154) highlights another rationale for the move to memorialis-
ing through thananetworking:
Markers of social position violate what in the funeral law is designated as ‘good grave cul-
ture’. The meaning of this expression is ambiguous. On the one hand, it is stated as a major
rule that the bereaved should be free to decide the appearance of the gravestone. On the
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other hand, it is up to graveyard authorities to decide the boundaries within which the be-
reaved can make these choices. These limitations, at least at modern cemeteries, usually
prescribe that every gravestone be kept within a clear shape, size and design.
Thananetworking overcomes one form of constraint regarding the construction
of formal memorials, but in doing so presents other constraints. What is, or is
not, possible within the ecosystem of Facebook, Bebo or GoneTooSoon represents
a different series of specific constraints to action. However, in contrast to ‘good
grave culture’, these restrictions are generally ‘technical’ in nature rather than
existing in relationship to other memorials or to received notions of what repre-
sents ‘good taste’ for a memorial and respect. The most obvious shift is from a
necessity for brevity, with a single photograph (if this is allowed at all) and a
specified number of words or letters, to an active encouragement for textual
and visual elaboration through photographs, clipart, ASCII art and extended nar-
ratives.
This understanding leads directly to the questions posed by our research.
Are the actions and communications found on memorial websites (such as gone-
toosoon.org) contemporary enactments of continuing belief practices?
4 GoneTooSoon: a site description
Gonetoosoon.org is a social network. It encourages its participants to inscribe
thoughts and memories as well as photographs and their own creative work.
This description does not provide any distinction from Facebook, Bebo, LinkedIn
or even Twitter or one of the many readily available blogging systems.What dis-
tinguishes GoneTooSoon is the focus upon mourning and the memorialising of
individual death – the key distinction that we utilise as the basis to claim that
thananetworking represents a specifically identifiable sub-category of social net-
working. While members of the site can themselves have a profile, the focus of
the site is upon the memorials created for deceased individuals. In effect, living
members ‘friend’ these memorials and create networks with the living members
of this site through the memorials of the deceased. In this sense, the dead take
priority in the GoneTooSoon space and represent the ‘hubs’ of the social network
of the living.
There are few restrictions within the site – anyone can create memorials to
anyone, and in the case of celebrity deaths there are often a number of separate
memorials that form separate hubs within distinct sub-networks of members.
The ability for anyone to create a memorial results in a disproportionate number
of memorials for ‘famous’ people – as the financial and etiquette restrictions of a
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physical memorial are removed within the GoneTooSoon space (an observation
that should also be contrasted with the audacious public grief displays such
as the £100,000 Michael Jackson memorial unveiled in early 2011 outside Ful-
ham Football Club’s stadium by the club’s owner Mohammed Al-Fayed). Impor-
tantly, the memorials of GoneTooSoon provide significantly more detail about the
life and death of the individual than a physical memorial. This capacity provides
one of the close connections of thananetworking with thanatourism.
Thanatourism involves visiting the burial site of an individual, where the ra-
tionale for visiting is tied to the story that makes the individual famous, infa-
mous or at least notable, rather than any personal connection to the individual
who is buried (Walter 1996). GoneTooSoon constructs and mythologises an indi-
vidual’s identity after his or her death and, in many cases, creates similarly de-
tailed and expansive stories as those found at thanatourism sites. This also con-
nects thananetworking to the mass celebritisation of everyday life – the desire to
know about the famous, or at least those who are currently figuring prominently
within mainstream media reporting (McAvan 2010). This desire to know is tied
into the compelling features of social networking, including the ability to ‘be-
friend’ people who are famous and the capacity to express and show this asso-
ciation. But social networking, particularly in its conceptualisation as the Read/
Write Web or Web 2.0, is also about the desire to inscribe and actively engage in
the construction of meaning (Latour and Woolgar 1986). This invitation and de-
sire to constantly record and annotate association results in the GoneTooSoon
memorials actively contributing to a more general blurring of fame, infamy
and notoriety, while also contributing to the ongoing construction of an individ-
ual’s fame after death. The ability of social media to continue to actively con-
struct an individual’s identity after death raises a number of contradictions
and engages these individuals with a range of broader issues, including the de-
gree to which a public individual has active control over his or her identity and
the veracity of any given identity. The presence of an aging population coupled
with the creation of generations of ‘digital natives’ increases the likelihood that
memorialising in this way will increase. This further raises concerns about the
digital assets of the dead and what happens to these assets after an individual
dies. The rise of thananetworking highlights that there is no individual or family
control over a ‘social’ memorial, and in many respects control has been passed
over to the ‘Admin’ of the various social networking sites. Doss (2002: 70) simi-
larly recognises this complexity and contradiction in roadside memorials:
The relationship between mourning and material culture is timeless, of course, and both
older and contemporary American monuments testify to human desires to capture and rep-
resent memory, to pay tribute, to validate certain historical, political and social perspec-
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tives, and to grieve. Yet the spontaneous, often impermanent, and distinctly ‘unofficial’ na-
ture of many of these roadside shrines, grassroots memorials, offerings and ritualistic be-
haviours seem less concerned with producing a critique of historical moments and tragic
events than [with] catharsis and redemption. This may relate to the nature of trauma itself,
and to the ways in which memory can fail because of traumatic events and episodes of
child abuse, civil war, torture, disease, natural disasters or the murder of family members
and loved ones.
The mythologising of the dead by the living can be considered as an attempt to
further define their own living identity (Doss 2002: 76).Within fame-oriented cul-
ture, this identity work includes attempts to define relationships with people –
both living and dead – who are, or were, famous as well as with individuals pop-
ularly defined as ‘good’ or popular. Within GoneTooSoon, this ongoing identity
work constructs relationships around remembrance and grieving that in turn me-
diate and connect like-minded living individuals.
Our analysis of observational data from gonetoosoon.org included identify-
ing and tagging events and instances of activities associated with ritualised prac-
tice, examples of storytelling activity and when community participants endeav-
oured to become associated with the celebration or mourning of the ‘famous’
dead. This body of evidence was subsequently scrutinised and examples extract-
ed to exemplify the belief practices and social relations enacted within these
communities.
5 Famous deaths vs. deaths of the famous
A visible feature of GoneTooSoon, and arguably a key source of its appeal, is the
range of ‘famous deaths’ that it records and memorialises with a degree of detail
that would not conventionally be found within newspaper or television report-
ing. These memorials contrast significantly with ‘deaths of the famous’ –
which is more regularly the focus of thanatourism research – including retro-
spective memorials that reference deaths that occurred before the establishment
of the site. Famous deaths are also increasingly marked by the development of a
campaign or a charity that remembers the victim and takes up issues surround-
ing the nature of the famous death itself. It is within the collection of famous
deaths that the visible creation of thananetworks is situated.
We offer the following series of vignettes to assist in defining the nature and
impact of famous deaths that are documented through GoneTooSoon.
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5.1 Ben Kinsella
Ben Kinsella was the school-aged victim of a knife crime in London in 2008 as
well as the half-brother of the former Eastenders actress Brooke Kinsella. ‘Lisa’,
who joined GoneTooSoon in August 2008, created the memorial and has never
logged on since (benkinsella.gonetoosoon.org). There have been over 3,400 visits
since the memorial was created. There are nine photographs on the memorial,
but only two of the photos are of Ben, including one of the images that had
been heavily used by the media immediately after he was murdered. Two of
the photographs are of the family after the murder; one is of a march with a ban-
ner, “Why Ben?”, while the remainder of the images are memorial cards that to
varying degrees bear Christian references. There are also fifty candles that have
been ‘lit’ for Ben. Living members of the GoneTooSoon community have been
lighting these candles continuously since 2008. In contrast, the six tributes
that have been left are confined to the month immediately after Ben’s death.
Since 2008 the Kinsella family, but most notably Brooke, has been involved
in campaigning against knife crime with the foundation of the Ben Kinsella Trust
(benkinsella.org.uk), a television documentary and support for the increase in
prison sentences for knife crime. Brooke Kinsella has subsequently received
an MBE (Member of the Order of the British Empire) for her campaigning against
knife crime in London and elsewhere.
5.2 Robert Knox
Robert Knox was a hopeful actor who appeared as an extra in one of the Harry
Potter films. He was also a victim of a knife attack in London in 2008. The me-
morial (robert-knox.gonetoosoon.org) was created by ‘Donna’, who has also cre-
ated memorials for Steve Galsworthy, a pub landlord from Bournemouth who
was stabbed by a gang in 2007; Richard Frank Cutler, who died in World War
II aged 23 (her grandfather); Danielle Perrin, the mother of a child at Donna’s
child’s school who was the victim of knife crime in 2008 in Poole; and Keith Cu-
tler (her brother), who died in 1962, eight years before Donna was born. She has
also created other memorials for violent crimes around Bournemouth (including
an attack on the same street as Steve Galsworthy’s pub). The Robert Knox memo-
rial has been visited over 2,700 times since it was created and has received 122
candles since then. Other memorials also exist for Robert – though none have
been created by members of his direct family. The photos on Donna’s memorial
include one of Robert on the set of Harry Potter, two portraits and two photos of
the flowers, gifts and balloons left at the site where he died. The memorial in-
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cludes a lengthy description of the attack and the subsequent court case drawn
from another website, evidenced by the bracketed word ‘advertisement’ left with-
in the body of the description.
5.3 Sophie Lancaster
Sophie Lancaster was the victim of a hate attack in Rossendale in 2007 (not Lan-
caster, as the memorial claims) (sophie-lancaster.gonetoosoon.org). Sophie and
her boyfriend were attacked by a group of youths, primarily because they
wore ‘goth’ fashions. Sophie rushed to support her boyfriend, who was initially
attacked, and as a consequence suffered head injuries that placed her in a coma
from which she never recovered.
This memorial was created by ‘Admin Gts’, who have created over 600 other
memorials. There have been over 4,600 visits to the memorial since 2007 and 255
candles left to date. There are 41 photographs included in the memorial, but only
two feature Sophie and these are themselves duplicates. The majority of the re-
mainder are memorial cards, many with overtly Christian imagery – including a
celebration of Sophie’s two-year anniversary as an ‘angel’. Others feature the
face of Bonnie Barratt (and ‘Jackie’), while another has an image of ‘Sharon’
wearing the armband of the S.O.P.H.I.E. campaign. Both ‘Sharon’ and ‘Jackie’
are active contributors to GoneTooSoon. ‘Sharon’ has created five memorials
and ‘Jackie’ has created nine.
Since Sophie’s death, her family has created S.O.P.H.I.E. and the Sophie Lan-
caster Foundation (sophielancasterfoundation.com), which has campaigned for
a widening of the definition of ‘hate crime’ and been actively involved in fund-
raising, primarily within the North West of England through arts events and con-
certs.
These three short vignettes reveal the relationship of actions and efforts to
express feelings of injustice and powerlessness brought about by each individual
loss, and these are consolidated around the memorials found on GoneTooSoon
as well as elsewhere. In all of these examples, GoneTooSoon is not the site or
focal point of memorial or remembrance for the family of the murder victims,
but rather a space for more distant personal friends and strangers to express
grief and association and to recount the details of the famous murder. The indi-
vidual distance from the specific death opens up the degree to which an individ-
ual’s death and more broadly their life can be mythologised. The photos on So-
phie Lancaster’s memorial are wide-ranging in their meanings and their
sentiments, making it evident that they are more a reflection of the poster’s at-
titudes and worldview than necessarily those of Sophie Lancaster’s lifestyle or
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her own beliefs. Similarly, tributes (such as ‘Sorry Sophie, hadn’t been on here
for quite some time until recently but you are always in my heart and thoughts.
Love Gill xxx’) convey more about the day-to-day commitments of the living and
the way in which memorials such as those for Sophie are a place to pause and
reflect, away from these commitments. These latter examples of actions and sen-
timents mirror those expressed in more traditional places for mourning.
Other tributes are more clearly theological in their intention, such as the
message on Sophie’s memorial from ‘Jackie’ (Figure 1). All of these tributes
can be read as ways of mourning defined by the personal context of the mourner.
The majority of the tributes, candle messages and photographs on the memorials
do not directly reflect the individual grief of personal loss or the social and cul-
tural disruptions caused by death. However, it is part of thananetworking that
personal grief and disruption can be identified through networks sharing mourn-
ing for the dead, whereby the grief is expressed and distributed across multiple
sites and through differing actions, as members of GoneTooSoon build a network
by adding other memorials to their personal ‘gardens’ as well as creating new
memorials. These forms of solidarity enable the potential for circuits of ex-
change, whereby the sharing of reciprocal respect and the mutual honouring
of memories can be spread across a range of memorials. Reciprocation from
other grieving site members often comes in the form of giving candles or tributes,
often with a reference back to their own cause for grief.
The development of a thananetwork as a distributed network of grieving also
enables the mythologising of individuals who have died and retrospective iden-
tity work that is invariably in a favourable light. In our research, the case of
‘Jackie’ is both indicative and an exemplar. As the mother of a murder victim,
‘Jackie’ is one of the most notably active members of the GoneTooSoon commun-
ity and is active on a number of the memorials that have a connection with her
daughter’s own circumstances, specifically the murders of known sex-workers by
men seeking some degree of fame or notoriety. This association also highlights
the way in which mythologising is intimately tied to the construction and repre-
sentation of innocence.
6 The construction of innocence, fame and
memory
‘Jackie’ was the mother of Bonnie Barratt (bonnie-barratt.gonetoosoon.org), a
sex-worker with addictions who was murdered in 2007 by Derek Brown, a Pres-
ton truck driver who wanted to become the ‘modern Jack the Ripper’. Alongside
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the memorial that ‘Jackie’ has created to Bonnie, there is also a memorial to Xiao
Mei Guo, the other woman murdered in Whitechapel by Derek Brown, as well as
to Stephen Booker, a victim of knife crime in 2000. Bonnie’s memorial, in con-
trast to counts of the previous examples, has since had over 42,000 visits and
over 22,500 candles lit (with the newest candle always lit ‘minutes ago’). ‘Jackie’
has left over 10,800 tributes and lit 8,600 candles while she has been an active
member of the site – approximately ten tributes and eight candles a day since
she joined. However, she has created no new memorials since 2008. The fact
that ‘Jackie’ has clearly actively worked at establishing a network on GoneToo-
Soon around the memorial she has created for her daughter is evidence of the
importance of reciprocated exchanging of candles and tributes, which assist in
the establishment of an active thananetwork formed through practices that are
based around remembrance of the dead. The description of Bonnie Barratt’s me-
morial has been altered a number of times since 2008, initially with a descrip-
tion of the circumstances of the death and then the subsequent court case.
This developed rapidly to include a series of notes for other victims of violent
crime as well as the beginning of a campaign called F.A.M.E. (Families Against
Murders Escalating). This campaign is then continued on other web pages
(www.myspace.com/474417923 and fame-barratt.webs.com/).While the MySpace
site is relatively unpopulated, the fame-barratt.webs.com site is primarily a long
list of images of murder victims directly drawn from GoneTooSoon. As part of es-
tablishing the F.A.M.E group, ‘Jackie’ asked through the memorial to her daugh-
ter on GoneTooSoon in 2009, ‘PLZZZZ ANY ONE ON MY GARDEN WHO HAD
SOME ONE MURDERD CAN I USE THERE PIC TO PUT ON F.A.M.E BANNER IF
YOU DONT MIND CAN YOU PLZZZ LET ME NO ASAP PLZZZZZ’ (sic).
The MySpace site describes the circumstances of Bonnie’s life from Jackie’s
perspective:
To many My daughter was seen as “No Angel”, as she was trapped in voilent relationship
and a life of drugs and prostitution, but to me she will always be My beauitful daughter and
mother to my young grandson who was robbed of his mum before his life had really began.
(sic)
Bonnie was taken after she had made up her mind to turn her life around and get back to
the person she used to be, she wanted to stop the drugs She wanted her life back and want-
ed to make it up to her family. She made plans to improve her life but she never got the
chance. (sic)
However, references and details to Bonnie’s life have become scarcer since 2009,
and increasingly ‘Jackie’ has introduced large amounts of ASCII art in creating
her tributes on other memorials with increasingly straightforward references to
Christian iconography. The creation and maintenance of these memorials is si-
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multaneously a mechanism for remembering the individual while constructing,
through the separation of time, a myth around his or her life.
For ‘Jackie’, mythologising individual lives is a fraught activity. In 2008, the
day after the conviction of Steven Wright and the murder of Anneli Anderton, she
left a candle with the note, ‘r.i.p my heart go out to your family as my daughter
was murder and othe lady was to in 2007 there bodys have not been found yet’
(sic, annelli-alderton.gonetoosoon.org – the name is misspelt on the memorial).
One of the photographs on Anneli’s memorial is from ‘Jackie’ and is a sombre
cartoon-style image of the Bible with the annotation, ‘r.i.p. no more pain xxx’
(sic). There are many parallels to the circumstances of the Anneli Anderton
and Bonnie Barratt murders and their lives beforehand. However, Anneli’s me-
morial was created by ‘Admin GTS’ in 2006 and has received less attention
than many more recent memorials. The photographs include only two images,
both of which are low resolution, and the main image used on the memorial
is drawn from the CCTV image of Anneli on the day she died. This image has
been a cause of contention, as a proportion of the small number of tributes
that have been left indicate: ‘i met annelli just 4days before she was horribly
murdered and she seemed a very nice women i hope she is happy and i
would like 2 say that this isnt a very nice pic off her she looked a lot different
very pretty r.i.p’ (sic). These tributes also attempt to begin the process of recon-
structing a public identity that contrasts with the one created by mainstream
media:
You did not deserve to die. you were so, so much more than a ‘prostitute’ and ‘drug addict’
as the papers keep calling you, you were a beautiful young mum who ended up in the hor-
rible world of addiction. I have been there and even though it changes you so much, the
litle girl you once were is always still there. I really hope your mum can see this and
that she remembers you for the girl you were before addiction took over because that is
the real annellli. (sic)
Unlike many of the other infamous murders from Suffolk or more broadly across
the UK through the 2000s, Anneli is not remembered with a foundation or cam-
paign, and there is no other visible online presence remembering Anneli. These
differences are reminiscent of those found at well-tended or poorly tended phys-
ical graves.
As a consequence of her own circumstances and her conscious choice to uti-
lise GoneTooSoon, ‘Jackie’ is contributing to the maintenance, remembrance and
ongoing mythologising of a number of women who parallel her own daughter’s
situation, as well as extending the stories portrayed publicly and through the
media as ‘innocent’ deaths – rather than the description regularly attached to
Anneli as ‘tragic’. The examples of Ben Kinsella and Sophie Lancaster confirm
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that GoneTooSoon is not the only location for thananetworking and that mainte-
nance of the memory of deceased individuals is being conducted through other
websites – primarily the websites and actions of the respective foundations that
are the memorialising and mythologising spaces of the more direct families of
the victims.
7 Conclusion
Beliefs and grieving practices provide a lens through which it is possible to ex-
plore the everyday interactions found on the GoneTooSoon network.While in no
way do we claim that the exemplars we have employed provide a full or com-
plete representation of GoneTooSoon, what we have identified within the Gone-
TooSoon community in describing the actions and interactions of the online
grieving process is what we describe as thananetworking. Thananetworking it-
self employs many of the practices of storytelling identified in anthropological
studies of traditional cultures.What is distinctive in the actions of thananetwork-
ing, however, are the links that can be identified between contemporary forms of
narrative and the association of thananetworking with the expectations found in
the construction of celebrity within fame culture. These explorations lead us to
consider what building a profile means for memorialising the life and death of
an individual and what its subsequent upkeep and maintenance mean for
both the living and dead. Personal separation and temporal distance from a spe-
cific death opens up the degree to which an individual’s death, and more broad-
ly the entirety of his or her life, can be constructed as something with meaning
rather than a meaningless tragedy.
By exploring everyday practices on these sites, we see that the GoneTooSoon
site provides a human response to the uncontrollable events of a life and death,
by and for those connected through a desire to associate with fame, or at least
famous death. In contrast, the response of families is seen in the establishment
of foundations, for example those developed by the families of Ben Kinsella and
Sophie Lancaster. In both of these examples, continued engagement and activity
rallying against the specific actions that brought about the death of the eponym
of the foundation gives friends and relatives of the bereaved a sense of hope that
the death was not in vain. In both of these examples, the eponymous individual
has a narrative crafted around his or her life that implies that they are represen-
tatives of the opposite sentiments to the type of crime that killed them, without
necessarily giving any specific examples of this opposition from the individual in
life. In contrast, through the thananetwork, post-mortem analysis and presenta-
tion of a life is employed by families and friends, as well as ‘fans’, to construct a
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mythology of life that is partially premised on the lives of others, brought into
complementary orbits through the reciprocal actions of thananetworking. The ex-
ample of Bonnie Barratt and her mother ‘Jackie’ is indicative of this attempt to
respond to unexpected death. In death, Bonnie Barratt’s life has become associ-
ated with those of the women murdered in Suffolk as well as more loosely with
those of the Soham murder victims¹ and other young women. This storytelling is
an active rewriting of Bonnie Barratt’s life and the lives of others from a position
of being in a vulnerable situation as sex-workers and drug-users. Mainstream
media choose to use the euphemism of a ‘tragic’ death, in contrast to one of ‘in-
nocent’ death. This, however, is the point – for the family – of constructing this
type of tale.
A socio-anthropological explanation also shows that there is an active at-
tempt to rationalise the events associated with death in a way that enables
those influenced by it to express their hopes and to establish a form of faith
in which these hopes can be realised. This is most readily evidenced in the asso-
ciation of ‘famous deaths’ with foundations subsequently organised by the fam-
ilies. However, in contemporary culture, this is also where the important param-
eter of fame intersects with more traditional forms of memorialising and even
ancestor worship, in that collective cultural memory increasingly blurs with
the concept of fame. Thus preservation of the memory of an individual necessi-
tates constructing them with some form of fame – even if this fame rests solely
on the circumstances of their death. Initially, Bonnie Barratt’s murder had rela-
tively minimal reporting, but through the actions of ‘Jackie’ and her use of Go-
neTooSoon to record the details and progress of the police investigation and sub-
sequent successful court case on Bonnie Barratt’s memorial, the story continued
and awareness of the story became wider. Bonnie Barratt’s name and story have
been shared across the network, with tributes, candles and memorials that ‘Jack-
ie’ has created on GoneTooSoon, in effect carrying the story of her daughter be-
yond the initial media reports and into direct association with the grief and
mourning of others. The commitment of individual time to continue this memo-
rial and the scale of the work being undertaken by ‘Jackie’ ensures that the myth
and the memorial continue to build, even years after the initial murder.
 The murder of two girls, Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman, by a school caretaker, Ian Huntley
(BBC 2003).
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